BURMA: KNU ON PEACE TALKS, POLITICAL GOALS, BORDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000061

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHUM BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA: KNU ON PEACE TALKS, POLITICAL GOALS, BORDER
SITUATION

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 49 (KNU SEEKS PRECONDITIONS)

B. CHIANG MAI 45 (THAI MEDIATION EFFORTS)

C. CHIANG MAI 37 (KNU UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE)

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CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



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Summary and Comment
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1. (C) The Karen National Union (KNU),which has been in a
protracted military conflict with the Burmese regime, has two
preconditions for peace talks with the GoB: the talks must be
held in a third country, and the KNU must negotiate with a
regime leader. The KNU wants to see the establishment of a
federal system in Burma; and has again been allowed to base
itself in Thailand, according to its Vice Chairman David
Tharckabaw. He characterized Thai FM Kasit's intentions as a
facilitator as "sincere," but made it clear he views the Burmese
regime's overture to the KNU as nothing more than a ploy
designed to enhance its international legitimacy. Tharckabaw
also sought U.S. financial support for the KNU to travel to
possible talks, for reuniting the various Karen splinter groups,
and for continuing the KNU's armed resistance. The recent
attack on the KNU carried out by the Burma Army and Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA -- a pro-GoB armed group) may have a
negative impact on Thailand's efforts to bring the two sides to
the negotiating table. End Summary and Comment.

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Two Preconditions
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2. (C) On April 29, we met with KNU Vice Chairman David
Tharckabaw, who clarified the KNU only has two real
preconditions for peace talks with the Burmese regime: the talks
must be held in a third country, and the KNU must negotiate
directly with an SPDC leader. Tharckabaw named Thailand, East
Timor and Norway as possible negotiating venues, and confirmed
what we reported in Ref A -- namely that either Burmese PM Thein
Sein or General Thura Shwe Mann would be acceptable
interlocutors. Tharckabaw noted that East Timor might be
problematic as a host country from the GoB's point of view
because he has heard rumors the self-proclaimed Burmese
Government in Exile (NCGUB, or National Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma) is on the verge of opening an office there.
Norway, he said, has not played a role in the talks so far, but
Tharckabaw emphasized its prior mediation roles in other
conflicts and said he believes the door is open for Norway to
participate/host.


3. (C) Tharckabaw characterized Thai FM Kasit's efforts to
facilitate talks with the GoB as "sincere," but expressed fear
Kasit might try to pressure the KNU to accept less than a just
peace later on. The regime, on the other hand, is only using
the possibility of talks as a ploy, he opined. What the GoB
really wants, he said, is KNU endorsement of and participation
in the 2010 elections, which he was adamant the KNU would not
provide. For the regime, the talks are nothing more than a ploy
to enhance its legitimacy, he added, noting that the KNU and the
GoB have tried on five previous occasions to reach a peace deal.

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What About During the Talks?
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4. (C) Tharckabaw made it clear that if the regime accepts the
two preconditions mentioned above, direct talks could begin.
During the negotiations, he said the KNU expects the regime to
observe a nationwide ceasefire, to withdraw its troops in Karen
areas from mountainous camps near villages to main roads, and
not to use the ceasefire to tacitly expand its economic
influence in Karen areas, i.e. by taking over land or additional
mining concessions. As for the KNU's goal, he said a more
permanent ceasefire could be achieved. He admitted, however,
that there was an internal rift within the KNU that needed to be
addressed. Some members want to see talks go ahead, even if the
regime does not observe a nationwide cease fire, he said. This
group, he opined, is mainly concerned with what the Karen people
will get out of the process. Tharckabaw's faction on the other
hand would like to see the talks lead to more momentous changes
that could have an impact across the country, and is less
flexible (see para 5 below). The KNU is discussing this issue
while it waits to hear from FM Kasit regarding the GoB's

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response to its two preconditions, he stated.

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Broader Political Goals
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5. (C) More broadly, Tharckabaw said that he and his supporters
within the KNU want a federal, democratic system in Burma, with
the existing seven administrative divisions declared to be
states. As for the Irrawaddy Delta, it should be designated as
a multiethnic State, he opined. The regime, on the other hand,
wants to found what he called "The Fourth Burmese Empire," and
perpetuate its rule. Though he fingered the SPDC as the root of
all Burma's problems, Tharckabaw agreed that it could be part of
a transitional government under the right conditions.

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On The Border
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6. (C) In response to our questions, Tharckabaw said that KNU
leaders are once again residing in Mae Sot on the Thai side of
the border. He said that the letter ordering them to leave
Thailand (Ref C) came from a local military commander, and was
not approved by the Thai Third Army Commander. The Army is not
enforcing the February order, he stated, adding that KNU
personnel are nonetheless keeping a low profile. He said the
KNU's biggest concern right now is fear of political
assassinations. (Note: KNU General Secretary Mahn Sha was
gunned down in Mae Sot in February 2008).


7. (C) Tharckabaw was aware of the April 27 clash between the
KNU and the DKBA and Burma Army (BA),though he did not have
up-to-date information from KNU troops at the time of our
meeting. He said that there had been 2-3 casualties on the KNU
side, but that he did not have figures for the DKBA or BA,
emphasizing he had to wait for radio intercepts to get those
statistics. Royal Thai Army and Thai Foreign Ministry contacts
told Embassy Bangkok on April 29 that several Thai soldiers had
been wounded in the fighting on April 28. According to them,
the BA and DKBA launched a joint attack on a KNU base near the
Thai border just opposite of Tak province on April 27. The
battle resumed again on April 28, and two Thai soldiers from the
Third Army patrolling the border were injured.


8. (C) According to the Thai Army, villagers from the nearby
border town were evacuated to a monastery. The MFA indicated no
official complaints have been filed by the Thai Embassy in Burma
as result of this incident; the RTG believes that this issue can
be resolved through the Regional Border Committee (RBC)
mechanism that is already in place. The next meeting is
scheduled for July.

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What Can the U.S. Do?
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9. (C) Tharckabaw made three requests of us during our April 29
meeting, namely that the U.S.:

-- provide financial support to the peace talks if they get
underway by funding KNU travel to the venue;

-- help the KNU bring Karen splinter groups back into the fold;
and

-- consider funding the KNU's armed resistance against the
Burmese regime.

Financial support for the talks would not be necessary if they
are held in Thailand, Tharckabaw noted, but could be if Norway
or a third country far away from Burma was chosen as the venue.
The DKBA, he opined, wants to rejoin the KNU, but the KNU does
not have resources to provide DKBA soldiers with food and
shelter. With financial support, he claimed the KNU could meet
the basic needs of the DKBA, and that many DKBA soldiers would
return. We told Tharckabaw that supporting the KNU's armed
insurgency was not an option for the U.S.


10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon.
MOORE