Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHIANGMAI58
2009-04-29 02:42:00
SECRET
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSURGENT LEADERS PRESS AHEAD ON PLAN TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH 
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VZCZCXRO1491
OO RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0058/01 1190242
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 290242Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1028
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1110
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000058 

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSURGENT LEADERS PRESS AHEAD ON PLAN TO
RESUME DIRECT TALKS WITH RTG

REF: A. 08 CHIANG MAI 177 (DEMISE OF SECRET PEACE DIALOGUE)

B. BANGKOK 618 (INCREMENTAL PROGRESS ON TALKS)

C. CHIANG MAI 11 (STALLED PEACE PROCESS AWAITS SIGNAL)

D. CHIANG MAI 23 (SECRET DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD)

CHIANG MAI 00000058 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
-----------------------------

Summary and Comment

-----------------------------



S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000058

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: INSURGENT LEADERS PRESS AHEAD ON PLAN TO
RESUME DIRECT TALKS WITH RTG

REF: A. 08 CHIANG MAI 177 (DEMISE OF SECRET PEACE DIALOGUE)

B. BANGKOK 618 (INCREMENTAL PROGRESS ON TALKS)

C. CHIANG MAI 11 (STALLED PEACE PROCESS AWAITS SIGNAL)

D. CHIANG MAI 23 (SECRET DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD)

CHIANG MAI 00000058 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------

Summary and Comment

--------------




1. (S) Mark Tamthai, former RTG point-man for secret talks with
southern insurgents, reports that militant leaders continue to
meet among themselves to flesh out a proposal they aim to
present as a basis for resuming direct dialogue with the RTG.
He told CG April 28 that this effort, now broadened to include
some non-militant Southern Thai religious leaders, is taking a
"reasonable" direction that stresses a high degree of local
authority yet fits within the framework of the Thai
constitution. Tamthai continues, however, to harbor doubts
about whether PM Abhisit's informal encouragement of this
process is sufficient to lead to eventual engagement by the Thai
military and old-guard Democrat Party leaders, who are not
currently part of the process.




2. (S) Comment: It is encouraging that the insurgent leaders
appear to have the political space to develop a plan that could
serve as the basis for resuming reconciliation talks. The
process remains highly fragile, however, given the exclusion of
most key RTG power-brokers, and lingering uncertainties about
the extent to which the insurgents can truly close ranks behind
a peace deal. End Summary and Comment.



-------------- --------------

Insurgents Meet Among Selves; RTG Sits Out

-------------- --------------




3. (S) CG met April 28 in Chiang Mai with Mark Tamthai,
Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion, Culture
and Peace and former RTG point-man for secret talks with
southern insurgents. Tamthai said the insurgents, or what he

now calls "the movement," continue to meet among themselves
(outside Thailand) to develop a reconciliation proposal that
could serve as the basis for resuming direct talks with the RTG.
These meetings continue to be facilitated by the Henri Dunant
Centre (HDC),whose role Tamthai described as being a "witness"
to the process. Neither the RTG, nor Tamthai, participate in
the meetings. Tamthai does, however, receive readouts and draft
documents from the participants, and provides feedback.




4. (S) According to Tamthai, this process takes place with the
informal encouragement of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who
has indicated willingness to have the RTG return to direct
dialogue with the movement should it come up with a "reasonable"
proposal for doing so. Asked to define "reasonable," Tamthai
said it would entail greater representation, participation, and
responsibility for the movement's Malay Muslims in the
administration of the far southern provinces, but stop short of
concepts such as autonomy and self-determination.




5. (S) Tamthai reiterated what he told DCM last November (Ref
A): it would be entirely workable for the far southern
provinces to take on the same status currently enjoyed by
metropolitan Bangkok under the current Constitution; e.g., an
elected governor and self-administration of schools, courts, and
other services. The movement, with HDC's assistance, is in fact
currently meeting in Malaysia to flesh out a framework document
along such lines. There is still a lot of detail to be filled
in because the movement has much to learn about the
responsibilities it wishes to take on. For example, it needs to
define what it proposes in terms of guaranteed Malay Muslim
representation in provincial administrative bodies, and how it

CHIANG MAI 00000058 002.2 OF 002


would administer development policy, education policy, and the
courts. Only then could the movement's proposal serve as a
useful basis for resuming negotiations with the RTG.




6. (S) Tamthai confirmed (as reported in Refs B and C) that the
various militant groups comprising the movement continue to
coalesce, in order to strengthen their credibility and speak
with one voice, and continue to include in their deliberations
influential non-militants, such as local religious leaders.
Together, they are moving toward completing a reconciliation
proposal as soon as possible, though they understand that in
order to re-engage the RTG in dialogue the proposal must first
contain sufficient detail on re-defining administrative
responsibilities in the far South.



-------------- --

Doubts About RTG Willingness to Resume Talks

-------------- --




7. (S) Tamthai admitted doubts about RTG willingness to engage
in genuine dialogue, even were a "reasonable" proposal to emerge
from the movement. Both the Thai military, and the old-guard
leadership of PM Abhisit's Democrat Party, have long been
disinclined to seek a political solution to the southern
insurgency. Even Abhisit himself, Tamthai said, while
supportive of the concept of reconciliation, is "conservative"
about the parameters of what a reconciliation deal would look
like.



--------------

Prisoner Release, Violence Levels

--------------




8. (S) Yet the PM is open-minded about considering prisoner
release as a goodwill gesture, Tamthai said. At Abhisit's
request, Tamthai prepared and sent him briefing papers on
several high-profile Malay Muslim prisoners, noting those he
judged to be good candidates for release (religious leaders) and
those he did not (militant commanders).




9. (S) Regarding the latest cycle of violence in the deep South
(detailed in Ref A),Tamthai characterized these acts as
targeted, "controlled" acts by the militants aimed at
demonstrating their capabilities and remaining in the headlines,
not random, "uncontrolled" acts perpetrated by persons acting
outside of militant command structures.




10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok.
MORROW