Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO823
2009-08-21 08:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

JAPANESE QUESTION CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT OF

Tags:  PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0421
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 1246
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1015
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000823 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: JAPANESE QUESTION CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT OF
EUROPEANS AS CO-CHAIRS

REF: SECSTATE 85620

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 COLOMBO 000823

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: JAPANESE QUESTION CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT OF
EUROPEANS AS CO-CHAIRS

REF: SECSTATE 85620

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: At an August 19 bilateral meeting, Japanese
Ambassador Takahashi told Charge that Japan questioned the
effectiveness of the Europeans as participants in the
Co-Chairs mechanism, effectively proposing that the U.S.,
India, and Japan would serve as the most influential
interlocutors (quote main partners unquote) with the GSL.
While Takahashi said Japan was "very severe" with the GSL
behind closed doors on such issues as the treatment of IDPs,
Japan also believed taking a critical approach publicly was
not fruitful and that conditionality on aid was
counter-productive. Charge said while consideration had been
given to a separate, larger Friends of Sri Lanka group, we
did not believe a decision had been made by the U.S. on
restructuring the Co-Chairs to make the group smaller. Post
believes creation of a larger Friends group -- which could
include Japan, India, the U.S., as well as Canada, Australia,
the U.K., and European partners -- could be productive. In
practice, post initiated such a consultative process in
developing a post-conflict assistance strategy in the East in
2007-08. The difficult question is whether to include China
in a larger contact group. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Japanese Ambassador to Sri Lanka Kunio Takahashi
invited Charge, acting DCM, Political Chief, and DATT to a
bilateral lunch with counterparts at the Japanese Embassy on
August 19. During the wide-ranging discussion, Takahashi
touched on the current political situation in Sri Lanka and
the conditions of the IDPs. In contrast to recent talk in
diplomatic circles in Colombo that the UN might consider
withholding its aid if the GSL did not make progress on
improving IDP camp conditions and releasing IDPs, Takahashi
noted that Japan opposed any conditionality. He also
reiterated the statement recently made by Japanese Special

Envoy to Sri Lanka Akashi to A/S Blake that Japan wanted to
delay a proposed meeting on Sri Lanka in Japan until after
Japanese parliamentary elections (reftel). It quickly became
evident, however, that the primary purpose of the meeting was
to float the idea of restructuring the Co-Chairs to eliminate
the EU and Norway.


3. (C) Takahashi -- who is a China specialist -- referred
repeatedly to Japanese concerns about the growing influence
of the Chinese, both politically and commercially, in Sri
Lanka. He said Japan believed the Europeans, "very direct"
approach to the Sri Lankans on humanitarian and human rights
issues was not productive, was alienating the Sri Lankans,
and risked pushing them into the arms of China, Iran, and
Burma. Japan, he claimed, was "very severe" with the Sri
Lankans behind closed doors, arguing strongly for
improvements in the conditions of the camps and the need for
political reform and decentralization. But overall, the Sri
Lankans were more receptive to carrots than sticks. To
continue down the path of harshly criticizing the Government
in public, as the Europeans did, risked alienating them
further. Thus, it was in the interest of the U.S. and Japan
to think about "restructuring" the Co-Chairs to accommodate
the changed conditions in post-war Sri Lanka. Charge asked
Takahashi to repeat his proposal to assure clarity, which he
did.


4. (C) Charge reminded Takahashi that Japanese Special Envoy
for Sri Lanka Akashi on his last visit just a few months ago
insisted that the "Co-Chairs should remain the Co-Chairs."
Charge also spoke about his own efforts in April to counter
GSL unilateral attempts to eliminate the Europeans from the

COLOMBO 00000823 002 OF 002


Co-Chairs format. He said he was unable at this point to
address Takahashi's proposal directly without Washington
guidance.

COMMENT
--------------


5. (C) It was clear from this meeting that the Japanese would
like to see the Europeans eased out of the Co-Chairs and that
they have great concern that the Europeans' more public
approach to criticizing the Sri Lankans risked pushing the
GSL toward China. This could be taken as a back-handed
criticism of the U.S. approach as well. While post agrees
that tough messages can be delivered effectively to the
Government privately, we also believe that public statements
on humanitarian concerns, the importance of the early return
of IDPs, and the need for concrete actions to address the
grievances of minority communities are essential.


6. (C) Post believes there is an argument for dropping of the
Co-Chairs mechanism if it were replaced by a larger Friends
of Sri Lanka contact group. Changed realities with the end
of the war call for a new approach that involves a larger
group of countries that have expressed interest in Sri Lanka.
Such a Friends group could include the U.S., Japan, India,
Canada, the UK, Australia, the EU, Norway, and others. (We
believe Co-Chair members Norway and the EU should be retained
in such a group.) In practice, the Embassy began to move in
this direction in 2007-08 when we consulted more widely in
Colombo on a post-conflict strategy for the East and
reconstruction efforts there. This process of wider donor
coordination generally worked well. We have done the same
this year in addressing humanitarian concerns created by the
large outflow of IDPs from the North and their confinement in
camps and in discussing with other donors the provision of
assistance for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former
combatants. The tough question would be whether to invite
China, which clearly plays a significant role in Sri Lanka
but whose political message to the GSL is often at variance
with ours and whose inclusion may be resisted by Japan and
India.
MOORE