Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO563
2009-05-26 11:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: IN FAREWELL, AMBASSADOR PRESSES HARD ON

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS CE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000563 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: IN FAREWELL, AMBASSADOR PRESSES HARD ON
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND POLITICAL SOLUTION

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 000563

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: IN FAREWELL, AMBASSADOR PRESSES HARD ON
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS AND POLITICAL SOLUTION

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JAMES R. MOORE. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In his round of farewell calls on Sri Lankan
government officials, Ambassador Blake emphasized that having
won the war against "Tamil Tiger" terrorism, the Sri Lankan
government now needed to consolidate its victory by "winning
the peace." Ambassador noted that following the military
defeat of the LTTE, it was time for the government to address
political concerns of the Tamils, including Sri Lanka's poor
human rights record. It could do this by making good on its
commitments to treat conflict-displaced persons fairly and
return them rapidly to their homes, by seeking dialogue with
its Tamil population on a political solution and by reaching
out to the principal opposition party to ensure support for
constitutional changes that would be necessary to implement
devolution to the provinces. Ambassador strongly pressed the
Sri Lanka government to cooperate with the UN and other
international humanitarian agencies to provide access and
treatment meeting international standards to Sri Lanka's
nearly 300,000 newly displaced persons. He stressed that
evidence of a firm commitment to early returns of the
conflict victims to their original homes would help make it
possible for the U.S. to contribute to longer-term
stabilization and recovery programs in the country's war-torn
north. An improvement in the human rights environment in Sri
Lanka would also bring about an overall improvement in our
bilateral relations, including a return to more normal levels
of military-to-military cooperation. End summary.

AMBASSADOR PRESSES ON HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting on May 18 with Foreign Minister
Bogollagama and Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona, Ambassador
stressed the importance of facilitating a visit to the former
"No-Fire Zone" by UN Secretary General's Chief of Staff Vijay
Nambiar with the ICRC, in particular to ensure that any
remaining wounded civilians receive medical treatment, but
also to show the international community that Sri Lanka has

nothing to hide. Ambassador said it was crucial to work with
the UN and ICRC with the goal of meeting the government's
commitment to return the majority of IDPs to their homes by
the end of 2009. He proposed that a good start would be to
issue identity cards to all IDPs in one of the camps, allow
them freedom of movement, and then use that as a template for
the other camps. This would show progress to the outside
world, and to Sri Lankan Tamils and the Tamil Diaspora in
particular.


3. (SBU) In a separate meeting on May 18, Ambassador asked
Minister of Disaster Management and Human Rights Mahinda
Samarasinghe to work closely with the ICRC and UN SYG Chief
of Staff Vijay Nambiar to ensure the large numbers of wounded
in the "No-Fire Zone" receive immediate care. Close
cooperation between the GSL, UN and ICRC would be critical in
the days and months ahead, he noted. Ambassador asked that
GSL facilitate a visit by Nambiar and ICRC to the former
"No-Fire Zone."


4. (C) Ambassador also raised the issue of humanitarian
access with Minister for Export Development and International
Trade G.L. Peiris. Peiris expressed the government's
dissatisfaction with many in the international community who,
rather than celebrating the GSL's monumental achievement,
were only criticizing the government. Peiris believed that
the press over-emphasized the importance of the role of the
international community, the UN, and NGOs. He stressed that
measures undertaken within the UN should be consensual, not
coercive. Concerning the UN Human Rights Council's Special
Session on Sri Lanka, Peiris commented "it will not lead
anywhere." He was confident that Sri Lanka could muster the
votes to defeat any resolution it did not agree with. Peiris
noted that the displacement problem in Sri Lanka was an
internal one. As the displaced persons did not meet the

COLOMBO 00000563 002 OF 004


legal definition of refugees, it was by definition not an
international problem in Sri Lanka. There was therefore some
question as to how much the UN should be involved.

DEATHS OF LTTE LEADERS: UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador asked Bogollagama and Kohona about the
attempts by LTTE leaders Nadesan and Pulidevan to surrender
on the morning of May 18, and the circumstances of their
deaths on that day. Foreign Secretary Kohona claimed that
although Nadesan and Pulidevan had made a number of phone
calls to intermediaries about their desire to surrender, they
had then done nothing to indicate on the ground that they
were surrendering, such as raising a white flag. (Note:
Kohona subsequently contradicted this in remarks to the
media, in which he stated that Nadesan and Pulidevan had been
shot by the LTTE in the act of surrendering to Sri Lankan
forces. End note.)


6. (C) Ambassador also requested that Samarasinghe
specifically follow up on what happened to LTTE leaders
Nadesan and Pulidevan, as they were reported to be trying to
surrender, and were then reported dead. Samarasinghe said no
details of the situation were confirmed yet, but that he
would look into it. Ambassador suggested it would be best to
investigate and find out what really happened. Ambassador
also asked Samarasinghe to follow up on the status and
well-being of four doctors and the Additional Government
Agent who had remained inside the conflict zone to treat
wounded civilians and coordinate aid shipments, and who had
furnished information about civilian casualties to the UN and
international media. He urged the doctors be well treated
and released as soon as possible.

NEED OF THE HOUR IS A POLITICAL SOLUTION
--------------


7. (SBU) Ambassador told all his Sri Lankan interlocutors
that the Tamils needed a political system that accorded them
a life of respect and dignity, and the ability to choose
their own leaders. Whether this came through some sort of
application of the 13th Amendment or some other means, it was
necessary to show steps were being taken to address these
larger political concerns.


8. (SBU) In his farewell call on President Rajapaksa on May
20, Ambassador stressed that the reconciliation phase must
include two vital components: the humanitarian side -
providing the IDPs with what they need and resettling them
expeditiously - and the political side - power-sharing
arrangements to give Tamils assurance of a future with hope
and dignity. This was the way to defeat terrorism for good.
The Ambassador encouraged the GSL to think about how to
engage with Tamil representatives. Ambassador said it was
particularly important to reach out to the Tamil Diaspora so
they would stop supporting the LTTE. The President said the
basis of his devolution plan would be the "13th amendment
plus 1" - meaning implementation of the existing
constitutional provisions for provincial councils, but adding
an upper house to Parliament, modeled on the U.S. Senate.


9. (C) However, the President said that the Tamil National
Alliance (the largest Tamil party in Parliament) was a
problem. He did not know "if they were happy with it." The
President thought that giving police powers to the provinces,
as the TNA and others were demanding, would cause problems.
He said that responsibility for prosecuting and punishing
serious crimes against society - he specifically mentioned
murder and rape - should be handled by the Sri Lankan state.
He noted that the incumbent Supreme Court Justice had already
decentralized the court system. Ambassador asked whether one
step to ensure devolution of power to the provinces would be
to abolish the concurrent list of powers to be shared by the

COLOMBO 00000563 003 OF 004


center and the provinces, instead giving the provinces
primary responsibility. Rajapaksa replied that "we,ve been
thinking about this but haven't decided yet." Ambassador
urged the President to bring Opposition Leader Ranil
Wickremesinghe on board for the constitutional changes, for
which a two-thirds majority is necessary. Rajapaksa made
light of the possibility of cooperation with the main
opposition party, hinting that "we're thinking of holding an
election soon." (Note: the earliest President Rajapaksa
could hold Presidential elections in November 2009.)


10. (SBU) The Ambassador told Minister Samarasinghe that a
constructive political solution meant representation for
Tamil citizens, by politicians with real popular support. He
noted longer-term U.S. reconstruction assistance would depend
in part on political progress and whether legitimate Tamil
representatives exercised power in Tamil-majority areas.
Ambassador stated there might even be persons inside the IDP
camps who could emerge as effective political leaders.
Ambassador offered U.S. assistance in ensuring the IDP camps
were operated in accordance with international standards, and
that no problems emerged there. He stressed that
resettlement must occur rapidly, and that the U.S. was ready
to assist with humanitarian demining programs. Samarasinghe
said GSL was aware it needed to address the Tamil Diaspora,
and that this group was "highly motivated." He spoke of this
as a "golden opportunity" to address Tamils both inside and
outside the country, and said he expected that the tone would
be set by the President's scheduled speech to Parliament on
May 19.


11. (C) The Ambassador recommended to G.L. Peiris that he and
other moderates in the government advocate for concrete steps
to move forward, including implementing the 13th Amendment,
reaching out to opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe to
seek the support of the United National Party for necessary
constitutional changes to further the devolution process, and
starting a genuine dialogue with Sri Lanka's Tamils.
Ambassador observed that among the symbolic gestures the
government could use to send a powerful signal would be to
appoint an independent senior Tamil as a special advisor to
the President. Ambassador pointed out that the IDPs
currently interned in camps represented a large block of
voters. The President would do well to establish
representative committees of residents of the IPD camps and
listen carefully to their concerns. Finally, the government
should set up some sort of truth and reconciliation
commission to help the healing process. Peiris opined that
while a truth and reconciliation process may be cathartic, it
is not always positive. Timing is key, he said, and he was
not sure Sri Lanka was ready for it yet.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEDIA FREEDOM
--------------


12. (C) In his meetings with the President and with Defense
Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, Ambassador emphasized that our
military-to-military relations would benefit greatly if we
could solve the problem of child soldiers serving with the
paramilitaries. The Defense Secretary said that releasing
the child soldiers was part of the process of disarming all
the paramilitaries, which had now begun. The LTTE no longer
existed, so the police, not militias, could provide security
to the leaders of these groups ) who were now ordinary
politicians.


13. (C) Ambassador said that an improvement in Sri Lanka's
poor human rights environment was also imperative for
reconciliation and long-term peace in Sri Lanka. It would
also be important to see an easing up of pressure on
independent media, and an end to extrajudicial killings and
disappearances, especially since all these had particularly
affected Tamil populations. Ambassador said it was equally
important to stop extrajudicial killings and disappearances,

COLOMBO 00000563 004 OF 004


and disarm all paramilitaries, particularly those in
Vavuniya. Further, he stressed it was time to turn the
corner on media freedom. A free press was essential to the
functioning of democracy.


14. (C) The President responded that slain editor Lasantha
Wickrematunge was a friend of his, and claimed he was also a
source who had provided information on the opposition and
civil society. He and the Defense Secretary noted that
relations with the government and the media were now much
improved, with the press "way ahead of us" in praising the
government's successful conclusion of the war. The President
opined that the opposition "Daily Mirror" had the best
presentation of his victory speech in Parliament, superior to
that of the government-owned newspapers.

PRESS CONFERENCE
--------------


15. (U) In his final comments to the media, Ambassador noted
that the wounds of a twenty-six-year conflict would take time
to heal. He noted that Tamils who lived in the
LTTE-controlled areas had endured great hardships. He
emphasized the critical importance of meeting the needs of
nearly 300,000 newly displaced people, and for access by the
UN, ICRC and other organizations to help them. He called for
them to have freedom of movement and to be able to return to
their homes quickly. Crucial for reconciliation would be a
political framework to address the aspirations of minorities:
"To achieve the promise of this new beginning and to ensure a
lasting end to terrorism, bold actions are needed now to
share power and to assure all of Sri Lanka's communities a
future of hope, respect and dignity."
MOORE