VORONIN SUGGESTS RUSSIA READY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHISINAU 000212

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS RS MD
SUBJECT: VORONIN SUGGESTS RUSSIA READY FOR
OBAMA/CLINTON ENGAGEMENT ON TRANSNISTRIA

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a March 19 private meeting
with the Ambassador, President Voronin said he
believed that the Russians wanted to be rid of the
Transnistria frozen conflict. If Secretary
Clinton or President Obama raised Transnistria
with Russia as part of "reset" bilateral
relations, Voronin felt the Russians would be
ready to move toward real discussions on a
resolution of the conflict. Voronin repeated
Medvedev's comments that both he and Foreign
Minister Lavrov had a good impression of their
meeting with Secretary Clinton. The President
urged that the new U.S. administration push the
troops issue with the Russians as this would give
positive impulse to a Transnistria settlement.


2. (C) Voronin put a positive spin on the outcome
of his March 18 "2-plus-1" meeting with Russian
President Dmitri Medvedev and Transnistrian leader
Igor Smirnov, suggesting that the meeting had
improved Moldova's relations with Russia and paved
the way for a resumption of 5-plus-2 talks. To
prove that the Russians were looking at life
beyond a settlement, Voronin said that Medvedev
had asked his opinion on who could best replace
Smirnov. In response to the Ambassador's concerns
about Russian peacekeeping forces (PKF),the
Moldovan President made a sharp distinction
between the PKF and the so-called "limited
contingent" of Russian troops with no peacekeeping
mandate and no authorization to stay. Voronin
stated that those Russian troops, covered by the
CFE and the Istanbul Commitments, should depart
Transnistria. End Summary.

A Positive View of the Moscow 2-plus-1 Meeting
-------------- -


3. (C) On March 19 President Voronin summoned the
EU, OSCE and U.S. Ambassadors to provide readout
on his "2-plus-1" meeting in Moscow the previous
day. Following a relatively short group briefing,
Voronin met separately for over an hour with
Ambassador Chaudhry (accompanied by Pol/Econ
Chief). Voronin said that the 2-plus-1 meeting
was Medvedev's idea, not Moldova's. Voronin
stated that this "crucial trip" had two
particularly significant positive results: (1)
improving the bilateral relations between Moldova
and Russia; and (2) paving the way for resumption
of meetings in the 5-plus-2 format. Voronin said
that he would meet with Smirnov on March 25 to
give further impulse to the eight confidence-
building working groups. In the first part of the
meeting, when the EU Ambassadors were present in
the room, Voronin apologized to Ambassador
Chaudhry for not having accepted a meeting in the
days before the 2-plus-1; to have met he said,
would have appeared to the Russians as if he was
coming with instructions from the Americans.


4. (C) Prior to the formal 2-plus-1 meeting,
Voronin had met separately with Russian President
Medvedev. According to Voronin, that meeting had
set a good tone for trade relations, provided a
positive stage for the 2-plus-1, and resulted in a
promise of humanitarian assistance. Russia will
provide Moldova with 50,000 tons of crude oil in
time for the spring agricultural season. A
significant result of the 2-plus-1, according to
Voronin, was the agreement that the 5-plus-2 was
expected to start within the first half of 2009.
Additionally, noted Voronin, this was the first
time that he had any discussions with the Russians
concerning issues relating to conditions after the
conflict was settled.

Russians want Settlement: USG Should Push
--------------


5. (C) Voronin said that confidentially he would
share something Medvedev had told him. Both
Medvedev and Lavrov had a good impression of their
meeting with Secretary Clinton. Voronin believed
that, if the new U.S. administration would push
the issues of Russian troops and the status of
Transnistria with the Russian Federation, that

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effort would definitely give a positive impulse to
a Transnistria settlement.


6. (C) Voronin said he felt that the Russians
would like to be rid of the Transnistria problem.
He believed that they would be interested in a
settlement, if it could be done diplomatically,
strategically and gracefully. He argued that
putting the Transnistria issue on the agenda of
Clinton and Obama's bilateral interactions with
Russian counterparts would positively influence
the Russians.

Speculation on Smirnov's Successor
--------------


7. (C) To prove that the Russians are willing to
reach a settlement, Voronin said that the previous
day, when he was alone with Medvedev, the Russian
President had inquired about who Voronin could see
as a successor for Smirnov. This question he said
was proof that they were looking at life beyond a
settlement. Voronin had responded that the
successor should be selected as a transition
figure. It should be someone within the current
leadership entourage, as a completely new figure
would not be accepted. Voronin said that he had
recommended Transnistrian parliamentary leader
Yevgeny Shevchuk, even though, as he mentioned to
Medvedev, the Transnistrian parliamentary speaker
does not have a strong leadership character.
Still, he would fit best as a transition leader.

PKF Different from Russian Troops
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador expressed USG concerns about
the fourth point in the Joint Statement signed by
the 2-plus-1 participants. That point, which
welcomed the continued presence of the Russian
peacekeepers and called for their transformation
into an OSCE force after a Transnistria
settlement, appeared to give Moldova's consent for
Russian forces to remain on Moldovan territory
until a Transnistria settlement was reached. In
response, Voronin explained that the Joint
Declaration referred only to the Peacekeeping
Force, and not the "Limited Contingent" of Russian
forces. Only the PKF had the right to be in
Moldova under the terms of the 22 June 1992
agreement. These PKF troops were located on the
security zone between right-bank Moldova and
Transnistria, and had battalions of Moldovan and
Ukrainian forces, in addition to the Russian
soldiers.


9. (C) On the other hand, continued Voronin, on
the territory where the 14th Russian Army had been
located were 1,200 troops of Russian origin that
the Russian Federation claimed were there to guard
the Russian military base. Moldova had not given
its consent for these troops to remain, and they
represented a violation of Moldova's neutral
status as guaranteed in the constitution, said
Voronin. Though the Peacekeeping Forces had a
mandate under the June 1992 agreement, the Russian
troops at the base were not peacekeepers, had no
legal status and should leave, per Russia's
Istanbul Commitments.


10. (C) Voronin said that he considered it a
success that the Russians had accepted
transformation of the peacekeeping force to one
under OSCE aegis. Now, he continued, they needed
to begin discussions with the OSCE about the
mechanism for this transfer. Voronin said that
nothing would prevent passing the force to OSCE
aegis even before a settlement was reached. He
further explained that in case the achievement of
a final Transnistria settlement were delayed,
Moldova could take a unilateral decision to
withdraw its forces, and perhaps Ukraine would
withdraw its troops as well, to replace these with
an OSCE force.

Importance of Confidence-Building Measures
--------------


11. (C) Voronin noted that he would meet with
Smirnov on March 25 to work on how to promote the

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eight confidence-building working groups, and to
prepare for the 5-plus-2. He viewed the working
groups as a way to penetrate into civil society in
Transnistria, and reduce the impact of MGB
propaganda on separatism. Contacts were important
for helping the citizens to better understand
Moldova's intentions. Though the financial
situation in Moldova was bad, last year Moldova
spent 780,000 Euros purchasing blood transfusion
equipment for Transnistria, and this year was
helping with 500,000 Euros to equip the maternity
hospital. Moldova was offering free passports for
Transnistrian residents. He noted that ten
thousand Transnistrian students were studying at
right bank universities, mostly for free.

Complaints about European Ambassadors' TN Contacts
-------------- --------------


12. (C) During his briefing with the European
Ambassadors, Voronin had noted his concern about
their direct contacts with the Transnistrian
authorities. He noted that the EU has a
designated negotiator, Kalman Miszei, so European
missions should rely upon Miszei to meet with the
Transnistrian authorities. The GOM gets no
information from their separate meetings, and so
Voronin requested that the EU Ambassadors refrain
from meeting with Transnistrian authorities.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) We concur with Voronin's assessment that
putting Transnistria on the high-level agenda for
bilateral USG meetings with Russia could fast-
track the 5-plus-2 process towards success.
Voronin's perception that the Russians are ready
but need a push suggests that the timing is right
for the Secretary to give some impetus. For
Moldova, signing the Joint Declaration represented
an exercise in damage limitation. Voronin had
long delayed a Moscow meeting for fear he would be
asked to sign something completely unacceptable.
We have heard reports of unacceptable elements in
earlier drafts of a Joint Declaration that did not
work their way into the final document (Voronin
confirmed that there was an earlier draft which
was completely unacceptable),suggesting that
Moldova succeeded in its negotiating efforts to
modify the text. Voronin appeared relieved that
he had managed to escape his encounter with the
bear unharmed, and in fact, had some optimism that
he had detected signs that a settlement was
possible.

CHAUDHRY