MOJ SECRETARY ON GOVERNMENT REFURB OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000890

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: MOJ SECRETARY ON GOVERNMENT REFURB OF
INTERNATIONAL IMAGE

REF: A. COLOMBO 855

B. COLOMBO 864

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a September 16 meeting with PolChief,
Secretary of the Sri Lankan Ministry of Justice Suhada
Gamalath said the recently named four-minister team to deal
with the EU on the GSP-plus issue would have both a PR
function (arguing in Europe that denial of GSP-plus would
hurt the neediest Sri Lankans) and a substantive policy
function (recommending and implementing changes in the GSL
policies and behaviors that had led the EU to the brink of
canceling GSP-plus). On the latter, however, Gamalath was
thin on details. On the Tissainayagam case, Gamalath implied
a presidential pardon was in the works. LTTE "surrendees"
(the bulk of conscripts at the end of the war) would undergo
a five-year rehab program, while the GSL was still searching
for legal mechanisms to deal with the smaller hard-core group
of LTTE terrorists. END SUMMARY.

GSP-PLUS DREAM -- OR DREAMING? -- TEAM
--------------


2. (C) PolChief asked for the meeting with Gamalath to seek
clarification on two potentially significant government
announcements. The first was the President's formation of a
four-member team (made up of the ministers of Justice,
Foreign Affairs, Disaster Management and Human Rights, and
Foreign Trade) to work with the EU on preserving Sri Lanka's
GSP-plus benefits. Asked whether the team would have only an
external focus on PR about the impact of cutting off GSP-plus
benefits on poor Sri Lankan garment workers or, rather, would
have some role in recommending changes in GSL human rights
policies that had led the EU to the brink of denying
benefits, Gamalath replied that it would do both. In terms
of the PR campaign with the EU, the team had already been
traveling in Europe making its case (which has been widely
covered in the Sri Lankan press).


3. (C) In terms of changes in GSL policies, Gamalath claimed
that several were in the works. For example, on the witness
protection legislation that the EU had complained had not
been acted on, Gamalath said it was now in parliament and
moving toward approval. The UN had noted that torture was
not systematically used by the GSL, but its practice by
individual policemen and others was widespread and there were
very few convictions by SL courts. Gamalath said SL judges
often failed to convict defendants because there were
mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines of at least ten years
that the judges were reluctant to trigger. The GSL was
working on giving judges greater leeway in sentencing that,
it was hoped, would result in more convictions. On the 17th
Amendment (which, inter alia, would give parliament greater
say in executive branch appointments but which the GSL has
failed to implement since President Rajapaksa came into
office in 2005),Gamalath said this was "terrible"
legislation, which had led to government gridlock and needed
to be fixed. (NOTE: It appeared from his comments that
President Rajapaksa had no intention of altering his current
stonewalling on the 17th Amendment and that the team's
strategy would be to make the case to the EU that it was the
fault of the legislation, not the President, that it was not
being implemented. END NOTE.)

TISSAINAYAGAM: "WE'LL DO SOMETHING"
--------------


4. (C) On the Tissainayagam verdict (refs A and B),which is
perhaps now the most damaging factor in terms of EU attitudes

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towards the GSL, Gamalath implied that a pardon might be in
the works. "We'll do something," he hinted, "give us time."
On the charges against Tissainayagam, Gamalath held to the
GSL line that Tissainayagam had received LTTE funding for his
website, noting that former LTTE press spokesman Daya Master,
who was recently released on bail, had said during GSL
interrogation that the LTTE provided money to Tissainayagam
in exchange for sympathetic articles. PolChief asked
Gamalath whether the GSL would provide to the USG whatever
evidence it had on alleged LTTE funding to Tissainayagam,
since we had seen nothing in the evidence presented in court
or subsequently discussed in the press to substantiate such
allegations. Gamalath agreed in principle to provide the
evidence but was non-committal on when or how. (NOTE: There
are several problems with Gamalath's assertions about
Tissainayagam's alleged LTTE funding. First, if we assume
that former LTTE spokesman Daya Master did in fact implicate
Tissainayagam under interrogation as Gamalath asserted, the
veracity of such an implication would be seriously in
question, given the high profile of the Tissainayagam case
and the obvious vested interest of Master in telling the GSL
what it wanted to hear about Tissainayagam. Second, even if
we assumed that Master's assertions were true, the GSL
interrogation of Master took place following his capture late
in the war after the prosecution and defense had rested their
cases in the Tissainayagam trial. Thus, this information
could not have been used to convict Tissainayagam and,
indeed, we have seen no such evidence in the court materials
and proceedings that we have examined. END NOTE.)

REVIEW OF TERROR LAWS?
--------------


5. (C) The other potentially significant recent GSL
announcement was President Rajapaksa's ordering of a review
of GSL terror laws, which was reported in the
Singhala-language press (though apparently not in the English
or Tamil press). Gamalath said the press had
mis-characterized the president's order, which was not for an
overall review of the terror laws but for a search of the
terror laws for guidance on how to treat ex-LTTE combatants.
(NOTE: The GSL has been looking for ways -- whether in their
own legislation or international experience -- to address the
question of dealing with ex-terrorists/combatants. This
question is the principal rationale for Minister of Justice
Moragoda's request for meetings in Washington for Gamalath
and the Sri Lankan attorney general. END NOTE.)


6. (C) Gamalath said that former LTTE fighters fell into two
categories: the hard-core fighters, who numbered about 1,500,
and the "surrendees," who were conscripted into LTTE ranks at
the end of the war and numbered about 12,000. It was for
dealing with the former that the GSL was looking for legal
models. The latter would be dealt with under the GSL
Emergency Regulations. They would be subject to a five-year
rehabilitation program: three years of re-education, which
would entail psycho-social, social, religious, and vocational
training; then two years of probation while living in
society. (NOTE: Although the GSL had not in the past defined
specifically what the rehabilitation program for "surrendees"
would look like, this five-year program is considerably
lengthier than what was widely presumed. END NOTE.)

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) The Rajapaksa leadership appears to be making a push
to improve the GSL's image with the western community,
particularly in advance of the EU decision on extending
GSP-plus benefits and release of the U.S. war crimes report.

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The president's appointment of the four-minister team falls
into this category, as do the hints about a pardon in the
works for Tissainayagam -- though the witch-hunt on the
Saravanamuttu death threat inaugurated September 16 (septel)
contradicts this campaign. These developments indicate that
the Rajapaksas hear what the international community is
saying and are prepared to take some cosmetic steps to
attempt to show that they are addressing western concerns,
while at the same time, trying to continue to appease their
core domestic audience. We will be watching closely for
indications of how this balancing act plays out and whether
what so far are largely cosmetic measures will develop into
real policy reforms.


8. (C) Gamalath will accompany the attorney general to the
U.S. next week for the consultations on dealing with
terrorist suspects and convicts. He is very solicitous of
members of diplomatic missions and readily criticizes his own
country, especially for past errors. At the same time, he
masterfully defends his current government's policies. In a
word, he is the ideal face of the GSL with the western
international community. It is more difficult for us to
determine what influence Gamalath -- a career civil servant
appointed to his current position in 2004 before the
president was elected -- enjoys in the Rajapaksa government.
BUTENIS