Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09COLOMBO479
2009-04-30 14:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Colombo
Cable title:  

SRI LANKA: FEW RESULTS FROM HIGH-LEVEL VISITS

Tags:  PGOV PREF PREL CE 
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O 301407Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9906
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
AMEMBASSY OSLO 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 
AMCONSUL CHENNAI 
AMCONSUL MUMBAI 
AMCONSUL TORONTO 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
USMISSION GENEVA 
DIA WASHINGTON DC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000479 


STATE FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FEW RESULTS FROM HIGH-LEVEL VISITS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 b and d

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000479


STATE FOR SCA/INSB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/30/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: FEW RESULTS FROM HIGH-LEVEL VISITS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (C) SUMMARY. Successive visits by UN Under Secretary
General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes, UK Development
Minister Mike Foster, UK Foreign Secretary Miliband and
French Foreign Minister Kouchner, as well as frequent
high-level contacts by Charge with GSL have yielded no
progress on getting a UN security team into the No-Fire Zone
(NFZ) or achieve a humanitarian pause in fighting. Japanese
FM Akashi was expected to arrive April 30 for a three-day
visit. President Rajapaksa announced the end of combat
operations at mid-day on April 27, and in particular the end
of the use of heavy caliber guns, combat aircraft and aerial
weapons, but sources inside and outside the NFZ say this
pledge has not been kept. President Rajapaksa told Holmes on
Monday that medicine would be allowed into the NFZ on the
ICRC medevac ferry. GSL is promising better cooperation and
coordination on aid for IDPs, and some limited progress has
been seen on allowing international aid into the IDP camps.
However GSL appears intent on taking control of the entire
NFZ militarily, whatever the cost to civilians still there.
The GSL shows no signs of honoring an agreement to Nambiar
and the UN SG to allow a UN team into the NFZ to try to
obtain a release of civilians from the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). End Summary.

JOHN HOLMES VISIT
--------------

2. (SBU) UN Under Secretary General for Humanitarian
Affairs John Holmes visited IDP camps and met with President
Rajapaksa on April 27 to press for access for a UN team into
the NFZ to negotiate with the LTTE for their surrender and/or
a release of civilians. Results were disappointing, with
only an agreeement to allow medicine into the NFZ on the ICRC
medical evacuation ferry, which happened April 28. Although
President Rajapaksa announced the end of combat operations at
mid-day on April 27, and in particular the end of the use of
heavy caliber guns, combat aircraft and aerial weapons,
sources both inside and outside the NFZ reported casualties
April 28-30 from continued use of such weapons, and many
other casualties from the use of smaller weapons.

UK AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS TEAM UP
--------------


3. (C) UK Foreign Secretary Miliband and French Foreign
Minister Kouchner arrived on April 29, visited the Manik Farm
IDP site and the new French field hospital, and met with
senior GSL leadership. At the conclusion of his visit,
Miliband asked Charge to convey the following points back to
the Department. First, it appeared very difficult for anyone
to get accurate information about what is actually happening
on the ground. President Rajapaksa himself appeared poorly
informed about ground realities. Second, the President
appeared increasingly worried about the opinion of the
international community, in particular with regard to the IMF
stand-by loan and the GSP negotiations with the EU. There
is as yet no evidence that this concern on his behalf will
translate into concrete positive steps from GSL. Third,
Rajapaksa is beginning to focus on a political way forward
along the lines of the 13th Amendment-plus.


4. (C) British Deputy High Commissioner reported to Charge
that Miliband and Kouchner focused on three main issues - a
ceasefire, access to IDPs and a timetable for IDP returns.
They made a strong push with the President, Foreign Minister
and Defense Secretary for a ceasefire to allow civilians out
and humanitarian aid in. The GSL was steadfast in its
opposition to a ceasefire, saying the LTTE was nearly
defeated and a ceasefire would only allow the LTTE to
regroup.


5. (C) In all their meetings with the GSL, Miliband and
Kouchner pushed for full access to IDP camps for humanitarian
workers and for treatment of IDPs that meets international
humanitarian standards. They raised the problems of
non-issuance of visas for ICRC staff and military checkpoint
blockages of aid shipments to the camps. The President
appeared to be unaware of such problems and turned to the FM
for clarification. The President committed to better
cooperation with the UN and NGOs and to greater access to IDP
transit sites. At Miliband's suggestion, the President
agreed to meet with the UN and ICRC resident representatives
to discuss these concerns.


6. (C) Miliband and Kouchner stressed the need for a
month-by-month plan with benchmarks for returning IDPs to
their homes. This would enable the international community
to work with and support GSL in meeting these targets.
Although the main focus was on more immediate concerns, they
also encouraged the President to articulate a political
proposal and way forward.

SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER "DISINVITED"
--------------

7. (C) Miliband and Kouchner told the President that the
denial of permission for Swedish Foreign Minister Bildt to
accompany them would not help Sri Lanka's standing in the EU,
particularly since Sweden was set to take over the EU
Presidency. (Note: A decision on renewal of GSP for Sri
Lanka will be made by the EU during Sweden's Presidency.)
The UK's Deputy High Commissioner told Charge privately he
felt the decision to block Bildt's visit was taken by
Bogollagama in part because a visit he hoped to make to
Sweden earlier this year did not materialize. An additional
consideration may have been the size of the delegation coming
on April 29.

JAPANESE FM AKASHI UP NEXT
--------------

8. (C) Japanese FM Akashi will arrive on April 30 for a
three day visit, including flying to the Manik Farm IDP site
the morning of May 1, meeting with Basil Rajapaksa that
afternoon, and then meeting with President Rajapaksa the
morning of May 2. He was to see the Co-Chair Ambassadors the
evening of May 2 to brief them on his meetings with GSL.

CHARGE PRESSES GSL
--------------

9. (C) Charge met seperately during the week with Foreign
Minister Bogollagama, Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa,
Senior Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa and Foreign
Secretary Kohona to reinforce these joint messages. He noted
that while the April 27 announcement of an end to combat
operations was a positive step, the military must abide by
its commitment to refrain from aerial bombing and the use of
heavy weapons. He expressed deep concern over continued
civilian casualties. He reiterated our messages on
conditions for IDPs, humanitarian access to transit sites,
and the need for publicly announced benchmarks for the return
of IDPs to their homes.

UNFRIENDLY GSL FOLLOW-UP TO MILIBAND/KOUCHNER VISIT
-------------- --------------

10. (C) On April 30, the day after FMs Miliband and Kouchner
were in Colombo, Foreign Minister Bogollagama called in UN
Resident Representative Neil Buhne and the UK and French
Heads of Mission to complain that the figures Miliband and
Kouchner cited for the casualties in the NFZ were inaccurate
and deliberately misleading. In the government's view, the
UN provided these numbers on the basis of incorrect
information provided by two government medical authorities
and the Assistant Government Agent in the NFZ, whom the
government feels are under intense pressure from the LTTE.
Buhne defended the accuracy of the figures, maintaining they
were the best estimates available. FM Bogollagama also
questioned the alleged violations of the GSL's commitment not
to use heavy weapons inside the NFZ, and called Chief of
Defense Staff Donald Perera who maintained that heavy weapons
had not been used.


11. (C) Foreign Secretary Kohona briefed Charge on the
April 30 meeting. Charge cautioned Kohona that GSL was
suffering from a major credibility problem in foreign
capitals. The Charge told Kohona it was incumbent on the GSL
to make good on its commitments and provide credible figures
of its own rather than shooting the messenger.


12. (C) COMMENT: The week's procession of high-level
visitors carrying consistent messages left the government
with no doubt of the international community's consensus on
the need to halt combat operations and prevent further large
scale casualties in the NFZ. Their messages on international
access to IDPs at each stage in the transfer process from the
no-fire zone to transit sites, conditions in and access to
the transit sites, and the importance of early returns were
equally clear. Even as it appeared to realize the possible
costs of its actions, the government did not blink in its
resolve to continue military operations in the NFZ until the
remaining territory comes under its control and the last LTTE
leaders still there are captured or killed. End Comment.


MOORE