The Way Forward in the North - A Serious Discussion about

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000621

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/INSB, PRM, PM/WRA (NETLAND)
STATE ALSO PASS TO USAID
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA
AID/W FOR DCHA/FFP FOR JDWORKEN, JBORNS
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA FOR ACONVERY, RTHAYER AND RKERR
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA WBERGER
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA MROGERS AND POL SBERRY
USMISSION GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
USUN FOR ECOSOC DMERCADO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM CE
SUBJECT: The Way Forward in the North - A Serious Discussion about
De-Mining and Returns


1. SUMMARY: Charge met with Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa on
June 15 to ask about Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) priorities for
de-mining and to discuss how the U.S. Government (USG) could support
those within a strategic framework. M.S. Jayasinghe, Chairman of
the National Steering Committee for Mine Action, W.K.K. Kumarasiri,
Secretary of the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate
Infrastructure Development (M/NBEID) also attended, as well as USAID
officer responsible for coordinating de-mining issues. The
discussion included de-mining performance to date, the GSL's desire
to create its own civilian humanitarian de-mining unit (HDU) within
the Ministry of Nationbuilding, and Rajapaksa's thoughts on a
strategic framework for de-mining to support returns in the North.
The conversation also included prospects for an early release of the
GSL "180-Day Plan" for the North, especially thoughts on how IDP
returns would take place. In response to our suggestion, Rajapaksa
instructed Mr. Kumarasiri to write a letter to the Embassy outlining
the GSL's priorities for de-mining. He also agreed to joint work on
a presentation due in two weeks that will outline a de-mining
approach for the North incorporating priority geographic areas, an
illustrative timetable, and coordination of roles for the Sri Lankan
Army (SLA) and de-mining INGOs. End Summary.

U.S. SUPPORT FOR A DE-MINING FRAMEWORK


2. State/WRA's proposal to contribute an additional $6 million in
FY 2009 de-mining funds would make the USG the largest donor this
year to de-mining operations in Sri Lanka. Given the importance of
de-mining as a prerequisite for displaced people to return home, and
the need to program these funds within a short timeframe, the Charge
had requested this meeting to discuss the best use of these
resources. To date, the GSL has issued task orders for de-mining on
a piecemeal basis. This has proven inefficient, since it does not
allow mine action NGOs to scale up their operations for a longer
planning period. Charge wanted to emphasize the importance of
operating within a forward-looking, strategic framework.

GSL PRIORITIES FOR DE-MINING THE NORTH


3. Rajapaksa outlined what he saw as priorities for de-mining
operations in the North. He spoke of the need to consider the Sri
Lankan Army's (SLA's) three corridor advance, as it fought the LTTE
- columns that moved northward from Mannar, Trincomalee, and
Vavuniya. He said that a current priority of SLA de-miners was to
gain access to communities by clearing the main roads in these
corridors (A32 along the Mannar coast, A9 leading to Kilinochchi and
Jaffna, and A34 and A35 leading into Mullaitivu District). Clearing
mines along these main trunk roads allows infrastructure projects to
take place, including road widening and the installation of
electricity lines. He emphasized how important de-mining is to
support economic reconstruction, particularly for specific projects
likely to receive foreign assistance. Examples sited in Mannar
District included potential World Bank funding of reconstruction
work on the Giant's Tank and Japanese Peace Fund funding for work on
the Akattimurripu Tank. He also described the JICA-funded
transmission line leading north from Trincomalee, the irrigation
canal leading to Jaffna from the Iranamadu Tank in Kilinochchi
District (with possible Asia Development Bank financing),the
Padawiya Wewa Tank in southern Mullaitivu District, and the Walawe
Oya irrigation system of one of the Mahaweli River tributaries.
Unrolling maps of the Northern Province's five districts, he pointed
out areas of former high population density - such as Kilinochchi
Town - as top priorities for de-mining. He emphasized that
de-mining of population centers should include hospitals, schools,
and government facilities, as well as housing. In contrast to the
East, where people returned to their communities before the
surrounding paddy fields had been cleared of contamination,
Rajapaksa emphasized the importance of simultaneously clearing areas
of important economic activity (paddy fields for farmers and access
to the sea for fisher communities). He also pointed out Madhu
Church on his map - an area heavily mined and a famous Catholic
shrine that receives up to 500,000 pilgrims every year.


4. Charge then brought up the State Department's pending proposal
of an additional $6 million in FY09 funding for de-mining and how to

best utilize these resources. He suggested a phased approach
emphasizing assessments and technical surveys to release large areas
quickly for IDP returns, and defining the respective roles of the
Army and international mine action NGOs. Rajapaksa took issue with
the suggestion that the INGOs' work could be more productive if they
were to begin with surveys of large areas of responsibility (such as
Mannar District's Manthai West Division, which is approximately 600
square kilometers). He pointed out that much of the North is
uninhabited jungle, and that technical surveys and de-mining
operations need to be focused on the priority roads and larger
towns. Although not opposed to assessments and technical surveys
for identifying areas of low mine risk, Rajapaksa wanted to be sure
that INGOs "did not bite off more than they could chew." He also
said that the survey work of INGOs would have to rely mostly on SLA
maps and army experience as to where minefields had been laid, since
civilians had been herded out of conflict areas by the LTTE before
its fighters had withdrawn, making civilian testimonies of mine
placement out of date.

HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING UNIT


5. Rajapaksa asked if some of the $6 million from PRM/WRA could be
used to equip the nascent civilian HDU within the Nationbuilding
Ministry (note: to be staffed largely by retired military
personnel). He said that the HDU was, in part, a response to the
Japanese Government's suggestion that a civilian de-mining
capability be developed within the GSL. (Note: Japan recently
announced an additional $1.5 million for de-mining operations in Sri
Lanka, including funding for INGOs, andJapan has contributed
significant resources for d-mining in the East.) Charge reiterated
that Stte Department funds were to finance INGO operation, but
that he would consult immediately with State/WRA to see if there was
any flexibility. Charge also brought up a potential FMF
contribution of up to $2 million to purchase de-mining equipment for
the SLA, depending on the recommendations of the upcoming DoD
demining mission.

BATTLEFIELD AREA CLEARANCE IS NOT HUMANITARIAN DE-MINING


6. Rajapaksa again referred to a Nationbuilding Ministry-prepared
table that showed that from 2002 to date 75 percent of mine
clearance had been performed by the Army (75 percent) and another 10
percent by an Indian mine action NGO, Horizon. EmbOffs pointed out
that Battlefield Area Clearance (BAC) was in no way comparable to
humanitarian de-mining. Rajapaksa responded that the SLA works
faster - and longer hours. One of his advisors added, "SLA
de-miners start at eight o'clock in the morning and end each day at
four in the afternoon. INGOs begin at ten and end at two. INGO
demining teams stand down for one week, after three weeks of work,
whereas the army never stops."

CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD A FRAMEWORK


7. Rajapaksa agreed to two U.S. suggestions to better define the
contributions of the SLA and INGOs to humanitarian de-mining
operations in the North. First, he committed to have the GSL send a
letter to Charge outlining GSL priorities for de-mining the North.
This will help planners work within a strategic framework that
addresses the Government's priorities for returns. The second
suggestion was that - taking advantage of the upcoming DoD
assessment - the SLA and INGOs meet to define their roles and
relative strengths, and to develop a collaborative approach to
addressing the de-mining priorities in the North. Rajapaksa agreed
to prepare a presentation of this approach in two weeks' time.

RETURNS -- HARD TO PIN DOWN


8. The discussion turned to returns and GSL plans for addressing
the priority recovery needs in the North. Rajapaksa stated that the
Government's return policy is "first displaced, first to return."
This is consistent with suggestions in other fora that the GSL's
return strategy may be a comprehensive one that includes people
displaced from their homes in the North over the past several years,
and not only the roughly 280,000 IDPs displaced since last October

by the conflict. Rajapaksa indicated that there were already
100,000 people living in Mannar District, another 100,000 in
Vavuniya District, and 559,000 in Jaffna District, in addition to
the IDPs in the Vavuniya camps. These people, he said, should be
given priority consideration in terms of reconstruction planning.


9. The Government has requested all ministries to draft
recovery/reconstruction plans for the North. By sector, these plans
address the priority needs of the first 180 days, and then a
two-year time period. Rajapaksa proceeded to thumb through several
preliminary drafts of these sector plans, pointing out priority
projects for ports, electricity, irrigation, health, and others. He
mentioned that he would be traveling the next day to Vavuniya to
speak directly with district authorities about their 180 day and
two-year priorities, and that he would be making similar trips to
discuss the priorities of other districts of the North. By the end
of June, he expected to have the sector plans fully vetted and
consolidated. The Charge encouraged him to share these plans with
the international community within the shortest possible timeframe.


10. Rajapaksa also touched on conditions in the Vavuniya IDP camps.
From a returns standpoint, he said that it was important that
returns take place, as soon as possible, to all five districts.
Otherwise, he thought that it would be psychologically hard for
people to see others returning to one or two districts (for example
to Mannar or Jaffna),with no returns to their own districts (for
example, Mullaitivu). He said that it was important for people in
the camps to feel engaged and to be suitably prepared for rebuilding
their lives at home. He talked about the importance of vocational
training, for example to help with shelter construction. He
suggested that a shift to temporary shelters in the camps - those of
wooden poles and tin roofs - would be practical not only for
immediate shelter needs in the camps, but also as part of the
package for families who return. He lamented that a few individuals
and international organizations were making statements and
assumptions about the GSL's long-term intentions for these IDPs,
when, in reality, the GSL wanted them to return as soon as possible
- with appropriate skills to aid their reconstruction and recovery.

COMMENT


11. Charge asked whether the GSL had any concrete goals for returns
by the end of 2009. Rajapaksa said, "If we can finish de-mining,
we'll return everyone by then. It depends on whether we get the
equipment we need." We found this an unfortunate way to end what
was otherwise a serious and constructive meeting, typical of GSL
responses to the international community's repeated requests for the
GSL to disclose its timetable and strategy for the returns of its
displaced people in the North. However, Rajapaksa articulated clear
and defensible priorities for de-mining. He welcomed that that the
USG is ready to commit substantial resources to support de-mining
efforts, but remains skeptical that the INGOs will perform at the
speed required. We are concerned that this will set the stage for
the GSL to blame the INGOs if de-mining proceeds at a pace short of
expectations. Since humanitarian mine action agencies are to focus
on people, and not economic assets, Rajapaksa's list of
infrastructure priorities for de-mining may be somewhat at odds with
the mission of mine action INGOs. This illustrates the importance
of better defining roles of the INGOs and SLA. His willingness to
share the GSL's priorities in written form is a positive signal.


12. COMMENT CONTINUED: The next two weeks will be important, as post
and the DoD assessment team work with the SLA and INGOs to develop
guidelines for roles and closer cooperation. PRM/WRA's anticipated
grants to mine action INGOs are therefore very timely. The
challenge will be to incorporate these resources into an overall GSL
de-mining framework and to get started while avoiding bureaucratic
delays. Embassy staff will need to play an active role as
facilitators among the different players such as the SLA, the
Nationbuilding Ministry, and UNDP. Although there was no mention of
a "returns framework" the meeting offered hope that the GSL is
sincere about people returning home as soon as conditions are right.
Factors discussed included a) the speed of de-mining operations, b)
the need for returns to all districts, c) the importance of meeting

the needs of the entire displaced population of the North, not just
the 280,000 Vanni IDPs, and d) the soon-to-be-disclosed 180-Day
Plan, as an indicator of what the Government views as priority
conditions for returns and recovery. Each of these factors has
political overtones, reflecting their complexity and the continuing
uncertainty around how and when returns will actually occur.

MOORE