Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHISINAU989
2009-12-24 09:06:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

CHISINAU: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

Tags:  PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS PINS PREL AEMR MD 
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VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCH #0989/01 3580906
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 240906Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8701
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS CHISINAU 000989 

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS PINS PREL AEMR MD
SUBJECT: CHISINAU: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 109980

UNCLAS CHISINAU 000989

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB AND S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS PINS PREL AEMR MD
SUBJECT: CHISINAU: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 109980


1. Moldova is not a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist groups.
No acts of international terrorism of major significance have
occurred in Moldova. One significant act of possible politically
motivated domestic terrorism, however, did occur. Moldova is not
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. The Government of
Moldova (GOM) does not have an active, cohesive counterterrorism
plan or strategy.


2. Moldovan support for counterterrorism was minimal, as compared to
previous years when Moldova sent demining contingents to Iraq and
had liaison officers assigned to Centcom Headquarters in Tampa,
Florida. Embassy Chisinau and the GOM, specifically the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (MIA),did not conduct any joint counterterrorism
training exercises as in previous years. One major Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) sponsored counterterrorism exercise had
been planned for September, but was canceled because of economic
reasons. No local inter-agency, inter-mission, or inter-sector
counterterrorism training took place. A substantial CIS backed
counterterrorism training exercise is planned for some time in 2010.


3. Moldova continued to work on implementation of
its obligations under UNSCR 1373, Executive Order
13224 (the Terrorism Finance Executive Order),and
provisions related to terrorist financing. The
GOM enthusiastically welcomes information
regarding terrorist financing from the USG and
other bodies, and actively applies such information
in its monitoring efforts through its Center for
Combating Economic Crimes and Corruption (CCECC).
Moldova's 2008 joining of the Egmont Group of financial intelligence
units may yield significant results in Moldova's counterterrorism
efforts, although it is still too soon to judge its impact.


4. In 2009, no new action plan/strategy for counterterrorism had
been developed, accepted, or implemented to replace the expired
2003-2008 National Action Plan on Combating Terrorism. There was no
indication that the GOM would renew the Plan in the near future.



5. On December 5, 2008, the Moldovan Parliament ratified a blueprint
on cooperation with the CIS states in combating terrorism. This
document was originally signed in August 2005 and provides for joint
measures aimed at the prevention and counter-action of terrorism and
extremism. The document allows for the exchange of information on
combating terrorism between CIS states, and provides for the
extradition of persons suspected of financing or
committing terrorist actions. The Moldovan
Parliament also ratified the specific program on
CIS member states' cooperation in combating
terrorism and extremism for 2008-2010. This
three-year program reflects the activities which
were included in the blueprint. This pact did not have a meaningful
impact on Moldovan counterterrorism efforts, as it placed no real
obligations on the GOM.


6. The separatist-controlled Transnistria region
of Moldova remained a potential area of concern.
Moldovan law enforcement worked hard to track the
whereabouts and activities of individuals moving
in and out of Transnistria, an area where central-
government police and security services are rarely
able to operate. However, Post is unable to fully assess the
ability of Moldovan law enforcement to operate in this region. Some
of these individuals moving in and out of Transnistria were foreign
students who remained in Moldova illegally, as the
government lacked the resources to deport them
when their visas expired. Corruption was endemic,
and it was easy to obtain false travel documents
in both Transnistria and Moldova. No formal cooperation on
counterterrorism between Moldova
and the separatist region of Transnistria took
place.


7. The U.S. Embassy does not maintain liaison
relationships or active, ongoing contacts with Transnistrian law
enforcement and/or security service personnel. Embassy Chisinau
requested meetings in the past with Transnistrian public-security
personnel, to no avail, but has successfully engaged certain
Transnistrian authorities on a recent counterfeiting case (although
it is not yet clear whether this engagement will result in concrete
cooperation and actions). The USG has not obtained any information
about known terrorist organizations or terrorists operating from or
within this region. Left-bank (separatist controlled Transnistria)
and right-bank (GOM controlled) Moldova have no cooperation on
counterterrorism matters, although right bank Moldova does not
believe that Transnistria's existence harms right-bank
counterterrorism efforts.


8. In right-bank Moldova, law enforcement and intelligence officials
had the authority to intercept wire, oral, and electronic
communications, but the investigator was required first to obtain
prosecutorial concurrence and authorization from a judge. A
specific section in the Prosecutor General's Office (PGO) would
handle any terrorism-related case. The primary investigative body
in counterterrorism cases is the Information and Security
Service(SIS),Moldova's intelligence service. For cases of
suspected domestic terrorism, the PGO decides who will complete the
investigation. The MIA is usually authorized to take the lead.


9. On October 14, 2009, at a downtown Chisinau celebration of City
Day, a grenade was thrown into the crowd of thousands, injuring over
30 persons. Moldovan authorities considered this to be a
domestically motivated criminal act, and both the PGO and the MIA
were investigating the attack. Neither could provide evidence
regarding the origin of or reason for the attack. While there may
have been some political motivation, the attack is most likely
linked to some domestically-based solitary criminal actor, or
emotionally disturbed person. It is improbable that the attack was
in any way linked to an internationally based group.


10. In 2006, SIS was given the governmental lead to establish and
manage a special Counterterrorism Center. In 2009, staffing and
funding were minimal, as were its activities. The U.S. Embassy's
law enforcement substantial assistance programs aid Moldovan efforts
to impede the ability of terrorists and other citizens without
proper documents to cross national borders. The programs also
facilitated automation at ports of entry to ensure greater security
of passports and travel documents.


11. Embassy point of contact for this report is Political/Economic
Officer Zach Koester. Email: KoesterRZ@state.gov

MICHELI