BURMA-KNU: KNU SEEKS PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000049

SIPDIS

NSC FOR PHU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/9/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA-KNU: KNU SEEKS PRECONDITIONS FOR TALKS

REF: A. CHIANG MAI 45 (BURMA-KNU: THAI MEDIATION)

B. CHIANG MAI 37 (KNU UNDER INCREASED PRESSURE)

C. BANGKOK 888 (AMBASSADOR AND KASIT)

D. BANGKOK 815 (KASIT'S VISIT TO BURMA)

E. RANGOON 214 (RUMORED MILITARY RESHUFFLING)

CHIANG MAI 00000049 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Despite the Burmese regime's offer reported in Ref A for
unconditional talks with the Karen National Union (KNU),which
has been waging a conflict against the regime for over 50 years,
the KNU placed several conditions on its participation in future
talks with the regime during its April 6 meeting with Thai FM
Kasit, who has offered to be a facilitator for direct talks
between the KNU and the Burmese regime. Though he characterized
some of the KNU's requests as unattainable, Kasit agreed to use
them as the starting point for a discussion with Burmese PM
Thein Sein he expects to have on the margins of the April 10-12
ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Summits in Pattaya, Thailand.
According to the NLDLA (National League for Democracy Liberated
Areas),the exile group that claims to speak for Aung San Suu
Kyi's NLD (National League for Democracy),the FM also, at its
request, agreed to explore possibilities for Thailand to serve
as a facilitator for discussions between the NLD and the Burmese
regime.


2. (C) Comment: The Thai realize that both the KNU and the
Burmese regime have preconditions but feel it is in all parties'
interests to seek a way to initiate direct talks (ref D). While
Kasit's personal intervention and genuine interest in promoting
dialogue may give new life to a long-stalled process, it remains
to be seen what impact the Thai facilitating role will have on
the parties' willingness to reach a deal. End Summary and
Comment.

--------------
Around the Table
--------------


3. (C) On Monday April 6, FM Kasit, accompanied by several
ministry officials but not his usual Burma team, met for
approximately two hours at a private Bangkok residence with KNU
leaders and an NLDLA representative. The KNU's representatives
were Vice Chairman David Tharklabaw, General Secretary Szipporah
Sein, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA - the armed wing of
the KNU) Commander Gen. Mu Tu, and Military Attache for Foreign
Affairs Aung Myint Shwe. At Kasit's request, the NLDLA's Nyo
Myint, who arranged for the meeting, also participated in the
discussion; Nyo Mint gave us a read-out on April 9. During the
discussion, Kasit reportedly noted that PM Abhisit, Army
Commander Anupong Paochinda and Defense Minister Prawit
Wongsuwan were aware of his mediation efforts.

--------------
Really Without Preconditions,?
--------------


4. (C) According to Nyo Myint, Kasit led off the meeting by
encouraging the KNU to be "more realistic" in its expectations,
pointing out that the nearly 60-year-old conflict it has waged
against the Burmese regime has not achieved any of its aims. He
also summarized his visit to Burma and held up the Philippines,
Indonesia, and Thailand as examples of countries that had
transitioned to democracy, and had experience that might be
relevant to Burma. Kasit added that in his view, Burmese Senior
General Than Shwe sees himself as Burma's King, but that those
below him espouse different views. Specifically, he suggested
that PM Thein Sein and FM Nyan Win are more flexible. (Embassy
Rangoon comments that while some observers do believe PM Thein
Sein and FM Nyan Win may be more flexible than Than Shwe, most
believe they have relatively little influence or decision-making
authority within the regime. Furthermore, Embassy Rangoon has
been hearing rumors Thein Sein may soon step down as PM (Ref E).)

CHIANG MAI 00000049 002.2 OF 003




5. (C) Kasit also emphasized that the regime had claimed to him
that it was prepared to enter into talks unconditionally, and
asked the KNU if it would place any preconditions on
negotiations, according to Nyo Myint. The KNU delegation
responded that talks would have to be accompanied by a temporary
ceasefire, and by the withdrawal of Burma Army troops from the
Thai-Burma border to positions 50 kilometers inside Burma. They
even marked up a map of military positions provided by the MFA
to reflect the desired troop realignment.


6. (C) KNU representatives also said that any peace deal would
have to continue to allow the group to be able to levy taxes on
mining, logging, and crops. According to Nyo Myint, when Kasit
asked how the KNU would handle border trade, the KNU added it to
the list of activities it would like to tax. (Note: The KNU
currently does not earn revenue from cross-border trade.)
Furthermore, the KNU delegation said it would not negotiate with
the Burmese regime on Burmese territory, subsequently ruling out
Italy, Germany, Sweden and Japan as possible alternate venues.
PM Thein Sein or Gen. Thura Shwe Mann would be acceptable
interlocutors, according to the KNU.

--------------
Kasit's Reaction
--------------


7. (C) Kasit observed that the request for Burmese troops to
withdraw from the border region was unlikely to be met, but
agreed to bring it up with PM Thein Sein, according to Nyo
Myint. Kasit offered Thailand as a host country for whatever
negotiations take place, to which the KNU agreed. Kasit
remarked that he thought the time was right to pursue a peace
deal, because Thein Sein told him during his recent visit to
Burma that the younger generation of Burma Army soldiers was
"tired of fighting." Nyo Mint said Kasit had added that Thein
Sein had also expressed interest in negotiations with the Shan
State Army South and Karenni National Progressive Party, but
said it was unclear whether Thein Sein would ask him to
facilitate these talks as well.


8. (C) At the request of the NLDLA, Kasit agreed to coordinate
with Royal Thai Army Commander Anupong to ensure the security of
the KNU during the remainder of this process, and to provide as
yet unspecified assistance in helping the KNU establish a
liaison office to maintain contact with Kasit. Nyo Mint claimed
Kasit also agreed that KNU leaders could return to the Thai side
of the border, though warned them sternly not to engage in any
cross-border military operations. (Note: As reported Ref B, in
February, the RTG ordered KNU leaders to relocate to positions
on the Burma side of the border.)

--------------
What's Next?
--------------


9. (C) Kasit said he expects to have an opportunity to brief
Burmese PM Thein Sein on his discussions with the KNU during the
ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Summits April 10-12 in Pattaya,
Thailand. More formal discussions could follow once the KNU
sends Kasit more concrete, considered thoughts on the way
forward, said Nyo Myint. Kasit told Nyo Myint he hoped to fly
to Rangoon in the first half of April to present the KNU's
views, but Nyo Myint told us that he had cautioned Kasit that
the KNU would need more time to consider its stance.

--------------
A Second Track?
--------------


10. (C) Also at the request of the NLD-LA, Kasit agreed to
explore possibilities for Thailand to serve as a go-between for
the NLD and the Burmese regime, Nyo Myint claimed. Nyo Myint
added that he had asked the NLD Central Executive Committee to
constructively critique Burma's new constitution and offer
alternative language for provisions it did not find acceptable.
According to Nyo Myint, the NLD took the request on board, and
he plans to share its views with Kasit, who he claims has agreed
in principle to convey the NLD's concerns to the Burmese regime.

CHIANG MAI 00000049 003.2 OF 003




11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassies Bangkok and
Rangoon.
MORROW