MOLDOVA'S 2009 PRIORITIES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000081

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS RU UP MD
SUBJECT: MOLDOVA'S 2009 PRIORITIES FOR
TRANSNISTRIAN SETTLEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a January 29 meeting, Minister
for Reintegration Vasile Sova outlined Moldova's
program of Transnistrian reintegration priorities
for 2009 and reviewed the results of recent
consultations with the Russians and Ukrainians.
Moldova's four priorities are: resumption of the
5-plus-2 talks, unilateral steps that the GOM
could take, the program of confidence-building
measures and demilitarization. Sova said that the
recent visit of Russian negotiator Nesterushkin
had achieved "absolutely zero," while
consultations with Ukrainian negotiator Kryanovsky
had largely focused on the problem of completing
demarcation of the Transnistrian segment of their
common border. Sova confirmed Voronin's readiness
to meet again with Smirnov in mid-March, while
noting that there was no timetable or agenda yet
for a Medvedev-Voronin-Smirnov meeting. He
expected that Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov
would visit Moldova February 23-24, perhaps to
help facilitate holding such a 2-plus-1 session.
In the meantime, Sova is focusing on internal
consultations with political party leaders within
Moldova to ensure a national consensus on
Transnistria that will keep the reintegration
process running smoothly after the upcoming
elections. End summary.

Moldova Adopts Four-Point Plan of Priorities for
2009
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2. (C) On January 29, Minister for Reintegration
Vasile Sova told Ambassador that at a recent
meeting with an inner circle of policymakers,
President Voronin had reviewed the events of 2007-
2008 and approved a program of reintegration
priorities for 2009. The GOM priorities are
grouped into four key issues as follows:

-- (1) Resumption of 5-plus-2 talks: Moldova
seeks a resumption of talks on the basis of its
document package. Sova underlined that Moldova
would refrain from signing any intermediate-term
documents (i.e., no agreements with Russia). The
Moldovans intend to continue consultations with
the EU and Russia in hopes of ensuring that the
Transnistrian problem is addressed at the next
Russia-EU summit. Sova said that the GOM seeks to
convene an International Donors Conference for
Post-Conflict Reconstruction by the end of 2009.
Sova said he was conducting internal consultations
with major political parties and NGOs to ensure
that a viable national consensus on Transnistria
continued after the elections.

-- (2) Unilateral Steps: The GOM is developing an
action plan for unilateral steps it could take to
help the reintegration process. Sova said that he
would hold preliminary consultations with all 5-
plus-2 partners prior to implementing the
projects. He said the GOM would like to implement
social and economic projects with the idea of
promoting Transnistrian involvement within a
single Moldovan space. The current status damages
exports and imports as well as internal trade, he
noted. Sova envisions a number of unilateral
projects in the spheres of agriculture,
irrigation, education, license plates, telephonic
communications, roads, etc.

-- (3) Program of Confidence-Building Measures:
The GOM will focus on the confidence-building
working group process in order to have Tiraspol
engaged in the work. However, he continued Sova,
if the Transnistrian side continued to ignore this
process, the GOM would focus on unilateral
measures.

-- (4) Demilitarization: Though the concept of
demilitarization was originally introduced under
the banner of confidence-building measures, the
GOM would consider it as a separate priority for

2009. Sova said that he had already discussed
with OSCE's Ambassador Remler the possibility of

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holding a seminar within the 5-plus-2 format
(either closed or public) in order to develop a
plan outlining the steps needed to carry out
demilitarization. Sova proposed that such a
seminar take place under OSCE aegis within the
next 1-2 months. He noted that some actions would
be needed in order to get the Russians to resume
their withdrawal of ammunition and troops.
However, continued Sova, to some extent this would
depend upon the results of US-Russia talks on the
CFE Treaty. Sova noted that the GOM had received
some reporting from its diplomatic missions about
the CFE talks. He added that another component of
the demilitarization process would be transition
from the current peacekeeping force to a civilian
observer mission.


3. (C) Sova said that, in addition to the four-
point plan, he had also prepared a detailed
commentary addressing all economic issues raised
by Smirnov at the December 24 meeting with
President Voronin. Sova said that the GOM would
address these economic issues in light of the
reintegration process rather than as if dealing
with an independent entity. Whatever the reaction
of Tiraspol to Chisinau's responses, the GOM would
still go ahead with implementing measures leading
towards reintegration.

Ukrainian Issues: Border Demarcation and EUBAM
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4. (C) During his recent visit, Ukrainian Deputy
Foreign Minister and Ambassador at Large for
Transnistria Viktor Kryzhanivskyi had focused
largely on the need to complete demarcation of the
Transnistrian portion of the border, said Sova.
Another important issue was the necessity of an
exchange of diplomatic notes to resolve extension
of EUBAM for another two years. Sova said that
Kryzhanivskyi had agreed that the Ukrainians would
adopt a more active position on the settlement
process. Their talks had also focused on how to
motivate Russia to withdraw its ammunition and
forces.


5. (C) The Ambassador noted that he had just
returned from several days in Ukraine and reported
that high-level Ukrainian officials had confirmed
their support for the continuation of the EUBAM
mission. However, repeatedly the Ukrainians had
raised the question of demarcation of the border,
which seemed to be a major issue for them. The
Ambassador had concluded from his talks in Kyiv
that Ukraine shared similar priorities in 5-plus-
2, and was committed to finding a solution that
preserved Moldova's territorial integrity while
giving a special status to Transnistria.

Consultations with the Russians Less Productive
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6. (C) Sova said Russian negotiator Nesterushkin
had recently visited Moldova (Jan. 26-27). Asking
that this comment be considered off the record, he
noted that the result had been "absolutely zero."
They had discussed the need for mediators and
observers to discuss resumption of the 5-plus-2
talks. The GOM had asked Russia to add
Transnistria settlement to the agenda at the next
Russia-EU summit. Nesterushkin had promised only
that the Russians "would examine this proposal."
Sova had also suggested that Russia support the
idea of an OSCE-led seminar on demilitarization.
Sova said he had told Nesterushkin that the
Moldovans would like to see greater engagement on
the part of Russia, suggesting that Russia should
actively call upon the parties to find a solution,
rather than just passively wait for the parties to
come up with the answer themselves.


7. (C) Sova went on to note that Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov was planning to visit Moldova in
February (Feb. 23-24). Sova believed that Lavrov
likely had two main goals for his visit. One was
to demonstrate that Russian-Moldovan relations
were now better than they had been after the
crisis resulting from the failure to adopt the
Kozak Memorandum in 2003. The other, speculated

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Sova, might be to explore the possibility of a
Medvedev-Voronin meeting. However, Sova was not
sure that the Russians would want to meet with
Voronin as a lame duck, and speculated that they
might prefer to wait until after the elections.
The timing of the visit more than a month before
the elections would give the GOM time to take any
necessary steps, Sova said.


8. (C) Sova said that President Voronin had
confirmed his intention to meeting with Smirnov in
mid-March, as had been agreed when the two leaders
met on December 24th. He speculated on whether
there would be a Medvedev-Voronin-Smirnov meeting
in March, and concluded that this issue might be
addressed during Lavrov's visit. He said that
President Voronin intended to tell Lavrov that
there was no wiggle room on the main component of
the Moldovan package document, i.e., that any
solution must provide for a special status for
Transnistria within a united Moldovan state. This
was a red line beyond which there was no
flexibility and no compromise.

Looking Towards the Election Campaign and
Afterwards
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9. (C) Sova said that during the electoral
campaign in February and March, he would seek to
maintain momentum in the Transnistria settlement
process, but not accelerate it. He said that he
was focusing on carrying out internal
consultations within Moldova to ensure national
consensus so that the reintegration process would
continue after the elections.

Comment
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10. (C) The Moldovan plan of priorities for 2009
appears to be well thought out. The GOM is wise
to include a category of unilateral measures that
can be taken to help bring the sides together,
even in the absence of cooperation from Tiraspol.
In the end, pragmatic economic interests can force
cooperation despite resistance from the political
hard-liners. We support the GOM in its efforts to
restart the 5-plus-2 negotiations. It is
important that the negotiating process move into a
new phase of tackling the status issue, and not
remain stuck on problems relating to confidence-
building measures. While these CBMs can help
bring the sides together, they should not become a
process just for their own sake when the real
issue is resolving the question of Transnistria's
status.

CHAUDHRY