Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHISINAU377
2009-05-20 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR MARK TKACIUK PREFERS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM MD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9149
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHCH #0377/01 1401437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201437Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7980
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000377 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM MD
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR MARK TKACIUK PREFERS
COMPROMISE TO THE "GOLDEN VOTE"

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Ref A: Chisinau 375

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000377

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM MD
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR MARK TKACIUK PREFERS
COMPROMISE TO THE "GOLDEN VOTE"

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Ref A: Chisinau 375


1. (C) Summary: In a May 18 meeting with the
Ambassador, Presidential Advisor Mark Tkaciuk
argued that Moldova has emerged from each of its
previous political crises as a stronger state. He
believed that cutting a deal to find the "golden
vote" would be possible, but would leave the
country divided, with a weaker democracy. It
would be far better to reach a political consensus
based on principles and power-sharing. There were
already some contacts with Urechean and his party
and Tkaciuk had been trying to call Filat to
initiate a discussion. Tkaciuk blamed Romania for
trying to force a repeat round of parliamentary
elections. End Summary

Crisis Makes Us Stronger
--------------


2. (C) In a May 18 meting Mark Tkaciuk explained
to the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief)
that in Moldova's recent history, each round of
crisis had made the country stronger. He cited
the situation in 2000 which had resulted in the
creation of a parliamentary regime. In response
to the Party of Communists' (PCRM) conflict with
Iurie Rosca in 2002, Moldova had entered a phase
of more active cooperation with European
institutions, particularly the Council of Europe.
As a result, said Tkaciuk, Moldova adopted the Law
on Public Broadcasting, held a number of
roundtables with the participation of both
opposition and GOM authorities, and held various
meetings between the authorities and NGOs.


3. (C) In 2005, an apparently unsolvable conflict
emerged following parliamentary elections that
left the PCRM short of votes needed to elect a
president. With the exception of Ghimpu and
Chirtoaca, all the other players were the same as
now. The key difference in 2005 was that the
opposition was then supported by Russia. The
conflict in 2005 was easier for the PCRM, because
they knew who their candidate for president would
be, but was more difficult for the opposition.
Tkaciuk said that he had conducted negotiations
with the key opposition leaders (Iurie Rosca, Oleg

Serebrian and Dumitry Diacov). In 2005, they
could have just cut a deal ("Soviet style") by
offering a government post to Serebrian, but
instead they discussed principles and worked out a
settlement that brought Rosca into the Parliament.
Of the agreements reached in 2005, Tkaciuk said
that they had implemented all principles except
two: (1) the GOM had not yet completed the
promised reform of the Prosecutor's office, and
(2) though the Parliament implemented the change
of the threshold from six to four percent, it had
set it back again.

Consensus Trumps "Golden Vote Deal"
--------------


4. (C) Tkaciuk suggested that the first option to
elect the PCRM's presidential candidate would be a
"golden vote deal" (the one MP needed to give the
PCRM the 61 needed to elect a president),but that
a far better approach would be to reach a
political consensus regarding principles. The
deal option was the wrong way to elect a
president, he continued, as it would continue the
majority party's cold war with the opposition,
resulting in a weaker democracy. Moldova could
then spend the next four years arguing about
whether elections were fraudulent and whether or
not the April 7 demonstrations and riots were
really a coup d'etat.


5. (C) Far better, continued Tkaciuk, would be a
consensus in the name of principles. Consensus
would give the opposition access to key positions
in the government to oversee human rights, special
services and federal reform. Tkaciuk said he
could theoretically assume what the opposition's
demands to reach consensus would be (such as
reform of the media),but noted that he had not

CHISINAU 00000377 002 OF 003


yet received any formal proposals from his
opposition colleagues. The Ambassador noted that
Filat had made a public statement listing six
conditions for negotiating, but Tkaciuk dismissed
this, saying that the opposition had not yet made
any formal proposal directly to the PCRM.


6. (C) Tkaciuk said that he was ready to reach an
understanding with the opposition, but that so far
the PCRM had not succeeded. Urechean kept
postponing meetings and, charged Tkaciuk, was
behaving like someone trying to cut a "golden vote
deal" rather than as a leader trying to reach a
political consensus. Thus far, Urechean preferred
to discuss these issues with other representatives
of the PCRM, rather than with Tkaciuk himself.
Tkaciuk continued by charging that Filat did not
know what he was doing. Tkaciuk had tried to call
him twice on the previous day (May 17) in order to
have a discussion.


7. (C) Tkaciuk did not expect to reach this
consensus in time for the May 20 vote, but was
hopeful that this could be done by the second
round of presidential voting. (Note: With all 41
opposition MPs boycotting the May 20 presidential
vote, the PCRM candidate, acting PM Greceanii,
received all 60 PCRM votes, one short of the the
61 needed. If a second try, scheduled for May 28,
fails, Parliament will be dissolved and a
nationwide parliamentary election must be held on
or before Sunday, July 12. End note.) However,
he noted, if they did not find the opportunity for
consensus, they would pursue the "golden vote
deal." This would allow the GOM to win in the
short term, but would destroy opposition
solidarity. Thus, the PCRM would strategically
lose the opportunity to modernize and to fix the
image of Moldova.

Romania Supports Early Parliamentary Elections
-------------- -


8. (C) Tkaciuk referred to Filat's statements in
Parliament that he favored repeating parliamentary
elections. Tkaciuk believed that the opposition's
support for repeat elections had been strengthened
by Romanian President Basescu's recent statements.
While claiming not to be a "Romania-phobe,"
Tkaciuk complained that Basescu's statements
demonstrated a rejection of Moldovan statehood.
He said that the next day all Romanian media
quoted statements from experts that "the time had
come to call things by their proper names, i.e.
that Romania wanted reintegration with Moldova."
Tkaciuk claimed that Romania wanted early
elections in Moldova. He said that the outcome
would be the same, but that the quality of the
elections would be bad. He feared that early
elections would lead to a hardening of the two
camps' positions that would destroy Moldova's
democratic process.

Projected Constitutional Amendments
--------------


9. (C) In separate comments to Pol/Econ Chief
after the meeting, Tkaciuk shed further light on
comments we had heard from President Voronin (ref
A) about future amendments to the constitution.
Tkaciuk confirmed that the new Speaker planned to
introduce the idea of amending the constitution in
order to create a stronger Parliament and a true
parliamentary system. The position of Prime
Minister would be strengthened at the expense of
the Presidency. Tkaciuk said that the goal would
be to have the Presidential post become a largely
ceremonial one, with much less responsibility for
day-to-day running of the government than the
position currently held.


10. (C) Comment: Tkaciuk is usually reported to
be the strategic analyst behind the Voronin
machine. As Tkaciuk was reputed to be a strong
supporter of Lupu, we were initially surprised
when Grecianii's name surfaced instead as the
PCRM's presidential candidate. The Tkaciuk-
Voronin plan to weaken the presidency helps
explain this move. The first challenge facing the
PCRM remains getting their presidential candidate

CHISINAU 00000377 003 OF 003


elected. Tkaciuk showed good strategic thinking
in his assessment that reaching a political deal
with the opposition would be better that the
"golden vote deal." As both Tkaciuk and Voronin
immediately mentioned Urechean when discussing the
idea of reaching an understanding with one of the
political parties, we can assume that they have
grounds for believing the Our Moldova Alliance
(AMN) will come over to the PCRM side. Tkaciuk
commented that he did not expect to remain as an
MP, which means he expects to be offered either a
ministerial or ambassadorial post.

CHAUDHRY