ENGAGING MOLDOVA'S DIASPORA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 CHISINAU 000705

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB, DRL/AE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP BTIO EAID EINV OEXC OIIP PGOV
PHUM, PREL, SCUL, SMIG, TSPL, MD
SUBJECT: ENGAGING MOLDOVA'S DIASPORA

REF: STATE 86401


1. Summary: Defining and identifying a "Moldovan
Diaspora" according to the definitions of reftel
is difficult. Moldovan communities abroad, which
are as ethnically and linguistically mixed as at
home, are still in the process of formation.
These communities share largely economic links
with their home country, sending remittances to
their families. Even though they number up to a
quarter of the country's roughly four million
inhabitants, many Moldovans abroad are labor
migrants who still intend to return home, rather
than permanent emigres. Moldovans abroad rarely
interact politically or institutionally with the
home country, and voter turnout overseas was low
in the recent elections. In a country that has
existed in modern times for only 18 years, and
which is the product of centuries of ethic
inflows, Moldovan national identity, even at home,
is still under construction. End Summary.

Historical Ethnic Mixes Dilute Moldovan Identity
-------------- ---


2. Once part of an independent principality of
Moldavia, most of present-day Moldova was ruled by
outside powers, including the Ottoman and Russian
empires, Romania, and most recently, the Soviet
Union. History thus endowed Moldova with a
variegated ethnic mix, as its fertile soils and
mild climate attracted succeeding waves of
migrants from imperial centers. Russian control
in the nineteenth century brought Orthodox
Christian Bulgarian and Gagauz minorities fleeing
the Ottoman Empire. Soviet population policies
also brought in many Ukrainian and Russian
migrants, and simultaneously spread ethnic
Moldovans across the territories of the Soviet
Union.


3. Thus, while its present majority consists of
ethnic Moldovans, Moldova retains significant
Ukranian, Russian, Gagauz, Bulgarian and other
minority populations. Ethnic "Moldovan"
populations also exist in Ukraine, most inhabiting
ancestral communities and not feeling any specific
ties to Moldova. (Note: Romania does not see the
inhabitants of its province of Moldavia as members
of a separate ethnic group. End Note.) Some
emigres who left their homeland before the breakup
of the Soviet Union and Moldova's independence
identify themselves as "Bessarabians."

Self-Identity Apart from the State
--------------


4. A Moldovan's national self-identity is not
necessarily tied to the Moldovan state. Some
Moldovan citizens see themselves as ethnically
Romanian, while Ukrainians or Russians often do
not self-identify themselves as Moldovan, but only
as living or having lived in Moldova. Moldovan
citizens often hold additional passports of the
state that corresponds to their sense of
nationality, including those of Romania, Bulgaria,
Russia, Ukraine and increasingly Israel.


5. In one possible indication of a widespread lack
of identification with the state, the numbers of
expatriate Moldovans who vote in national
elections at Moldovan consulates and embassies are
low. In April and July 2009 parliamentary
elections, fewer than 18,000 voters, out of
roughly 36,000 on the lists, voted at Moldovan
embassies and consulates. Even accounting for the
difficulties of travel to diplomatic polling
stations; concerns about revealing their presence
to host-government authorities; and the
inconvenience of the July 29 election day falling
on a work day, these numbers compare poorly with
the approximately 1.6 million (out of 2.5 to 2.7
million registered in April and July) who voted in
Moldova itself.

Language Politics and Divided Loyalties
--------------


6. The uncertainty of identity is further
demonstrated by Moldova's confused language

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politics. While the majority of Moldovans speak
Romanian, Soviet policies promoted the myth of a
distinct "Moldovan" language which, unlike
Romanian, was written in the Cyrillic script. The
Communist Party-led Government of Moldova (GOM)
also has insisted that the "language of state" be
identified as "Moldovan," so as to discourage
identity with Romania (and has consistently tarred
its enemies on the center-right as supporters of
Romanian irredentism),while the pro-Romanian
opposition parties insist that their language is
called "Romanian."


7. Parliamentary elections on July 29 gave
opposition parties a majority in Parliament, but
not enough votes to elect a president. If the
impasse is broken, and the four-party Alliance for
European Integration gains full power, we can
expect a relaxation of policies that drew a sharp
distinction between the two subdialects. Such a
change would more accurately reflect reality,
because Moldovan linguistic discrepancies consist
principally of small differences of pronunciation
(adding a "y" sound before "e"),vocabulary (the
occasional substitution of Russian words for their
Romanian equivalents),and spelling (use of
circumflexed "i" instead of circumflexed "a" to
spell the same sound).


8. Thus, while the "language of state" has
fostered a sense of nationhood among Moldovans,
some Russian speakers and Communists have
identified those who use it exclusively as loyal
to Romania. Similarly, some Romanian speakers
feel the same way about Russian speakers. Both
languages have been used as political wedges, and
as symbols of loyalty to foreign states. While
most Moldovans speak Russian either as a first or
more commonly a second language, a small minority
would like to eliminate it entirely from the
public sphere. An estimated 20 percent of
Moldovans either cannot speak Romanian, or use it
at only the most basic level. Difficulties with
linguistic self-identification extend to Moldovan
communities living outside its borders.

Moldovan Diaspora
--------------


9. Moldova has significant numbers of its
citizens living abroad, by some estimates as much
as one third of its working age population, or a
quarter of its actual population. Most of these
migrants work in low-wage occupations with poor
job security: according to a 2008 International
Organization for Migration (IOM) report, estimates
for 2006 show 46 percent working in construction,
19 percent in services, ten percent each in trade
and transport, and the rest in agriculture,
industry, and housekeeping. Because many of these
migrants are undocumented, figures for migrants
working in host countries are not available. Many
are known to work either in Russia or Ukraine, as
well as in Italy, Portugal, Spain, Israel and
Turkey.


10. Communities of Moldovans also exist in the
U.S., often centered on Pentecostal or Baptist
Churches, though some of the Moldovans are part of
Jewish emigre communities. New York City
(predominantly Brighton Beach and Queens) is home
to many of these mostly Jewish Moldovans who left
either during the Soviet or post-Soviet period,
while church-based communities have formed in
Sacramento, California as well as throughout the
Pacific Northwest and Atlantic Southern states.
Significant church-based communities exist in
Washington State in the Seattle-Tacoma and Spokane
metropolitan areas, and in Portland, Oregon.
Growth in such communities is also visible in the
states of Illinois, Georgia and North Carolina.


11. Focusing on ethnic Moldovan communities, the
following paragraphs are keyed to the questions
posed in reftel:

-- (Question A) There are a number of non-
governmental organizations representing Moldovans
abroad, many focusing on Moldovan culture or
political advocacy. A representative list may be

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gleaned from those organizations which signed an
open letter requesting additional polling stations
prior to the April 5, 2009, parliamentary
elections: The Community of Bessarabian Romanians
in USA (Phoenix, USA) (website: www.LaBordei.com);
the Italia-Moldova Institute for Cooperation and
Development (Trieste, Italy); the Association of
the Moldovan Community in Ireland (Dublin,
Ireland); the Fratia Association (Setubal,
Portugal); the DOINA Socio-Cultural Association
(Rome, Italy); Mondomigranti Newspaper (Bologna,
Italy); Assomoldave-Associazione donne Moldave in
Italia (Roma, Italy); the Moldova for Democracy
and Development Foundation (New York, USA); The
Moldova Foundation (Washington, USA); the Mihai
Eminescu Socio-Cultural Association (Reggio
Emilia, Italy); the Association of Moldovan
Emigrants in USA (Tampa, USA); the Association of
United Moldovan Communities (ACUM) Q COMUNISON
(London, Great Britain); Moldovenii in Lume (Rome,
Italy); the Moldova Cultural Association (Trento,
Italy); and the Speranta Association (Torino.
Italy). (Note: the Moldova Foundation in
Washington DC, website
http://foundation.moldova.org, is headed by former
Moldovan Embassy DCM Vlad Spanu; former U.S.
Ambassador to Moldova John Todd Stewart serves on
the Advisory Board. End Note.)

-- (Question B) Many Moldovans living abroad are
economic migrants who provide direct support to
their extended families. Until the recent
economic crisis, remittances from employment
abroad accounted for well over a third of
Moldova's national GDP. However, aside from
direct economic support to family members back
home, it is not at all clear that there is a well
developed sense of a shared ethnic or national
identity, or some sense of a lost homeland. Most
of these economic migrants have Moldovan
citizenship, many own property in Moldova, and
some return home either if they lose their jobs
or, temporarily, if they wish to vote. It was the
IOM, and not diaspora-based community
organizations, which spearheaded "get out the
vote" efforts in Moldovan communities abroad.
(Note: Those Moldovans abroad who did vote in
April and July parliamentary elections gave only
8.5 percent of their votes in both elections to
the PCRM. The PCRM scored 49 and 44 percent,
respectively, in Moldova. End Note.)

-- (Question C) The outgoing PCRM government in
Moldova is not popular with much of the economic
migrant population, who see it as responsible for
their need to leave the country. Post has no
information on the GOM's ability to influence
either secular or religious diaspora communities.
Admittedly, this may change with a peaceful
transfer of power from the PCRM government to
those parties which had until the July election
been in the opposition. However, some of the
church communities outside of Moldova are very
active in attempting to provide assistance to
social services such as orphanages or nursing
homes in Moldova, usually in partnership with U.S.
based missionary groups. Strikingly, Moldova does
not appear to have a philanthropic infrastructure
outside of that provided by religious groups.

-- (Question D) The current diaspora communities
provide individual economic support to nuclear and
extended family members. No concerted efforts to
improve infrastructure, or to reinvest earned
income in Moldovan projects, have been apparent
among the Moldovan diaspora. In large part this
may be caused by migrants' belief that social and
government structures in Moldova are corrupt.
(Note: any money inflows by diaspora members tend
to go to purchase of consumer goods by supported
relatives and to the construction of houses for
use by relatives and returning emigres. End
Note.) By contrast, Turkey does provide social
and infrastructure support to the semi-autonomous
Gagauz region in the south of Moldova, whose
inhabitants speak a dialect of Turkish and
emigrated to the region at least 200 years ago.
As the development of Moldovan communities abroad
is still in its formative stages, it is difficult
to assess their potential in the future. If

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emigrants' perceptions of corruption and
favoritism in Moldova change, and if they generate
enough surplus income to make significant
investments, significant investment could occur.

-- (Question E) The present diaspora communities
are much more concerned with earning their daily
bread than with scientific or institutional
development. While both in private conversations
and in the press, Moldovans commonly declare the
need for foreign investment, no similar statements
about such investment have come from the diaspora.
Moldovans are very positive about learning from
the West through travel, work abroad, and study in
Europe and the U.S., and hundreds of qualified
Moldovan applicants go to the U.S. each year for
academic studies. Approaching such applicants
while they are in the U.S., or shortly after their
return, may be the best way to involve them in
science diplomacy programs. For the last three
summers, Moldovan university students traveling to
the United States on Summer Work and Travel (SWT)
programs numbered 2,600 in 2009, 5,500 in 2008,
and 5,000 in 2007. (Note: The drop in 2009
numbers was the result of fraudulent activities of
numerous SWT sponsoring companies in 2008. End
Note.) Moldovan SWT veterans who study science at
university are possible participants in science
diplomacy programs.

-- (Question F) Moldova endures a frozen conflict
with the unrecognized break-away region of
Transnistria, which separated from Moldova under
Russian influence, after a 1992 ceasefire halted
hostilities. In Transnistria, the Russian
language is heavily favored, and Latin-script
Romanian-language schools are subject to
discrimination, as the Transnistrian authorities
maintain that the Moldovan language should remain
as it was during the Soviet period, written in the
Cyrillic script. The presence of Russian troops
in Transnistria is a violation of Moldovan
territorial integrity, and an effective bar to any
future integration into the European Union. With
the exception of political advocacy on the part of
those Moldovan organizations formed specifically
for that purpose (such as the Moldova Foundation
in Washington D.C.),Moldovans abroad have played
no active part in resolving this issue.

-- (Question G) Moldovans abroad are not involved
in meeting the needs of indigenous peoples outside
of the majority population group.

-- (Question H) Moldovans voting abroad
overwhelmingly supported non-PCRM parties in April
and July elections, giving a combined 70.4 percent
of their vote to the pro-west center-right Liberal
and Liberal Democratic parties in April; in July,
the combined total was 76.9 percent. With a
peaceful transfer of power from the PCRM
government to the Alliance for European
Integration, it is likely that opportunities for
engagement would grow significantly.

-- (Question I) The outgoing PCRM government has
not demonstrated a significant amount of concern
for Moldovan communities abroad, although the
continued flow of remittances has contributed to
the economic stability of the country.

-- (Question J) Because they are diffuse and not
politically active, Post has not attempted any
outreach to Moldovan diaspora communities.

-- (Question K) Post has not received any
unsolicited requests from diaspora community
members, apart from those requesting visa issuance
for family members. These requests are handled as
a routine consular matter. Several Moldovans
residing in the U.S. have asked their senators and
members of Congress to write to us on behalf of
relatives seeking visas, demonstrating a growing
political awareness of and familiarity with U.S.
government operations.

-- (Question K) Post has not attempted any public
diplomacy program outreach to Moldovan diaspora
communities. Outreach to Moldovan communities in
the U.S. could contravene the Smith-Mundt Act

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(which prohibits domestic access to information
intended for foreign audiences),and Post has
until now focused its attention on outreach to
Moldovan citizens in Moldova.

-- (Question M) Post sees anticipated requests
from the Moldovan diaspora community, apart from
visa issues described in para. 18),as falling
primarily in the economic and investment sphere.
The knowledge-management tools and information
materials most helpful to action officers at Post
consist of our extant contacts in the government,
financial sector, and business community.

COMMENT:
--------------


12. The continued existence of Moldovan migrant
communities in Europe depends in large part upon
the economic and political situation in Moldova.
Should the economic situation at home improve,
large numbers of migrants would likely return home
to reunite with their children and parents.
Although this outcome would affect the numbers of
the Moldovan diaspora, it is also clear that some
Moldovans will remain permanently outside of
Moldova, as is already happening with the members
of the faith-based communities in the U.S. It is
unclear at present how such communities will
define themselves in relation to, or apart from,
their homeland.

CHAUDHRY