What Comes Next: Expert Views

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SUBJECT: What Comes Next: Expert Views

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REF: Chisinau 604


1. (SBU) Summary: Moldovan experts agree that the
July 29 elections offer a chance for opposition
parties to exercise power, although the
constitutional provisions for establishing a
government will make the process complicated. The
current ruling Communist Party of the Republic of
Moldova (PCRM) retains the largest number of seats
and may be able to block opposition initiatives.
The four different analysts with whom we spoke
each concurred that the four opposition parties
will try to work together, but disagreed about
whether this cooperation would successfully
endure. Another point of disagreement was the
extent to which a non-PCRM government should
prosecute alleged crimes and corruption by
outgoing GOM officials. On Transnistria, our
analyst contacts believed that Chisinau's policy
was unlikely to change significantly. There was
general relief that the election had gone smoothly
and had produced results acceptable to the
parties, despite the challenges ahead. End
Summary.


Opportunity, yes Q capability, maybe
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2. (SBU) In separate meetings, TDY poloffs spoke
July 31 and August 3 with four leading Moldovan
political analysts to explore potential post-
election developments. Jockeying and speculation
continue, complicated by Moldova's political
system, (reftel) which will require either
agreement by the two main blocs on a president or
sufficient defections from one side to the other
to reach the 61 votes necessary for electing a
president. The experts agreed that Moldova's
opposition parties had gained a real chance to
play a significant role in governing the country.
However, their ability to remain unified and to
develop policies beyond "out with the Communists"
is much less clear. Analysts agreed that the four
opposition parties were united for the present,
although views varied as to whether they would be
able to govern together. The parties hold a
slender edge (53 out of 101 seats in Parliament)
even for votes requiring a simple majority, so
maintaining party discipline and interparty
concord will be of ongoing importance on all
votes.

3. (SBU) Our contacts were in general agreement on
the major differences among the four opposition
parties. The Liberal Party, (PL),which gained 15
seats, is the most stridently pro-Romanian and
anti-PCRM; its social policies tend toward the
populist as seen in its support for lowering the
retirement age. The 18-seat Liberal Democratic
Party (PLDM) is widely regarded as pro-business
with some talented technocrats Q but also alleged
ties to dubious privatizations. The Our Moldova
Alliance (AMN),with seven seats, has been in
decline and our experts predicted it would
disappear in the next elections. The new face in
the opposition, with 13 seats, is the Democratic
Party (PD),led by former speaker Marian Lupu who
defected from PCRM in June. PD, formerly a
marginal party, lacks a fully-developed ideology
but several experts said it aspires to be a
center-left social democratic party. It is also
the party best placed to reach out to PCRM
assuming Acting President Voronin can forgive
Lupu's "betrayal."

Cooperate with PCRM, or shut it out?
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4. (SBU) The question of how, or whether, the
opposition should try to work with PCRM emerged as
a clear area of disagreement. Some commentators
favored trying to lure potential PCRM defectors to
an opposition-led coalition, arguing that the
PCRM's declining support combined with the example
set by Lupu could ensure success. Another analyst
opposed any "cohabitation" with PCRM completely,

CHISINAU 00000608 002 OF 002


while the fourth argued for working with PCRM to
nominate a compromise candidate for President.
Such a person, perhaps former Prime Minister
Greceanii (who is not a member of any party),
would not be entirely in debt to either side and
would be harder to manipulate. In addition, the
grave economic situation should push the
opposition to "sharing the blame" by having at
least some PCRM role in government formation.

5. (SBU) Two of our experts raised the question of
how to address alleged crime and corruption by
PCRM officials. One believed it crucial for the
new government - which he expected could take
power quickly despite the constitutional hurdles -
to take immediate steps to "put people in jail"
and restore public trust. His colleague, who came
back to this point several times, argued the
opposite: the PCRM retains substantial popular
support, and for the opposition to appear to be
engaged in a vendetta would further polarize an
already difficult atmosphere. Non-transparent
prosecutions would damage a key opposition claim:
that they are the proponents of rule-of-law and
democratic "European" values.
Transnistria: major shift unlikely
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6. (SBU) Regardless of how, or if, the government
is formed, our contacts did not foresee a major
shift on Transnistria. Several commented that
attempts to push forward on Transnistria could be
counterproductive and consume energy that could be
better spent on priorities in right-bank Moldova.
Comment:
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7. (SBU) Neither Transnistria nor the Russian
presence there elicited strong emotions from any
of our experts. They all recognize that, however
inter-party dynamics play out, domestic
considerations come first. End Comment.
Chaudhry