SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF SECRET DIALOGUE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000089

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF SECRET DIALOGUE
STILL CHURNING IN PLACE

REF: A. BANGKOK 1508 (RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUNE 8 MOSQUE ATTACK)

B. CHIANG MAI 58 (INSURGENT LEADERS PRESS AHEAD)

C. 08 CHIANG MAI 120 (IMPLEMENTATION STALLED)

D. 08 CHIANG MAI 177 (DEMISE OF SECRET PEACE DIALOGUE)

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CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
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Summary and Comment

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1. (S) Mark Tamthai, former RTG point-man for secret talks with
southern insurgents, sees a potential silver lining in the
recent surge in violence in southern Thailand following the June
8 mosque killings and subsequent reprisals. He told CG June 24
that the uptick in violence and the military's indirect
implication in the mosque attack have given PM Abhisit the upper
hand over hardliners who oppose a political resolution to the
insurgency. Tamthai believes public sentiment is growing that
the military-led approach is a dead end. This gives Abhisit a
window of opportunity to show his government's sincerity about
reconciliation via steps such as releasing an imprisoned Muslim
elder and implementing a pilot peace zone plan in Yala city.
Tamthai himself will return to talks next week with exile
insurgent leaders, though not as an RTG representative.




2. (S) Comment: If recent developments in the South have
indeed given PM Abhisit a tactical advantage over hardliners in
his government, the flip side is that hardliners among the
insurgents likely have the upper hand over moderates for the
same reasons. It is modestly encouraging that Tamthai is
re-engaging in talks with the insurgents (presumably with
Abhisit's blessing). However, real implementation of
conciliatory steps like those outlined above continues to face
stiff resistance by hardliners on both sides. End Summary and
Comment.



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Surge in Violence Gives PM Upper Hand over Hardliners?

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3. (S) CG met June 24 in Chiang Mai with Mark Tamthai, Director
of Payap University's Institute of Religion, Culture and Peace
and former RTG point-man for secret talks with southern
insurgents. Tamthai referred to the recent surge in violence
and reprisals since the late May Tak Bai post mortem inquest
ruling, most notably the June 8 mosque killings reportedly
perpetrated by volunteer paramilitaries linked to a military
figure close to the royal family (Ref A). Tamthai asserted a
silver lining in this cloud of new violence: it has given Prime
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva the "upper hand" over hardliners who
continue to oppose a political approach to resolving the
southern insurgency. The PM's new confidence and resolve that
his inclination for a political solution must go forward,
Tamthai said, was one reason why he spoke publicly on June 14 in
favor of creating a special administrative zone for the three
southernmost provinces.




4. (S) Although the usual naysayers (military/security
hardliners, the Democrat Party's old guard, and those who call
for enshrining Buddhism in the Constitution as the national
religion) were quick to skewer PM Abhisit's proposal, Tamthai
said the plan has growing support. He claimed the Thai public
increasingly sees the current military-led approach as
unworkable, and asserted that even most senior military
commanders in the South consider it a dead end. The mosque
killings, and subsequent brutal reprisals by insurgents, have
reinforced this sentiment (and we note a June 24 Bangkok Post
opinion piece calling on the RTG to "change course" away from
"hopeless" military means and toward a political solution).




5. (S) Moreover, Tamthai said, the implication of links between

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the mosque attack and current and retired Royal Thai Army (RTA)
personnel has put the RTA and other hardliners on the defensive,
Tamthai said, encouraging PM Abhisit to push ahead with a
political approach. At the same time, however, Tamthai admitted
that the mosque incident has angered the ethnic Malay Muslim
insurgents, and given hardliners among them the upper hand over
those favoring political reconciliation. The insurgents are
having an easy time now attracting new recruits, he added.



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Window for Action

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6. (S) Tamthai outlined fairly modest goals for what PM Abhisit
might be able to accomplish with this current tactical advantage
over hardliners. Limiting factors include the ongoing struggle
between "establishment" forces and those loyal to ousted former
PM Thaksin Shinawatra, and uncertainties about the staying power
of Abhisit's multi-party governing coalition. Against this
background and with a potentially short-lived window of
opportunity, Tamthai said he is urging Abhisit to act now to
re-establish the RTG's sincerity about the peace process by:



-- releasing from prison a local Muslim leader known as Baba
Betong (as heard),a well known, elderly religious figure who
has been imprisoned for some 10 years. Tamthai claims Abhisit
favors this move as a goodwill gesture.



-- implement a well-developed but long-shelved pilot "peace
zone" in Yala city (Ref C).



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Tamthai Back at the Table, But Not on RTG's Dime

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7. (S) Tamthai reported that, for the first time in months, he
himself will again be involved in direct talks with exiled
insurgent leaders - at a meeting next week at a
yet-to-be-disclosed location. This will be his first direct
contact with the insurgents since the demise of the
RTG-insurgent secret dialogue last year (Ref D). The meeting is
being organized and facilitated by the Henri Dunant Centre,
which in recent months has brokered periodic meetings among the
insurgents to develop a reconciliation proposal that could serve
as the basis for resuming direct talks with the RTG.




8. (S) While Tamthai's participation has the blessing of PM
Abhisit, he is not attending as an RTG representative. His
travel, in fact, is being paid for by the Henri Dunant Centre,
since Tamthai's own budget disappeared with last year's official
demise of the secret dialogue. Tamthai expressed discomfort
with this arrangement, but recognized he is boxed in by
Abhisit's June 14 public vow that his government would not
negotiate with the insurgents. The most Tamthai is hoping for
is that Abhisit would eventually resurrect Tamthai's old team
with a "mandate" (and budget) for resuming "dialogue" - but not
"negotiation" - with the insurgents.




9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok.
MORROW