Northern Sri Lanka SitRep 51

UNCLAS COLOMBO 000413

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR SCA (BOUCHER),SCA/INS AND PRM
STATE ALSO PASS USAID
AID/W FOR ANE/SCA, DCHA/FFP (DWORKEN, KSHEIN)
AID/W FOR DCHA/OFDA (MORRISP, ACONVERY, RTHAYER, RKERR)
ATHENS FOR PCARTER
BANGKOK FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA (WBERGER)
KATHMANDU FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA AND POL (SBERRY)
GENEVA FOR RMA (NKYLOH, NHILGERT, MPITOTTI)
USUN NEW YORK FOR ECOSOC (D MERCADO)
SECDEF FOR OSD - POLICY
PACOM ALSO FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF MOPS PHUM PGOV PREL ASEC CE
SUBJECT: Northern Sri Lanka SitRep 51

Ref: A) Colombo 412 B) Colombo 410 C) Colombo 402 D) Colombo 401
E) Colombo 400 F) Colombo 396 G) Colombo 393 H) Colombo 384 I)
Colombo 374 J) Colombo 368 K) Colombo 361 L) Colombo 360 M)
Colombo 321


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The government of Sri Lanka announced a 48-hour
period of restraint, during which the armed forces would confine
themselves to defensive operations. International observers noted
that shelling of the "safe zone" had diminished on April 11 and 12,
and that no firing was now being reported from the area. UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon welcomed the government's move, noting
it was less than the pause of several days he had called for. He
reiterated his appeal to the LTTE to allow civilians freedom of
movement and to the government to adhere to its commitments not to
use heavy weapons. Previously, Ambassador had undertaken numerous
contacts with the Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary and Senior
Presidential Advisor Basil Rajapaksa to urge them to declare a
longer humanitarian pause and consider the idea of a UN Special
Envoy to negotiate the release of the civilians trapped in the "safe
zone." The ICRC plans to evacuate approximately 600 wounded
civilians from the safe zone on April 13 and 14. Basil Rajapaksa
said that the hold-fire period could be extended, particularly if
the LTTE begins to release civilians. According to the UN and GSL
sources, the earliest a ship can depart for the safe zone with badly
needed food and medical supplies is April 16. End summary.

GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES 48 HOUR PERIOD OF RESTRAINT
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2. (U) On April 12, President Rajapaksa announced a 48-hour period
of restraint in which the Sri Lankan armed forces would confine
themselves to defensive operations: "The President is deeply
conscious of the need to give the civilian population entrapped as
hostages by the ruthless actions of the LTTE the opportunity... to
have uninhibited freedom of movement from the No Fire Zone to the
cleared areas. With this objective in view, His Excellency has
directed the Armed Forces of the State to restrict their operations
during the New Year to those of a defensive nature... It is timely
for the LTTE to acknowledge its military defeat and lay down its
weapons and surrender. The LTTE must also renounce terrorism and
violence permanently."

3. (U) In a statement issued on April 12 in New York, United
Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon welcomed the Sri Lanka
government's decision, noting, "This is less than the full
humanitarian pause of several days I had pressed for but is
nevertheless a useful first step and an opportunity to move towards
the peaceful and orderly end to the fighting now so badly needed...
The United Nations will, therefore, do whatever it can to support
this humanitarian pause and help end the grave predicament of
civilians in the conflict zone, including through the provision of
more aid to those still trapped in the zone." The Secretary General
said that during the period of the pause civilians wishing to leave
the conflict zone should be allowed to do so and should then be
treated fully in accordance with international standards and
principles: "In particular, the LTTE must allow civilians to choose
whether they stay or leave. This is a terrible conflict that must be
ended as soon as possible. In the meantime, with tens of thousands
of lives at risk on the beaches of northern Sri Lanka, I call on the
government forces to adhere scrupulously to the commitments of the

government about non-use of heavy weapons. I also count on key
members of the international community to support this pause and to
continue to do all they can to avert further death and suffering in
Sri Lanka."

4. (SBU) Head of the ICRC Colombo office Paul Castella told
Ambassador on April 13 that ICRC staff in the safe zone reported
that no firing of any kind had taken place since the
government-announced pause began at midnight. Previously, on April
12, firing had diminished in intensity, without artillery, but
mortars and automatic weapons were used. ICRC sources reported 62
wounded, of whom 16 were children. Three of the wounded later died
in the hospital. Not including those wounded on April 12, 533
wounded were waiting to be evacuated. The ICRC plans to get half of
these out on April 13 and the other half on April 14. The improved
weather situation should help. The ICRC told us that the Ministry
of Health had approved an ICRC medical shipment to go with the
vessel for the wounded but that the military had yet to clear the
delivery.

FOOD SHIP ON APRIL 16?
--------------


5. (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator Neil Buhne told Ambassador on
April 13 that according to Basil Rajapaksa, the earliest a ship
could sail with WFP food supplies would be April 16. This would be
after the government-declared pause expires. Significantly, Buhne
reported that Rajapaksa said it could be extended "if the LTTE
behaves." Basil also confirmed that badly needed medicine would be
on board. Buhne also said that UN staff in the safe zone report it
had become much quieter in the safe zone. A few RPG rounds may have
caused a few casualties, but nothing on the scale of the previous
several days. Finally, he noted that it appeared the LTTE was
trying to move civilians into the southern part of the safe zone in
anticipation of GSL military operations in the northern part.
25-30,000 civilians are reluctant to move from their current
locations, he said. If the LTTE permits them to stay, it is possible
they might be able to escape to government-controlled territory.

FOREIGN SECRETARY CONTINUES TO QUESTION SHELLING
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6. (SBU) Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona reported to Ambassador on
April 13 that during his recent visit to Washington he was shown
three satellite photos of the no fire zone, indicating houses with
roofs blown off and water-filled circular craters. Kohona
questioned whether the houses could have been damaged during the
1996 military campaign when the Mullaitivu camp was attacked by the
LTTE. He said he had received assurances that no artillery had been
directed to the no-fire zone. Ambassador noted that credible
medical sources reported large numbers of wounded with shrapnel
injuries sustained around April 8-9. Ambassador told Kohona that
had these been caused by the LTTE, there would likely have been an
insurrection in the no-fire zone, given our knowledge of existing
tensions stemming form from the LTTE shootings of IDPs trying to
escape.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ON SHELLING,
HUMANITARIAN PAUSE AND SPECIAL ENVOY IDEA
--------------


7. (SBU) Ambassador met Foreign Minister Bogollagama on April 11 to
discuss U.S. concerns about shelling of the civilian safe zone, and
the ideas of a humanitarian pause and of a UN Special Envoy.
Ambassador noted he and others had held many bilateral meetings with
senior Sri Lankan officials, including Army Commander Fonseka,
Defense Secretary Gothabaya Rajapaksa, and Foreign Secretary Kohona,
all of whom had denied that Sri Lankan forces were shelling the safe
zone. Ambassador stated that these denials were not credible. The
ICRC had reported 600 wounded waiting to be evacuated, all of whom
had been wounded April 8 and 9. The injuries were from shrapnel,
not bullet wounds. The Foreign Minister said he would attend a Sri
Lankan National Security Council meeting later on April 11 which
would discuss a 4-day humanitarian pause to begin on Monday, April

13. He asked what should be done during the pause. Ambassador
urged that the GSL work with the UN to move up the next planned food
shipment into that window, and highlighted that medicines and
surgical supplies of all kinds had to be included, given critical
shortages.


8. (SBU) Ambassador expressed hope that the GSL would not state
publicly that the pause would be an opportunity for civilians to
leave, only to announce at the end of that period, it was time for
the military to act. Ambassador pointed out that it was common
knowledge the Tamil Tigers won't let the civilians go. A better
alternative, he said, would be for the GSL to allow a UN envoy to go
in to the safe zone during the pause to talk directly to LTTE
supremo Prabhakaran about terms for letting the civilians go and
surrender of those LTTE cadres still in the safe zone.


9. (SBU) Bogollagama countered that the GSL was worried that the
LTTE would seek to generate public relations capital from a visit,
or try to string out the discussions. Ambassador explained that the
UN and others could make clear publicly what the parameters of the
visit were. Ambassador said the UN would have to be clear that the
urgency of getting civilians out of harm's way would not permit
lengthy negotiations. He observed the alternative of sending the
army into the safe zone would be disastrous for Sri Lanka. The
GSL's own Unmanned Aerial Vehicle footage confirmed the LTTE is
building a berm, bunkers and trenches in anticipation of an attack.
The bunkers will shelter cadres so it is the civilians who will be
killed, Ambassador noted. The LTTE would like nothing more than to
see 10,000 or more civilians killed which would give them a new
1983-style massacre around which they could rejuvenate the LTTE
after its military defeat. Large civilian casualties would also
have serious longer-term consequences for the GSL. Ambassador
sought Bogollagama's personal intervention in raising these issues
in the National Security Council meeting.


10. (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator Neil Buhne saw Bogollagama soon
afterwards to share with him UN satellite imagery showing recent
shelling craters.


11. (SBU) The Foreign Minister called on April 12 to brief
Ambassador on the outcome of the Sri Lankan Security Council
meeting. He previewed the President's announcement of a 48-hour
"restraint of military operations to defensive nature" to begin at
midnight. He said the military had opposed any pause, so as not to
give the LTTE time to re-group. The Security Council had settled on

a two-day period of restraint, which he thought was positive.
Bogollagama also said the GSL would work to find a ship so that
relief supplies could go in during the 48 hour hold-fire period.
The Minister reported that he had raised idea of a UN envoy, but
there was no confidence within the Security Council that an envoy
could do anything.


12. (SBU) Ambassador observed that the President had backtracked on
his conversation with UN SYG Ban Ki-Moon in which he had held out
the prospect of a 4-day "humanitarian pause" previously discussed.
Ambassador noted that holding fire is something the GSL should be
doing anyway in their own self-declared safe zone. Further, the GSL
announcement appeared to leave little or no room for diplomacy.
Ambassador asked whether the Minister had shared the Norwegian
information that some LTTE leaders favor talks to work out a
surrender. Bogollagama responded that he had, but Norway has lost
credibility. Ambassador told the Foreign Minister that he was
forced to conclude that the Government had decided the military will
go into the safe zone and settle this, which would be disastrous
both for the trapped civilians and the GSL. He asserted that Sri
Lanka was missing a big opportunity to negotiate an LTTE surrender
and save many lives. Bogollagama hesitated, then said, "let's wait
to see how the 48-hour period goes."


13. (SBU) Ambassador subsequently spoke to the President's brother
and senior advisor, Basil Rajapaksa and sought to convince him of
the need for time to persuade the LTTE to surrender peacefully.
Rajapaksa responded that so far the UN had not broached the idea of
a Special Envoy. Further, he asked how we could know that the LTTE
wouldn't take the envoy hostage? Or that Prabhakaran would agree to
meet? He said the GSL would need firm commitments on these issues
before agreeing to a Special Envoy. Ambassador responded that those
conditions were all manageable, but that the main thing was that the
GSL agree to give time for diplomacy to work. He emphasized that we
all want an end to LTTE terror, but not in a way that kills
thousands of civilians and gives the LTTE a new cause on which to
re-mobilize opinion behind it. Rajapaksa agreed and said he would
talk to the President.


14. (SBU) Tamil sources from within the "safe zone" reported 37
dead and 112 injured April 12 and until 7 am April 13 due to
artillery fire.

BLAKE