BURMA: ETHNIC ARMED GROUPS RETHINKING STRATEGY IN WAKE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000071

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/4/2019
TAGS: PGOV MOPS MARR PINR PINS SNAR BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA: ETHNIC ARMED GROUPS RETHINKING STRATEGY IN WAKE OF
SPECULATION ABOUT BORDER DEFENSE FORCE

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
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Summary and Comment

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1. (C) In the wake of a rumored GoB plan for armed ethnic
ceasefire groups to integrate into Burma's security forces as
border guards or hand in their weapons altogether, several
groups are reportedly contemplating whether to comply. The
United Wa State Army is reportedly exploring the option of
joining the current self-proclaimed Burmese Government in exile,
and the two most important Karen armed groups (who oppose each
other) have entered into secret talks.




2. (C) Comment: Speculation has circulated widely that the GOB
will persuade or force armed cease-fire ethnic groups to disarm;
the alleged plan for a new border guard force is the latest
iteration. While that effort remains a possibility, Embassy
Rangoon notes that so far the regime has not made public its
intentions. Nonetheless, the fact that some members of key
ethnic groups are considering how to respond to such pressure
demonstrates expectations of renewed GOB efforts to address
ethnic challenges prior to the 2010 elections, and the potential
impact of any such step. We note recent clashes between armed
ethnic groups and the Burma Army that have spilled across the
border into Thailand. If some of these groups adopt a stiffer
posture vis-a-vis the regime, it is possible that the number of
such incidents may rise. We might also see an increase in the
number of Burmese seeking refuge in Thailand, even as the RTG
finds it necessary to strengthen its border defenses. End
Summary and Comment.



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Wa to Join Exile Government?

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3. (C) On May 19, Pol/Econ chief met in Mae Sot with a member
of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and a western journalist who
has been a Burma watcher for over 20 years. They told us that
speculation the GOB may require armed ethnic ceasefire groups to
integrate into a newly-created Border Defense Force or hand in
their weapons prompted a United Wa State Army (UWSA) official to
contact the Mon National Liberation Army Commander to express
interest in joining the National Coalition Government of the
Union of Burma (NCGUB) -- the self-proclaimed Burmese Government
in exile.




4. (C) According to the NMSP's Kyaw Nyunt, the UWSA is not
prepared to enter the Border Defense Force at the regime's
behest, and is considering other options. He added that the Wa
were even ready to finger GOB and military officials profiting
from the drug trade if the U.S. would drop the more than 20
indictments against UWSA leaders still pending in Federal Court.
(Note: we presume any such Wa offer would in reality only be
offering the USG information we already have on regime officials
whom we cannot bring to justice, in exchange for dropping
charges against people we still have a chance of bringing to
trial).




5. Kyaw Nyunt said the NCGUB is still thinking over the UWSA's
request. It is concerned about the potential negative U.S.
reaction to allowing indicted drug traffickers to join it.



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What about the Karen?

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6. (C) Meanwhile, Karen and Royal Thai Army (RTA) contacts
confirmed to us on May 20 that the Karen National Union (KNU),
which has been engaged in conflict with the Burmese regime for
over 50 years, has held secret discussions recently with the
pro-regime Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). The KNU
reports its is lobbying the DKBA hard to defect, and that DKBA
leaders remain split over how to respond to a GOB directive to
join the new Border Defense Force.




7. (C) Our RTA contact opined that if the DKBA decides not to
join the Border Defense Force, the regime will have to rethink
its approach. The GOB, he asserted, needs the DKBA more that
the DKBA needs it. He noted that when the Burma Army attacks
the KNU, DKBA troops lead the assault. DKBA units consist of
400 soldiers, he stated, whereas Burma Army units only have a
fighting strength of 180. In his view, the regime is
particularly keen to have the DKBA in the Border Defense Force
because the DKBA - which taxes border trade, benefits from the
drug trade, and is operating from a position of financial and
military strength - has gotten too big for its britches.




8. (C) Our RTA contact told us that if the DKBA and KNU were to
rejoin forces, the RTG would have to prepare to receive greater
numbers of refugees and strengthen its border defenses. KNU
contacts told us the regime had given the DKBA three months to
formally respond to its directive to join the Border Defense
Force. In the RTA's view, if the DKBA does not comply with the
GOB's order, the regime is likely to find another ethnic group
to serve as a test case for Border Defense Force implementation
rather than run the risk of the DKBA rejoining the KNU. Once
the DKBA has had some time to observe the Border Defense Force
functioning, the regime will renew pressure on the DKBA to join,
he speculated.




9. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon.
MORROW