Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO897
2009-09-21 09:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

FOREIGN MINISTER WANTS NEW RELATIONSHIP BUT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0294
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHLM #0897/01 2640952
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210952Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0545
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 1910
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 8939
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7177
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5134
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3316
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5090
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1367
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0625
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4200
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9504
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 6805
RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 1296
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3741
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000897 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER WANTS NEW RELATIONSHIP BUT
DEFENDS OLD POLICIES

REF: A. COLOMBO 893

B. COLOMBO 807

COLOMBO 00000897 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000897

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER WANTS NEW RELATIONSHIP BUT
DEFENDS OLD POLICIES

REF: A. COLOMBO 893

B. COLOMBO 807

COLOMBO 00000897 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 18 initial courtesy call by
ambassador, Foreign Minister Rohitha Bogollagama expressed
his government's strong desire to improve and broaden
relations with the U.S. in the new, post-war environment.
Ambassador expressed our desire as well to broaden the
relationship but underscored that this would only be possible
if the GSL addressed our concerns on key issues, such as
freedom of movement for IDPs and the human rights situation
in Sri Lanka. Bogollagama offered familiar security and
logistical arguments why the IDPs could not immediately be
released and claimed the GSL could not interfere with the
judiciary in the Tissainayagam case. He also continued to
argue that the ICRC needed a new mandate in Sri Lanka and had
to change its mode of operations. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In response to ambassador's question as to the type of
bilateral relationship the GSL envisioned, Bogollagama spent
much time discussing long and mutually beneficial U.S.-Sri
Lanka ties, noting our shared heritage of free-market
economies and pluralist democracies. Sri Lanka, however, had
been paying a high price and had known little peace. The FM
thanked the U.S. for its support and assistance during its
trials. The GSL was especially appreciative of our security
assistance and cooperation, as well as U.S. efforts to block
terrorist asset flows. But ambassador was arriving at the
dawn of a new era of transformation, and the FM looked
forward to working together.


3. (C) Ambassador said she shared the same hopes for a new,
expanded relationship and wanted greater cooperation in
defense, educational exchanges, trade, etc. But our great
eagerness to expand the relationship made the current
obstacles to doing so that much more frustrating. In

particular, she noted that IDP freedom of movement and the
GSL's broader human rights record stood in the way of our
moving forward. While ambassador understood the GSL's own
frustration at the slow pace of de-mining and other
logistical difficulties that prevented it from accomplishing
its own goals more quickly, the bottom line was that the IDPs
must be given the freedom to choose whether to stay or leave
the camps. In addition, ambassador noted the practical
urgency of the impending monsoon. While President Rajapaksa
had promised 80 percent of IDPs would be resettled by year's
end, she pointed out, the current number of those released
did not indicate that this goal would be reached. Moreover,
those IDPs that were being released from the big camps were
now ending up being further detained in "transit camps."


4. (C) Bogollagama responded with what has become the
standard GSL defense that security and logistical issues
prevented the government from moving faster -- though it,
too, wanted the IDPs home as soon as possible. The transit
camps were necessary in the same way that people arriving
from abroad had to be processed through an airport.
Ambassador conceded that the logistics of handling 300,000
IDPs were daunting but the issue still came down to freedom
of movement and as long as that question was not resolved,
our relationship would be hampered.


5. (C) Ambassador also touched on the ICRC mandate, which
Bogollagama had told us earlier was in his purview to decide
(ref B),underscoring the important role the organization
played and the need to allow it to continue to function in
Sri Lanka. Bogollagama agreed the ICRC had done good work
but insisted there had been personnel and visa problems and,

COLOMBO 00000897 002.2 OF 002


thus, the ICRC "needed a new relationship" with the GSL. On
the Tissainayagam case, Bogollagama again retreated to
familiar ground by arguing that whatever the verdict, the
government could not interfere with the judiciary and,
moreover, he had been furthering terrorism. Ambassador
agreed on the idea that a judiciary must be independent of
executive authority, but she stressed the international
community's incredulity at a journalist getting twenty years
for writing a few articles.


6. (C) At the meeting's conclusion, ambassador informed the
FM that we would be publishing an OpEd this weekend outlining
her goals as ambassador for our relationship. She also
enumerated the many constituencies to which she, as
ambassador, had to answer but reiterated her desire to work
for a better relationship between the U.S. and Sri Lanka.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Bogollagama spent a great deal of time expressing his
government's desire to foster a new, better relationship with
the U.S., though on substantive changes in GSL policies that
could make such a new relationship possible, he did not give
an inch. Despite his prestigious position, Bogollagama is
not well-connected with the Rajapaksas. Indeed, the
president reportedly castigated the FM at last week's Cabinet
meeting for "not doing his duty" to counter the bad publicity
Sri Lanka was getting abroad on war crimes and IDPs. Thus,
while the GSL clearly wishes to improve its standing with
Washington, it is not clear whether the Rajapaksas' desire to
do so runs as deeply as Bogollagama's.
BUTENIS