LUPU DEFECTION FROM COMMUNISTS CREATES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000575

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM MD
SUBJECT: LUPU DEFECTION FROM COMMUNISTS CREATES
NEW CENTER IN MOLDOVAN POLITICAL SPECTRUM

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The departure of former
Parliamentary Speaker Marian Lupu from the Party
of Communists (PCRM) on June 10 has transformed
the deeply-divided Moldovan political map by
introducing a new political center. Immediately
following Lupu's announcement, the Ambassador met
with key political party leaders to hear their
opinions on the upcoming repeat parliamentary
elections and the political developments
surrounding Lupu's defection. Some expressed
doubts about whether Lupu's defection was sincere
or a "Communist project." Interlocutors concurred
that the key test would be whether Lupu later
voted with the Communists or the opposition when
the new parliament convened after the July 29
repeat elections.


2. (C) Though there was an initial scramble to see
whether Lupu would be able to unite either the
entire opposition, or at least the centrist
parties, in the end egos and political differences
prevailed and Lupu ended up taking over the
electoral list of Dumitru Diacov's Democratic
Party. The three main opposition parties (Liberal
Party - PL, Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova -
PDLM and Our Moldova Alliance - AMN) later made an
attempt to unite on a single list, which also
failed. Moldova now stands poised for July 29
elections facing the likely scenario that no party
will win enough votes to elect a president and
that a coalition will be needed in order to put
together a new government. If such coalition were
to fail, President Voronin woQd continue on as a
limping (but not fully lame) duck president until
new parliamentary elections could be held in 2010.
End Summary.

Lupu's Defection from PCRM Changes Political
Spectrum
-------------- --------------
---


3. (C) Following the two failed attempts by the
Parliament elected April 5 to provide the 60
percent majority of votes needed to choose a
president (May 20 and June 4),it was clear that
repeat parliamentary elections would be required.
On June 10, former Parliamentary Speaker Marian
Lupu delivered his stunning announcement that he
was leaving the Party of Communists. Lupu quickly
came to an agreement with Dumitru Diacov that he
would take over the Democratic Party's electoral
list and use this established party as the vehicle
for his campaign platform. Lupu's defection has
created a new electoral force to occupy a centrist
position, establishing a third alternative to the
two opposing poles, of PCRM vs. opposition
parties. Following Lupu's defection, Ambassador
(accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief) met immediately
and repeatedly with the range of party leaders
(Urechean, Ghimpu, Diacov, Filat, Bragis, and
Lupu) to discuss the shifting political picture in
Moldova.

Was Lupu's Defection Sincere or a Communist
Project?
-------------- --------------
--


4. (C) The opposition leaders expressed some
uncertainties and doubts about Lupu's sincerity
and his motives. Urechean said (6/10) that he was
not sure if Lupu's defection was sincere, or if it
was "a Voronin project."
Liberal Party Leader Mihai Ghimpu also expressed
some doubts (6/11),but said optimistically, that
if Lupu had sincerely left the Communists, then
there was now a new light of hope that things
could change in Moldova. Ghimpu took some credit
for this turn of events, saying that if the
opposition had voted along with the Communists and
selected a president, then Lupu would have stayed
there too, and nothing would have changed.


5. (C) All interlocutors noted that the key test
would be determined by whether Lupu joined up with
the Communists or the Opposition in the new

CHISINAU 00000575 002 OF 003


parliament after the repeat elections. Urechean
believed that if Lupu made it into the parliament,
he might end up joining with the Communists, a
scenario that was actually ideal for Voronin. On
the other hand, Urechean speculated that if Lupu
were able to unite all the Social Democrats
together, such unity would be good for Moldova's
democratic development.

Lupu's Search for his Best Campaign Vehicle
--------------


6. (C) In the days before Lupu's announcement that
he would lead the list of Diacov's Democratic
Party, opposition leaders met repeatedly with each
other and with Lupu. All were involved in trying
to determine whether a common list would be
possible, while Lupu was also negotiating to
resolve the question of which list to run on.
Diacov confirmed that on June 10 he had met with
Filat and Urechean. He said that he had tried to
convince them not to be too aggressive about Lupu
leaving the PCRM, and to stop suggesting that
Lupu's leaving the party was a project of the
PCRM. Filat confirmed on June 10 that he was
reaching out to Lupu and had also met with Diacov
and Braghis.


7. (C) Diacov explained how he had offered Lupu
the chairmanship of the party. He said that
initially Filat had wanted Diacov to join his
(Filat's) party, but nothing worked out between
them. Diacov confided that he believed the real
problem was between Filat and Lupu -- Filat would
not accept having anyone else as number one, and
hence preferred to run on his own ticket. Diacov
noted that unfortunately he did not manage to get
a common position with Bragis. Diacov told
Ambassador that he objectively believed that Lupu
was the most suitable person in Moldova for the
post of president.


8. (C) Lupu confided to Ambassador on June 14 that
he had carefully considered his options. He had
systematically talked to Urechean, Filat, Diacov
and Bragis. There were also two completely
unknown parties that had offered him the chance to
take over, and build the party structure himself.
These two unknown parties were Moldova Unita
(United Moldova) headed by Ana Taciuc and Forta
Noua (New Force) headed by former Minister of
Defense Valeriu Plesca. Lupu feared that Moldova
Unita was backed by the FSB, and was concerned
that Forta Noua was nothing more than Plesca
himself. Lupu reported that his best discussions
were with Diacov, and in the end he decided that
Diacov offered him the best party structure to
work with.

Opposition Attempts to form a Joint List
--------------


9. (C) In early July, days before the deadline for
finalizing candidate lists, the three opposition
parties PDLM, PL and AMN made a last attempt to
form a joint list. Liberal Party leader and
Chisinau Mayor Dorin Chirtoaca told the Ambassador
that Filat had approached him urging that the
parties run together. Objective observers
suggested that if the parties could run together
with a unified message, they would be much
stronger and might possibly win enough support to
form a government. A Party Congress of the
Liberal Party met on Saturday July 4, attended by
54 members of the Central Committee, and voted
almost unanimously in favor of running on a joint
list. As Filat was pushing for a joint list and
Urechean was apparently on board, it appeared
possible that these parties might actually come
together for the elections.


10. (C) Apparently egos did not allow the parties
to resolve the sticky questions of which party's
list the three would run on, or who would head the
list. The three parties did not succeed in
forming a joint list. Filat later told the
Ambassador that he was angry that he had lost the
first twelve days of the official electoral
campaign with his back and forth discussions with
the PL and AMN leaders. Filat claimed he had

CHISINAU 00000575 003 OF 003


even willing agree to running on the Liberal Party
list, and even to let Chirtoaca run as number one,
but the initiative hQ nonetheless failed. Filat
blamed AMN leader Urechean for the failure to run
together, telling us that Urechean had agreed at
first, and then backed down.

No Party to Win the Golden Majority
--------------


11. (C) Looking ahead to likely results of the
elections, it appears that the Party of Communists
will have a poorer showing July 29 than they did
on April 5. Urechean told us he was quite sure
that the Communists would do worse in the repeat
elections, and predicted a drop of some 10-15
percent, resulting in not more than 49-50 seats
altogether -- not even enough to elect a Speaker.
As Parliament could not be dissolved a second time
in the same year, it would thus be necessary for
the parties to reach an arrangement in the new
parliament.


12. (C) Ghimpu predicted that Lupu could draw some
5-10% away from the PCRM. Ghimpu explained that
the PCRM controls a certain niche that no one
would remove, suggesting that there were several
categories of voters for the PCRM: (1) those who
support the PCRM regardless of the standard of
living; (2) those who got their jobs from the PCRM
(and would be dismissed if other parties came to
power); and (3) the Russian-speaking electorate.
On the other hand there were in the PCRM people
who had voted for Lupu, some of whom would now
follow him to the Democratic Party.


13. (C) Diacov was quite confident that with Lupu
on this party's ticket, the Democratic Party would
be successful in winning a place in the new
parliament. At the most pessimistic, he predicted
a 10 percent showing, though he thought 15-20
percent was more optimistic, and that 10-15
percent was a realistic estimate.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) At this point, Embassy believes it most
likely that neither the PCRM nor the PL/PLDM/AMN
opposition pole will win enough votes to elect the
president after the elections. It is possible
that, as they did in the last elections, the PCRM
will once again win enough seats to select a
speaker (51),but not enough to elect the
president (61). On the other hand, according to
early polling data, it is also likely that the
PCRM may fail even to win the speaker's majority.
In such a case, the PCRM would be forced to seek a
coalition partner. It appears Lupu would likely
have enough votes to be the "kingmaker." While it
is theoretically possible that the PCRM might seek
coalition with Filat or Urechean, it is more
likely that it will either have to make a
coalition with Lupu, or fail to put a new
government in place. If so, Voronin would
continue on as a limping (not fully lame) duck
President until repeat parliamentary elections
could be held in 2010. While such a scenario
might suit Voronin, if he truly desires to hang on
to the presidency, prolonging the state of
electoral uncertainties would be disastrous for
Moldova in the current economic times. Moldova
needs to get a new government in place, start
negotiations with the IMF for a new agreement, and
get on with the business of running the country.

CHAUDHRY