SMIRNOV IN A SNIT AGAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L CHISINAU 000132

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS UP MD
SUBJECT: SMIRNOV IN A SNIT AGAIN

Classified by: Ambassador Asif J. Chaudhry for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: It appears that EU and U.S.
relations with Transnistria are now going to take
a turn for the worse. In a February 19 meeting,
Ukrainian Ambassador Pirozhkov briefed us on his
meeting the previous day with Transnistrian leader
Smirnov. Apparently angered by the EU's recent
announcement extending its visa ban on Smirnov and
other Transnistrian officials, Smirnov told the
Ukrainian Ambassador that European and American
ambassadors would no longer be welcome in
Transnistria. Smirnov also told Pirozhkov that he
did not recognize the 5-plus-2 format any more.
Smirnov said that while in Moscow he had promised
to meet with Voronin in March, and apparently
agreed to a 2-plus-1 meeting as well. In hopes of
achieving a breakthrough on the stalled border
demarcation process, the Ukrainians were
organizing a conference in Odessa on February 27
with the support of EUBAM. End summary.


2. (C) In a February 19 meeting with Ambassador
Chaudhry, visiting EUR/UMB Office Director Bob
Boehme, and Pol/Econ Section Chief, Ukrainian
Ambassador Sergei Pirozhkov described his meeting
with Transnistrian "President" Smirnov the
previous day (February 18). Smirnov had invited
the Ukrainian Ambassador for a meeting in order to
provide a debrief on his recent trip to Moscow to
meet Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and his stop
in Kyiv en route home. While in Kyiv, Smirnov had
met with Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister
Ogryzko.

"You Can Bury 5-plus-2"
--------------


3. (C) Incensed by the EU's recent announcement
extending its visa ban on certain Transnistrian
authorities (Smirnov is number one on the list),
Smirnov had retorted that "the EU and U.S.
Ambassadors would no longer be acceptable guests
in Transnistria." Smirnov further declared that
he did not want any relationship with the EU and
went on to say that he would no longer recognize
the 5-plus-2 format. "You can simply bury 5-plus-
2" the Transnistrian leader had told Pirozhkov.
Instead, Smirnov would work directly with Russia
and Ukraine, meeting occasionally with the
Moldovans as needed. Pirozhkov speculated that
while in Moscow Smirnov had accepted Lavrov's
proposal for the 2-plus-1 format, and thus would
now serve to impede the 5-plus-2 format.
Pirozhkov speculated that there would be greater
clarity on the next steps following Lavrov's
February 23-24 visit to Chisinau.


4. (C) Smirnov told Pirozhkov that a meeting with
Voronin was being planned for March. Though
Smirnov had no desire for such a meeting, while in
Moscow he had promised to participate. When asked
whether a 2-plus-1 meeting could end with the
signing of a Joint Declaration, Smirnov had told
the Ukrainian Ambassador that he did not exclude
such a possibility. Pirozhkov speculated that; as
the main goal of Smirnov's trip was to obtain
financial assistance from Russia, Smirnov was
ready to do anything requested by Moscow in
exchange. Pirozhkov concluded that Smirnov would
now escalate confrontation with the EU and U.S.,
escalate conflict with 5-plus-2, and not do
anything constructive.

Talking with the Transnistrians on Border
Demarcation
-------------- --------------
---


5. (C) Ambassador Pirozhkov said he had told
Smirnov that it was a high priority for Ukraine to
conduct demarcation of the segment of the
Ukrainian border with Moldova that Transnistria
controls. Pirozhkov said that the Ukrainians have
been negotiating with the Transnistrians on border
demarcation for over a year, since early 2008.
Pirozhkov said that the border wiggled village by
village and field by field, so it was necessary to
have the participation of local villagers and
farmers who knew exactly where the line was.
Though Smirnov did not reject the Ukrainian
proposal for demarcation, so far he had done
nothing to start the process.


6. (C) In response to Ambassador Chaudhry's
question about Ukraine negotiating directly with
Transnistria, Pirozhkov said that Smirnov had
declared his readiness to sign any protocols for
demarcation, but without Moldova. When Ukraine
had responded that a signing could not happen
without Moldova, Smirnov had reportedly responded
that "if Ukraine won't sign with me, then I won't
allow Moldovan representatives on my territory."


7. (C) As a way out of this negotiating dead end,
the Ukrainians had initiated, together with
Moldova, discussions with EUBAM about
participating in the demarcation process. The
Ukrainians consulted with the EU, received a
positive answer, and had decided to hold a
conference in Odessa on February 27th. The
conference will bring together specialists from
Ukraine, Moldova and Transnistria under the
supervision of EUBAM to work on developing
concrete technical measures for demarcation.
Pirozhkov said he believed that starting the
demarcation process would be a significant help
for the Transnistrian settlement process.

Smirnov not Interested in Economic Cooperation
Projects
-------------- --------------
--------------


8. (C) Within the framework of confidence-building
measures, the Ukrainians plan to introduce an
economic cooperation project involving the regions
bordering the Dniester, i.e., the Vinnitsya region
of Ukraine, northern districts of Moldova such as
Soroca and Ocnita, and the Kaminka District of
Transnsitria. Pirozhkov said that this proposal
had support from the EU, and that the Moldovan
side had also expressed some support. The idea
was to initiate a project that would be attractive
to the local population. They had agreed to hold
a founding seminar in Soroca on February 24.
Pirozhkov said that in initial discussions a year
ago, Smirnov had agreed that Kaminka District
would participate, but during their February 18
meeting, Smirnov had changed his mind and declared
that the Transnistrian representative would not
attend. Pirozhkov believed this proved that
Smirnov did not want any economic contacts and
cooperation with the right bank but noted that
Smirnov had asked for four days to think it over
and had promised a final answer on February 23.


9. (C) Smirnov had gone on to say that all of the
confidence-building measures established as a
result of his meeting with Voronin had showed no
result to date. He said cynically that after
discussions at each working group, the
participants said that they needed to consult with
their leadership, and hence were not empowered to
make any actual decisions.


10. (C) Pirozhkov told us that, with respect to
MCC, Smirnov had commented that he was not very
interested. He had said that he was not
interested because he did not travel on those
roads.

Comment
--------------


11. (C) This is not the first time that Smirnov
has had a snit and tightened Transnistria's travel
regime for diplomats. Similar travel difficulties
followed the Georgia conflict in August 2008, and
the EU's visa ban announcement last year; in each
case, restrictions lightened up again after a few
weeks. Parliamentary speaker Shevchuk had
introduced legislation seeking to regularize
diplomatic travel, but that draft is now tied up
as a result of Smirnov's veto, and has come to
represent the differences dividing the two
leaders. Coming on the heels of this visit to
Moscow, Smirnov's desire to circumvent 5-plus-2
would seem to reflect a Russian strategy to move
the arena of action over to a 2-plus-1 format. At
any rate, there was little expectation of any 5-
plus-2 progress in the period leading up to
Moldova's April elections. The GOM, negotiators
and observers need to stand firm on their
declarations that the 5-plus-2 is the only format
for negotiating a settlement, and by the time
Moldova's electoral season has passed,
Transnistria may adopt a more cooperative posture.
While Smirnov's remarks about MCC give some cause
for concern, we already understood that there were
hardliners within the Transnistrian hierarchy who
oppose MCC. However, there are also those who
understand its value and the Transnistrian
representative at the February 9 meeting of the
Transportation Working Group once again pledged
Transnistria's intention to cooperate and provide
unimpeded access for the MCC feasibility studies.

CHAUDHRY