Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO945
2009-10-13 12:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

RULING PARTY FEELING VULNERABLE AFTER SOUTHERN

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000945 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: RULING PARTY FEELING VULNERABLE AFTER SOUTHERN
ELECTIONS, ELECTION STRATEGY UNCERTAIN

REF: COLOMBO 942

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000945

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: RULING PARTY FEELING VULNERABLE AFTER SOUTHERN
ELECTIONS, ELECTION STRATEGY UNCERTAIN

REF: COLOMBO 942

Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. The United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA),
which includes President Mahinda Rajapaksa's Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP),won the southern provincial election
with a 67 percent majority, considerably lower than their
goal of 75 to 80 percent. This setback may shift their
strategy for presidential and parliamentary elections. An
announcement on elections by the president is expected
sometime this week, perhaps at the SLFP's conference on
October 17. Nonetheless, the party and most press outlets
continue to hail the election as a major victory. END SUMMARY.

Smaller Margin Could Alter Election Strategy
--------------


2. (SBU) On October 10, just over a million voters went to
the polls across the southern districts of Galle, Matara, and
Hambantota in the provincial elections. With a voter
participation rate of about two-thirds, the UPFA won a 67
percent majority, garnering 36 seats, plus the two bonus
seats assigned to the overall winner, for a total of 38
seats. The UNP won 25 percent of the vote, collecting 14
seats. The nationalist JVP party won 6 percent of the vote,
earning 3 seats.


3. (C) President Rajapaksa is expected to speak at the SLFP
congress on October 17 and could use the opportunity to
announce the presidential election schedule, which is
currently uncertain. (NOTE: Until a few days ago, it was
widely assumed the president would call for presidential
elections in January to take advantage of his popularity
following the defeat of the LTTE. END NOTE.) Despite crowing
over the governing party's win, Rajapaksa most likely
realizes that the 67 percent victory does not assure a
decisive win in the upcoming national elections. He may also
be concerned that outside of the southern, majority
Sinhalese-Buddhist province, his UPFA coalition could not

achieve the necessary parliamentary majority to amend the
constitution to change the current system of proportional
representation, which would benefit the ruling party and
decrease the influence of the minority parties.


4. (C) After the ruling coalition's smaller-than-expected
win, some observers have speculated that the government may
hold off on national elections until after parliamentary
elections in April 2010. The government began backpedaling on
its previous preference to hold early elections towards the
end of the campaign, illustrating their lack of confidence in
gaining an 80 percent victory. The government could wait as
long as four months to announce the parliamentary elections
and, with almost two years left in his presidential term,
Rajapaksa could postpone calling elections until
approximately six weeks before the actual elections.

Splitting the Sinhalese-Buddhist Vote
--------------


5. (C) The ruling party probably fears the opposition United
National Party's (UNP) likely increased participation in a
national election, and the nascent United National Alliance
(UNA) electoral alliance with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
and others, which could split the Sinhalese-Buddhist vote.
General Sarath Fonseka and Sarath Silva's participation in
either a second or third party alliance would likely take
votes away from the UPFA in a national election. Fonseka's
weekend speech where he said "this may be the last time (he)
addresses the army," did nothing to allay the ruling party's
fears.

COLOMBO 00000945 002 OF 002




6. (C) The nationalist and often anti-Western JVP won 3 seats
and 6 percent of the vote, up significantly from 2.5 percent
in the last provincial election in Uva province. This is
notable because the votes that the governing party lost went
to the more radical JVP, as opposed to the more liberal UNP.
In the recent past, the JVP has won 5 percent or less of the
vote, though historically, the party's increased popularity
corresponded with high levels of unemployment.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) This weekend's election results exposed fissures and
weaknesses within the ruling UPFA, and the government appears
uncertain how to proceed. The opposition is probably
comfortable with this uncertainty and, indeed, is most likely
waiting to react to the government's next move.


8. (C) Reports of intimidation, destruction of property, and
even physical violence leading up to the southern provincial
election are probably a prelude to upcoming presidential and
parliamentary elections (reftel). Despite these shenanigans,
and the UPFA's heavy investment in the southern polls, the
ruling party was still unable to attract more than 67 percent
in the heart of their constituency. The government will not
be able to control the national electorate as ably as they
did in the southern province, and their concerns about a
decisive national victory may be well-founded.
BUTENIS