Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHISINAU264
2009-04-01 07:59:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Chisinau
Cable title:  

Fraud Summary - Chisinau: September 2008 -February 2009

Tags:  KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KTIP MD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6050
RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHCH #0264/01 0910759
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010759Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CHISINAU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7822
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH 0012
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 1926
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 CHISINAU 000264

DEPT FOR CA/FPP; DS/ICI/CR
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
FRANKFURT FOR RCO

DEPT PASS KCC WILLIAMSBURG KY

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC KTIP MD
SUBJECT: Fraud Summary - Chisinau: September 2008 -February 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840


A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Before its forced annexation into the Soviet
Union in 1940, Moldova was part of Romania for 21 years, and hence
enjoyed close ties to Europe. Those historic ties, and the ability
of many Moldovans to quickly learn Romance languages similar to
their native Romanian, have made it possible for hundreds of
thousands of Moldovans - between 25% and 33% of the working-age
population - to live and work in Western Europe, particularly in
Italy, Spain and Portugal. Most Moldovans also speak Russian and
many more work in Russia. Although Moldova's per capita GDP has
more than doubled in the last five years, the current international
financial crisis now threatens that growth as remittances from those
working abroad decline. Business and investment suffer because of
corruption, excessive bureaucracy and official interference. Many
public services, particularly healthcare, are being overwhelmed by
the combined impact of budgetary constraints and an aging
population.

Moldovan passports are considered secure, although most other
documents provided by visa applicants are unreliable. School or
university diplomas, drivers' licenses and employment booklets can
be purchased on the local market. False documents are available
from some Moldovan officials. Local firms advertise visa assistance
services in newspapers and help applicants secure letters of
invitation and prepare documents.

Moldova's law enforcement and judicial systems are under-funded,
poorly trained, often corrupt, and lack public support and
credibility. EU and U.S. training assistance efforts have helped
the host government revise legislation, improve effectiveness,
increase transparency and impose accountability. However, criminal
prosecution of document and passport fraud is very limited in
Moldova.

A separatist regime controls a narrow strip of land in the
Transnistria region of eastern Moldova. Many Transnistrian
companies are not legally registered with Moldovan authorities and
operate in contravention of Moldovan law. Verification of work and

travel documents from this area is extremely difficult. Residents
of Transnistria frequently hold Russian or Ukrainian passports in
lieu of Moldovan passports.

Chisinau is a medium fraud post.


B. NONIMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD:
B-1/B-2: Moldova's weak economic condition and lack of criminal
prosecution are the main factors contributing to NIV fraud. Most
Moldovan citizens who commit NIV fraud do so to travel to the United
States to work illegally. Their destinations are usually the larger
Moldovan refugee communities, most commonly in and around
Sacramento, CA, Portland OR, Tacoma, WA, and Asheville, NC. Others
attempt to go to Russian-speaking communities in Brooklyn, NY, or
Los Angeles, CA. Given the large disparity between wages in Moldova
and the United States (in Moldova, professionals normally earn
monthly salaries between USD 200-500, and construction workers
usually earn up to around USD 500 monthly),many applicants are
willing to pay hundreds and even thousands of dollars for forged
documents to support their case for an NIV.

Post has observed that most applicants using fraudulent documents to
obtain visas are between 18 and 35 years of age, but many older
Moldovan citizens also try to work illegally in the U.S. Post
regularly sees applications from middle-aged women going to Los
Angeles claiming to visit long-resident relatives, but actually
intending to work in nursing homes. Applicants in the above
categories normally are dispatched through INA 214(b) refusals.

A large number of NIV applicants are sponsored by churches and
religious organizations in the United States, usually to visit
communities with large Moldovan refugee communities. Post has not
detected significant fraud or abuse of visas by applicants in that
category.

In the past year post has seen several applicants planning to attend
intensive English language training programs, most often in New York
City. The applicants claim to have located the U.S. schools and
applied for SEVIS without the aid of middlemen. However, searches
of SEVIS by school and nationality show that groups of applicants
attending the same school enter SEVIS at the same time, frequently
on the same day. The improbability that they are acting
independently, usually combined with completely unrealistic expenses
and weak social and work ties, result in INA 214(b) refusals.

J-1 - The Summer Work and Travel Program: Post received a record

CHISINAU 00000264 002 OF 004


7,000 applications for the Summer Work and Travel (SWT) program in
2008, and issued 5,500 visas. We conducted a thorough validation
study in November, 2008 and found that 23% of SWT applicants had
remained in the United States after the completion of their
programs. Roughly half of those had applied to USCIS for an
adjustment of status. The validation survey determined that final
year students constituted the highest risk for overstay (51%). It
also noted other significant risk categories (e.g., Sports
University, older students, specific U.S. employers),but found that
wide differences in return rate between local recruiting companies
seen in 2007 had been largely eliminated.

Post works closely with the Ministries of External Affairs and
Education to curb SWT abuses. We maintain close contact with U.S.
sponsors active in Moldova to better inform them about local
conditions and recruiting companies.

J-1 Trainees and Interns: Post continues to see (and refuse)
ostensible J-1 training and intern programs for hotel housekeeping,
food and beverage, fast food restaurant workers, and other unskilled
labor positions. Most of these applicants are former SWT program
participants who have recently graduated university and face poor
employment prospects in Moldova.

H-2B Visas: Post detected a new trend in H2-B applications during
the reporting period, receiving applications from those who could
clearly not earn enough money working legally in the United States
to pay for program expenses. When post placed calls to local
recruiting companies, posing as potentially interested clients for
H-2B programs, we were quoted "processing fees" from USD 1,900 to
3,000 Euros. When we asked applicants at visa interviews how much
they paid for their applications, they responded with obviously
coached answers that they paid a certain amount, usually USD 600.
One petitioner instructed his applicants to state that they pay
nothing up front for the program. One applicant, quizzed on this
point, speculated that the petitioner ran a charity organization.
Our calls to that petitioner's local recruiter revealed an actual
processing fee of USD 3,000 for those who obtained visas.

Frequently applicants admitted that they could not cover expenses
but that they would get a second (illegal) job. We also saw a case
in which it appeared that the petitioner (for housekeeping jobs in
Miami, FL hotels) was fronting for a poultry processing plant in
Virginia. After contacting employers in the U.S. about work
arrangements, it became clear that another petitioner was obviously
benching hotel workers, and hiring them out on an as-needed basis to
hotels, other than those identified in the petition, in and around
Naples, FL.

Adjustment of Status in the United States: Post has detected
several institutions that have many Moldovans on their student
rolls, all or most of who have applied for their I-20s or DS-2019s
while already in the United States on a B-1/B-2 or J-1 visa.
Whenever post receives an F-1 application at post from an unfamiliar
institution, we search SEVIS using the school name and the Moldovan
country code. We now routinely run results of ADIS searches that
indicate an individual has applied for a change of status to F-1 or
J-1 through SEVIS to spot schools hosting other visa holders who
have failed to return to Moldova.


C. IV FRAUD: Immigrant Visas for Moldovans are processed in
Bucharest. Post takes occasional I-130 petitions and processes
I-604 (Request for and Report on Overseas Orphan Investigation) for
international adoption cases originating from Moldova. We have not
seen suspicious I-130 petitions during the reporting period.


D. DV FRAUD: Embassy Bucharest processes all DV applications for
Moldovan citizens. On occasion Bucharest requests assistance with
checking the legitimacy of Moldovan documents, usually diplomas,
with local authorities. Post has confirmed a few fake diplomas
submitted by Moldovan applicants to Embassy Bucharest. Post has
been contacted by a few Moldovans who have had their winning DV
entries intercepted and held hostage by the companies that submitted
their entries. The applicants then have to pay the companies USD
1,200-1,400 to receive their winning applications.


E. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: In November, Post received a CRBA
application from a naturalized American who falsely claimed
sufficient presence in the United States to transmit citizenship to
his newborn child. ADIS checks of his travel record contradicted
his account on several points, and he withdrew his application.
Chisinau has not otherwise encountered incidences of U.S. passport
and citizenship fraud.


F. ADOPTION FRAUD: As noted above, Chisinau does not process IV

CHISINAU 00000264 003 OF 004


cases, but it does process I-604 overseas orphan investigation
requests. Local authorities administer international adoptions
carefully and post has not encountered a suspicious or fraudulent
adoption.


G. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not employed DNA testing.


H. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: Chisinau has not seen
direct evidence of asylum cases or DHS benefits fraud. We see fewer
than five lost I-551s per year. However, post notes that a large
number of NIV applicants traveling to visit "refugee" relatives
indicate that their relative emigrated for reasons other than
credible fear of persecution. When asked why they thought their
relatives applied for refugee status, visa applicants commonly refer
to abuses that occurred in the Soviet period. Many of these
refugees return regularly to Moldova for family visits. Communities
with large refugee populations are also primary sources of
suspicious invitations for NIV applicants.


I. ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, AND TERRORIST
TRAVEL: While we are aware of reported trafficking of Moldovans to
Turkey, Western Europe, and other former Soviet states, post has
seen little evidence of transit to the United States. We are not
aware of the production in Moldova of fake U.S. travel documents.
An Amcit accused of operating a ring trafficking electricians to
Baltimore on H-2B and H-3 visas last year was sentence to five
months in prison and a $250,000 fine on November 14.

The RSO has cultivated an excellent relationship with local law
enforcement officials. Based on their information, we have entered
the identities of nearly two hundred known and suspected Moldovan OC
figures into CLASS. Post has no indication of terrorist travel from
Moldova.


J. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: The Consular Section has not
initiated investigations at post in the past year requiring RSO
assistance.


K. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCRUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY:
Host country identification documents are of high quality and
considered secure. Post has not detected a false Moldovan passport,
but is aware of a recent case in which Government of Moldova
authorities detected a genuine passport issued with fake supporting
documentation. Moldova began issuing biometric passports in March,

2008. Regular-issue Moldovan passports are machine-readable and
those manufactured after June 2005 contain a digitalized photo.

The host government authorizes the simultaneous possession of two
valid tourist passports. Moldova has begun in the past year to
issue machine-readable official and diplomatic passports with
digitalized photos. Older versions still in service are not
machine-readable and contain laminated photos. Regular Moldovan
Passports cost USD 12 and can be obtained in one month; however, for
a USD 100 expediting fee, a Moldovan passport can be ordered and
received in one day. Applicants for passports must present birth
certificates, proof of identification, and in the case of university
graduates, diplomas.


L. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: The Consular
Section has an active relationship with the Ministry of External
Affairs. As noted above, the RSO maintains excellent relations with
host government law enforcement, including its Center for Combating
Economic Crime and Corruption and the Center for Combating
Trafficking in Persons. The Ministry of Education and the General
Department of Civil Records are reliable sources when we seek to
verify educational, marriage and birth records.


M. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: With several thousand Moldovan
students recently participating in Summer Work and Travel program
jobs in the United States, Chisinau is concerned that many have been
actively sought out and encouraged to adjust status in the United
States by members of their respective immigrant communities and
"facilitators" for immigration attorneys. These facilitators
actively advertise services to assist Moldovans in the United States
to adjust status to F-1 or H2B with USCIS in order to prolong their
stays. In the past two years, according to ADIS data, more that
1,000 Moldovan SWT participants (10% of the total) sought to adjust
status in the United States. This rate of applications to extend
status strikes us as far higher than might be reasonable expected
and that Moldovan exchange program participants are being encouraged
by various third parties to remain in the United States.


N. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Chisinau has one full-time Consular
Officer, Consul David Franz, who attended fraud prevention training
at FSI in 2007. The Fraud Prevention FSN, hired in 2008, has not

CHISINAU 00000264 004 OF 004


attended fraud prevention training.

CHAUDHRY