MOLDOVA 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHISINAU 000268

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SUBJECT: MOLDOVA 2009 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
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REFS: A. 08 Chisinau 1257 B. 08 Chisinau 1276


1. (SBU) Summary: With the April 5 at-large
parliamentary elections rapidly approaching, the
electoral campaign is at its final stage. The
most recent poll shows a relatively high 26.4
percent of voters as still undecided, and likely
to make up their minds in the very last days. At
this point it is still unclear whether the Party
of Communists (PCRM) will overcome its steady
slide in popularity since 2001 to win enough votes
to put together the ruling coalition or whether
the opposition parties could overcome historical
animosities to form a coalition of the 61
parliamentary votes (out of 101) needed to elect
the president. An increasingly real possibility
is a third outcome: that neither side gets a
clear majority and that the new parliament remains
deadlocked and unable to choose a consensus
president. If two attempts to choose a president
fail, the law requires a second round of
nationwide parliamentary elections. Post is
completing its campaign monitoring visits to all
32 raions (districts) in the country (to be
reported septel) and will field teams of observers
on election day. End summary.

PCRM Steadily Losing Support
--------------


2. (SBU) From its high point in the 2001
parliamentary elections, when it gained 49.9
percent of the vote (and 71 seats in Parliament),
the PCRM has suffered a steady decline: in the
2005 parliamentary elections, it received 45.9
percent (and 56 seats). The trend in local
council and mayoral elections was similar. In the
2003 mayoral elections, the PCRM won 41 percent of
the mayoralties, dropping to 37.3 percent in 2007;
it won 48.1 percent of the votes for raion and
municipal councils in 2003, dropping to 34.2
percent in 2007; and in the 2003 town and village
council elections, the PCRM won 44.9 percent of
votes, dropping to 32.7 percent in 2007.


3. (SBU) The PCRM has continued to suffer from
declining popularity throughout the country. Most
polls put the PCRM somewhere in the 30 percent
range, representing solid support (i.e.,
respondents express few or no second-party
preferences) from mostly older and rural voters.
It is expected that the PCRM will be the largest
single party in the parliament, but that it will
not muster enough votes to put together a majority
without the support of MPs from other parties.

Legal (but Suspect) Means to Gain Advantage May
Backfire
-------------- --------------
--------------


4. (SBU) Moldovan law prohibits changes to the
electoral code within six months of the elections.
In January 2008, in the run-up to the elections,
the GOM made several changes to the electoral code
which, though legal, appeared designed to give an
advantage to the PCRM. One change to the
electoral code raised the threshold for
parliamentary representation from 4 to 6 percent
of votes, in an attempt to exclude smaller
parties. The higher threshold will result in more
"wasted" votes for smaller parties. The votes for
parties that do not receive at least 6 percent of
votes will be redistributed to the parties which
cleared the threshold. The PCRM would, at its
present poll strength, receive the plurality share
of the redistributed votes. The new code also
banned electoral coalitions during the election
campaign. The ban on coalitions divides and
theoretically weakens the opposition. The changes
to the code also disallowed Moldovans with dual
nationality from holding elected office.


5. (SBU) However, these moves may backfire on the
PCRM: the threshold will likely eliminate several

CHISINAU 00000268 002 OF 004


smaller parties that might have been willing to
trade their small number of votes in Parliament
for a minor cabinet position. The PCRM may find
itself isolated without smaller parties willing to
form a coalition, and consequently denied the
possibility of a majority. In addition, the three
major opposition parties have already declared
that they would not vote with the PCRM in the new
Parliament to elect the President.

Some Charges of Abuse; Some Problems Resolved
--------------


6. (SBU) During the campaign, some opposition
party leaders said that police intimidated voters
with drawn-out checks of their businesses and
threats of possible job loss. Some public workers
(school directors, hospital directors, civil
servants) reportedly were told that they had to
attend PCRM campaign meetings. The government
also opened or reopened cases against some
opposition leaders in advance of the electoral
season. We have heard consistent reports of
misuse of administrative resources, e.g., official
cars and cell phones used for campaign purposes.
We note that these charges have also been levied
against other parties, in raions where other
parties govern at the local level. A Moldovan
NGO, which systematically monitored the pre-
campaign and campaign seasons, reported police
intimidation of one of its staff during an attempt
to investigate the violent disruption of campaign
meetings. Media not affiliated with the ruling
party claimed intimidation by governmental
representatives (e.g., a police officer twisting a
reporter's arm during an interview and local
police seizing computers in a warrantless search
of a TV station). In reaction to the ProTV case
(ref A),government decided to postpone any action
on the licensing of broadcasters until after the
elections.


7. (SBU) In December there were reports that the
Ministry of Justice was creating roadblocks for
the re-registration of political parties. On
January 30, all 28 parties who sought registration
received it. During the electoral campaign,
parties held political demonstrations. (See ref B
for an account of an opposition rally that went
ahead despite police attempts to block it. See
ref A for an account of GOM threats to de-license
an independent TV station, and the government's
decision to defer action until "later," under
international pressure.) Reports of police
stopping buses of opposition supporters heading to
rallies in Chisinau noted drawn-out document
checks, and participants being late for the
demonstration.


8. (SBU) The Central Election Commission (CEC)
established and administered the rules for
campaigning and voting, regularly cooperating with
international organizations and NGOs. Donors
noted a high level of transparency in CEC
administration of campaign-related activity. The
CEC initially resisted Embassy requests to
register U.S. Embassy Kyiv officials and some
embassy-affiliated people as election monitors.
The CEC eventually accredited all our volunteers.
On the down side, after allowing NDI to register
short-term observers, the CEC refused the same
request from IRI.

It's About Personalities not Ideologies
--------------


9. (SBU) There is not a great deal of difference
between the parties in terms of their platform.
Despite its "Communist" name, all parties,
including the PCRM, support a market economy and
promote European integration as a goal. The
liberal parties (the Liberal Democratic Party,
PLDM, and the Liberal Party, PL) take a more free-
market stance and favor closer ties with Romania.
Note that they do not support unification; that
idea died as a viable platform over a decade ago.
The PL and PLDM tilt in favor of NATO membership,
while the PCRM maintains support for the

CHISINAU 00000268 003 OF 004


neutrality clause in the Constitution. However,
most voters have almost no interest in these
policies and continue to identify parties by the
names of their leaders. For many voters the
primary concern is solving the economic problems
that have driven almost a quarter of the
population out of the country. The party that
makes the most believable pitch to improve the
economy is the one that will receive their votes.

Predictions--and the Best Outlook for the PCRM
-------------- -


10. (SBU) Given historical trends, poll results,
analyses from contacts, and our own educated
guesses, we are predicting that fairly counted
election results would yield about 30-35 percent
for the PCRM; 10-20 percent for the AMN (Our
Moldova Alliance),and a maximum of 10-15 percent
each for the PL and PLDM. These scenarios assume
that only the PCRM, AMN, PL, and PLDM get past the
six percent threshold. Though some observers
still consider it possible that Dumitru Diacov's
Democratic Party (PD) or Vasile Tarlev's UCM
(Centrist Union of Moldova) might cross the
threshold, the chances seem marginal.


11. (SBU) In a projected scenario representing the
most favorable outcome for the PCRM (35 percent,
and an AMN/PL/PLDM aggregate of an equal 35
percent),the PCRM would receive half of the
remaining 30 percent "wasted" votes, or 15
percent, giving it a total of 50 percent of the
vote, and the AMN/PL/PLDM aggregate the same,
leaving both sides in deadlock well short of the
three-fifths vote needed to elect a President. In
a second parliamentary election, both sides would
need the support of smaller parties that did not
make it over the threshold. In the past, the PCRM
has shown itself adept at winning over individual
opposition membersQin Parliament, in the raions,
and even in the Chisinau Municipal CouncilQin
sufficient numbers, and by perfectly legal quid-
pro-quo offers, to enhance its numbers.

The Real Politics Begin after the Elections
--------------


12. (SBU) Election day represents a process of
dealing the cards to each party. Once the results
are counted, the PCRM, AMN, PL, PLDM and other
parties will each evaluate their positions and
calculate the strength of their hand. That's when
the real political game begins. On the opposition
side, several very stubborn, strong-willed men
will begin the search for the right formula to
divide the spoils. If one partyQmost likely the
AMNQdid significantly better than the other two,
then its leader, Serafim Urechean, would have the
best argument to be the coalition candidate for
President. It is at the cabinet level that we
could expect some drawn-out and complicated
wrangling for positions.


13. (SBU) If the April 5 voting gives no clear
majority in Parliament, as we expect, then it is
highly doubtful that any candidate will receive
the required 61 votes in the first round of
parliamentary voting for president. In such a
case a second parliamentary runoff round would be
held within three days between the two top
candidates. If a factionalized Parliament again
failed to elect a president, then parliamentarians
would have a final, third try, which must be
organized within 15 days. If this last try also
fails to elect a President, then the Acting
President must dissolve the newly elected
Parliament and set a date for new parliamentary
elections. During such a political crisis,
President Voronin would continue on as Acting
President with the same cabinet in place, until a
new parliament succeeded in electing a president.
Such a situation took place in 2000 when the
Parliament had to elect the president, failed, and
was dissolved. "Early" elections were announced
and resulted in a new parliament and the election
of President Voronin in 2001.


CHISINAU 00000268 004 OF 004


Comment
--------------


14. (SBU) As we have noted, predictions are still
impossible at this point. For election junkies
who want to see how things turn out as they turn
out, Post recommends that they log on to
www.cec.md or www.voteaza.md, starting around
11:00 P.M. local (4:00 P.M. EST) on April 5, and
watch the results as they are posted in real time.

CHAUDHRY