Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHISINAU283
2009-04-07 14:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

JOINT DECLARATION 2-PLUS-1: MISTAKES WERE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM RO MD 
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DE RUEHCH #0283/01 0971448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071448Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7854
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000283 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM RO MD
SUBJECT: JOINT DECLARATION 2-PLUS-1: MISTAKES WERE
MADE

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Ref A: Chisinau 216

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000283

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM RO MD
SUBJECT: JOINT DECLARATION 2-PLUS-1: MISTAKES WERE
MADE

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

Ref A: Chisinau 216


1. (C) Summary: Minister for Reintegration Vasile
Sova and former Presidential Advisor Marc Tkaciuk
called on Ambassador on March 24, upon
instructions from President Voronin, to provide
further explanation about the March 18 2-plus-1
meeting and the Joint Declaration. It is not
patently clear to the Moldovans that the document
was a mistake. While in Moscow, Voronin had
accepted Smirnov's invitation to meet in Tiraspol
on March 25. Sova and Tkaciuk informed us of
their intention to announce that Voronin would not
participate. According to Sova and Tkaciuk,
Voronin was so outraged by Smirnov's statement
earlier that day announcing a travel ban against
the U.S. and EU ambassadors that he would not meet
again with Smirnov until the ban was lifted. End
Summary.

No Voronin-Smirnov Meeting March 25
--------------


2. (C) Though Voronin had formally accepted
Smirnov's invitation to meet in Tiraspol in a 1-
plus-1 format on March 25, Sova and Tkaciuk
informed us that this meeting would not take
place. The GOM was so outraged by Smirnov's
"counter-productive" press statement on March 24
announcing a travel ban against Ambassador
Chaudhry, EU Special Representative Kalman Miszei,
and Czech Ambassador Petr Kypr (because he holds
the EU chairmanship),that Voronin felt it would
not be possible to meet with Smirnov, lest this
appear as a form of agreement with him. GOM
officials were particularly outraged by Smirnov's
linking his statement to the March 18 declaration,
thus giving the impression that Smirnov felt he
did not have to let the EU and U.S.
representatives into Transnistria. The Moldovan
interpretation was that Smirnov wanted to
aggressively use the travel ban to kill prospects
for a 5-plus-2, by showing he could even keep U.S.
and EU negotiators out of his "country." Tkaciuk
and Sova said that no meeting with Smirnov could
take place unless all participants could move
freely in that part of Moldova.


3. (C) Sova and Tkaciuk informed us in advance of

their intention to announce that, as a result of
the destabilizing statements by Smirnov, the GOM
was no longer interested in participating in the
previously agreed-upon March 25 meeting. Sova and
Tkaciuk said that they wanted to consult with the
U.S. Ambassador before issuing the statement.
They had already spoken with Kalman Miszei who had
responded that Solana's office supported such a
Moldovan statement. The Moldovan officials wanted
to know if the USG supported this approach, and
the Ambassador answered that indeed we did.

Joint Declaration was a Mistake
--------------


4. (C) Sova and Tkaciuk said that President
Voronin had specifically told them to meet with
the American Ambassador, listen to USG concerns
and give us a factual description of what actually
happened in Moscow. To allay concerns about lack
of transparency, they explained that as late as
Friday, March 13, the GOM side was almost certain
that there would be no 2-plus-1 meeting at all.
In fact, they were so sure that Presidential
Advisor Stati called in the Russian Ambassador to
tell him that the GOM proposed postponing the
meeting until after elections. However, the next
day, on Saturday the 14th, Russian President
Medvedev personally called Voronin to urge him to
participate. Medvedev said that the Russians
would accept any Moldovan starting position. When
President Voronin went to Moscow, there was no
draft statement. However, according to Sova and
Tkaciuk, they had talked about the principles --
territorial integrity, holding a 5-plus-2 to
discuss Transnistria (TN)status issues,
demilitarization and confidence building measures.


CHISINAU 00000283 002 OF 003



5. (C) The Ambassador went though the main USG
concerns on the Joint Declaration (drawing on
previous talking points),citing lack of trust
created, no mention of territorial integrity, and
in particular, the setback on peacekeeping forces
that point 4 represented. Sova and Tkaciuk
admitted that these criticisms were valid, and
agreed that the statement was a mistake. They
said they had the same concerns.


6. (C) By way of explanation they noted that Sova
was in the hospital, and Tkaciuk had remained in
Chisinau -- hence Voronin went off to Moscow
without his key experts. Before the president's
departure, they agreed that Tkaciuk would be
available at all times by telephone, and Voronin
promised to call. Tkaciuk said that the only call
he received from Stati (who had accompanied
Voronin) was after the agreement was signed to
read it to him.


7. (C) As far back as a year ago, they noted, the
GOM had been concerned that the Russians would
give them a draft statement just before the
elections. After Russia's negative intervention
in the 2005 elections, Voronin had decided to go
to Moscow now so that it would not be possible to
accuse him of not taking a Transnistria settlement
seriously.


8. (C) Unfortunately, Sova and Mark felt that
since they, the two best experts on TN issues (by
their own modest assessment),did not go to Moscow
with the president, the end result was
unacceptable. They agreed that they had learned
their lesson, acknowledged that they may have lost
our trust, but were ready to work together, to
move forward, recognizing that there was no other
format but the 5-plus-2. Until the president went
to Moscow, the GOM had believed that a 2-plus-1
would be only consultations. The Joint
Declaration had turned the meeting into
negotiations which, they said, was never their
intention.

Next Step: Use the Declaration to Move Forward
-------------- --


9. (C) Now that the declaration was signed,
Tkaciuk argued that it was important to use it to
unite the efforts of 5-plus-2 participants to push
for a substantive 5-plus-2 meeting. Sova said the
GOM would immediately ask all 5-plus-2 partners to
support holding a substantive 5-plus-2. He
mentioned the upcoming 3-plus-2 in Vienna on April
8, which they hoped would prepare the dates for a
5-plus-2 meeting. According to the Joint
Declaration, a 5-plus-2 meeting should take place
before the end of June. The Ambassador agreed on
the need to hold everyone to that part of the
declaration, and responded that of course the USG
would support such a push.


10. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question
about the declaration's Point 4 allowing the
peacekeeping forces to remain, Sova responded that
the declaration would not impede resumption of the
withdrawal of Russian troops. The presence of the
peacekeeping forces related to the 1992 ceasefire
agreement, noted Sova. That agreement had no
expiration date on it. The Ambassador suggested
an additional point: bringing in the OSCE to start
discussions on military issues and the
transformation of the peacekeeping force to an
OSCE force. Tkaciuk responded that the GOM had
put some details on paper two months ago, and
promised a detailed discussion to address the
military issues in the near future.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) By now it is clear to us that the GOM
understands that signing the 2-plus-1 Joint
Declaration was a mistake. We have heard that
President Voronin was so upset with advisor Stati
over this blunder that he wanted to fire him, and
only refrained as the public scandal would
compound the mistake. No doubt as a result,
Tkaciuk said that Voronin had personally asked him

CHISINAU 00000283 003 OF 003


to take responsibility for Transnistria issues
again, and hence the joint Tkaciuk and Sova visit.

CHAUDHRY