Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHISINAU643
2009-08-14 16:01:00
SECRET
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM EAID MD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2824
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHCH #0643/01 2261601
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 141601Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8293
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000643 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID MD
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHISINAU 000643

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2029
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM EAID MD
SUBJECT: POSSIBILITY OF COMMUNIST PARTY SPLIT

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary: Deputy Prime Minister Igor Dodon
(strictly protect) confided to Ambassador that a
group of younger, reform-minded members of the
Party of Communists (PCRM) were considering
breaking with PCRM to establish a new center-left
party. This new party, which would focus on
economic reform and implementing IMF
recommendations, could unite with other non-
Communist parties to attempt to elect a president.
Dodon said that the new party would also seek to
remove the hard-line PCRM Ministers of Interior
and Security from office (an agenda that coincides
with that of the four-party non-Communist
coalition). In a separate conversation, political
analyst Andrei Popov, who was elected MP on
Democratic Party leader Lupu's list, shed further
light on divisions within the PCRM. End Summary.

Reformists Considering Breaking from PCRM
--------------


2. (S) On August 13, Deputy Prime Minister Igor
Dodon (strictly protect) told the Ambassador that
there were on-going discussions within the PCRM
about the possibilities for making a coalition
with one or two of the opposition parties. He
said that he himself favored a coalition with
Lupu, whom the PCRM would then support for
President. However, to be palatable to Lupu, such
an arrangement would require Voronin to renounce
designs on either the Speaker or Prime Minister
positions. Dodon conceded that he was unsure
whether Voronin would agree to this, but said he
would discuss the scenario with the Acting
President when he (Voronin) returns from his
vacation on August 15.


3. (S) Dodon then confided that if Voronin
declined Dodon's proposal, a group of younger,
reform-minded members of the PCRM could break with
the Communists to form a new center-left party.
Dodon said that this new group wanted to bring the
IMF back and follow the recommendations of the IMF
report, and was ready to push economic reform. In
addition, they would seek to remove Minister of
the Interior Papuc, Minister of State Security
Services (SIS) Artur Resetnikov, Deputy Prime

Minister Rosca, and Foreign Minister Stratan from
office.


4. (S) Dodon said that the emergence of this
splinter party would help create a real center in
the Moldovan political spectrum. The unreformed
Communists would occupy the far left and Ghimpu's
Liberals the far right, while Dodon's new grouping
would work with the Democratic Party, Our Moldova
Alliance (AMN),and the Liberal Democratic Party
to put together a government.

PCRM Division into Two Camps
--------------


5. (C) In a separate conversation on August 12,
political analyst Andrei Popov (who was just
elected MP on Lupu's list) also described to
Pol/Econ chief the divisions within the PCRM.
Popov, who noted that the 48-member PCRM
parliamentary faction has 12 non-party members on
its list (including eight who are among the top
22),said that the party split between "reformers"
and "hard-liners" was obvious during the election
campaign, and had sharpened now over how to handle
the current political situation.


6. (C) According to Popov, the PCRM's reformist
camp, headed by Voronin advisor Mark Tkaciuk,
included such figures as DPM Dodon, Voronin's
economic advisor Oleg Reidman, Deputy Speaker
Grigorie Petrenco, Minister of Reintegration
Vasile Sova, Yuri Muntaneanu, and others. The
hard-line camp was headed by First Deputy Speaker
Turcan, and included SIS head Resetnikov, Foreign
Minister Stratan, Minister of Interior Papuc,
Minister of Justice Victor Pirlog, Deputy Prime
Minister Victor Stepaniuc, Eugenia Ostapciuc and
Maria Postoico. Although Iurie Rosca was not a
PCRM member, according to Popov, he was allied
with the hard-liner camp.

CHISINAU 00000643 002 OF 002




7. (C) Popov explained that Mark Tkaciuk had hand-
picked and groomed both Stratan and Lupu and
helped them rise to Deputy Minister and then
Ministerial levels. In 2005, when Voronin's re-
election as President was uncertain, and Tkaciuk
won over Iurie Rosca, eventually providing an
additional 22 votes (rather than just the
necessary 5),in exchange, Voronin let Tkaciuk's
protege Lupu become the Speaker. According to
Popov, Tkaciuk's relations with Stratan soured in
2004, and from 2006, when Lupu wanted to be more
independent from Tkaciuk, their relations soured
as well. The firing of Lazar as Minister of
Economy in September 2006 signaled Lupu's waning
influence. Popov said that Tkaciuk then focused
on grooming an even younger group including
Petrenco, Dodon, Muntaneanu and Ion Ceban.

Comment
--------------


8. (S) It is clear that nothing is certain at this
juncture and that all the players are actively
considering their options. That said, Dodon's
scenario of a split within the PCRM, while at
present highly uncertain, could dramatically
transform the political picture in Moldova. There
could be enough "reformers" in the PCRM faction to
ensure the election of the President, should the
new group join with the non-Communist coalition
parties. (According to Moldovan legislation,
although MPs are elected on a party slate, once
within the Parliament, an MP who wishes to change
parties may do so.)


9. (S) It is unclear where Mark Tkaciuk stands in
this complex scenario. After personally grooming
Lupu and Stratan and helping them to rise to
power, his relations with them soured; therefore
we do not know if his hand-picked young reformers
are breaking away from him, or if he is supporting
this idea. Currently, our best guess is that they
do not have his blessing, and that Dodon appears
to be considering his own bid for the personal
political limelight.

CHAUDHRY