SOUTHERN THAILAND: SKEPTICAL ARMY LEADERSHIP STEPPING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000171

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM PTER TH MY
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND: SKEPTICAL ARMY LEADERSHIP STEPPING
ABOARD SECRET DIALOGUE PROCESS

REF: A. BANGKOK 2844 (Chavalit Stirs the Pot)

B. CHIANG MAI 145 (PM Pushes Secret Dialogue)

C. BANGKOK 2096 (HDC Dialogue Resumes)

D. BANGKOK 2792 (Najib Wades In)

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CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
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Summary and Comment

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1. (S) PM Abhisit appears to be bringing a skeptical Thai
military leadership more fully on board with his policy to
resume a secret dialogue with insurgents as a means to resolve
the long-running ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency in the country's
deep south. At an Abhisit-chaired November 2 meeting of the
RTG's southern security policy team, Army Commander Anupong
joined for the first time and reportedly indicated he would not
stand in the way of the talks, though he did not believe they
would succeed. Days later the latest round of talks were held
in Manila. It produced no movement on various
confidence-building measures, and focused mainly on interference
by Malaysian security officials who wish to "own" the dialogue
for themselves, according to one Thai participant. At a higher
level, Malaysian PM Najib's recent comment advocating some form
of autonomy for the southernmost provinces is seen by some
observers here as an opportunity. Although "autonomy" is a
loaded term in the southern Thailand context, the concept of a
greater local voice in governance has long been on the table as
an essential element for ending the conflict. Local empowerment
in the South will be explored in depth at a high-level seminar
at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University on November 30.




2. (S) Comment: Having General Anupong apparently on board to
be part of the peace process is, despite Anupong's pessimism, an
important development. If it holds, it leaves Abhisit less
alone in pushing toward a political solution through dialogue --
though the negative reaction across much of the Bangkok
political spectrum (including within Abhisit's own Democrat
Party) to opposition leader Chavalit's "Pattani City" idea is an
indication of the political challenge ahead (Ref A). For now,
however, the dialogue is making scant progress on
confidence-building measures that must succeed if meaningful
progress is to be made toward ending an insurgency that is
unlikely to be resolved by force of arms. End Summary and
Comment.



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Southern Policy: Bringing the (Skeptical) Army on Board

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3. (S) Consul General met November 12 in Chiang Mai with Mark
Tamthai, Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion,
Culture and Peace and RTG point-man for secret talks with
southern insurgents. Tamthai referred to press accounts of a
November 2 meeting of the RTG's southern security policy team,
chaired by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva. He said the media
wrongly portrayed the gathering as intended to plot a
counter-move to the public proposal by opposition Puea Thai
Party leader Chavalit Yongchaiyut to create a separate,
autonomous administrative unit for Thailand's three
insurgency-plagued southernmost provinces (Ref A). In reality,
the meeting was held to prepare the RTG negotiating team for the
latest round of talks that took place later that week in Manila.
The RTG typically holds such a meeting prior to every round of
talks, Tamthai explained. The November 2 meeting was
particularly significant, however, for a couple of reasons:



-- The group finally met with a full slate of members: PM
Abhisit chairing, NSC SYG Tawin Piansri, Army Commander Aunpong
Paochinda, Democrat Party deputy leader Kraisak Choonhavan, MFA
PermSec Virasak Futrakul, plus Tamthai and NSC Southern team
lead Somkiat Boonchu.


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-- The 90-minute meeting served not only to reaffirm that
pursuit of a reconciliation track was indeed RTG policy, but
also to "clear the air" of concerns and doubts about various RTG
players' commitment to that approach. Notably, General Anupong,
who as recently reported was not at all on board with the
dialogue approach (Ref B),indicated that - while he did not
believe the talks were useful - he would not stand in the way of
the process. (Note: Tamthai's readout and assessment of the
meeting tracked precisely with the account the Embassy heard
November 6 from Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk, who is very
close to multiple members of the southern policy team. End
Note).




4. (S) During the meeting Anupong was asked whether "not
standing in the way" would include "not looking the other way"
when extra-legal violent acts were committed by Army and other
security-linked personnel. Anupong replied that, when presented
with evidence of wrong-doing, he would take appropriate action
against the perpetrator(s). He complained, however, that the
all-too-frequent charges of extra-legal actions that reached
him, sometimes including name-naming and finger-pointing, were
rarely accompanied by actionable evidence.



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Malaysia Wants In: Problems and Opportunities

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5. (S) The Manila round of talks, held late in the first week
of November, was brief and intended mainly to address Malaysian
"interference" in the peace process, Tamthai reported. As in
the past, the insurgent representatives in the negotiations -
most of whom live in exile in Malaysia - continue to complain of
harassment by Malaysian Special Branch police officials who wish
to "own" the dialogue for themselves (Ref C). The insurgents
seek "protection" by the RTG, and suggested Bangkok issue them
written documentation authorizing their travel to and from the
talks. (Note: HRW's Sunai suggested to us that the RTG has now
resumed paying for insurgent travel to the talks, which had
occurred under the interim Surayud government in 2007 but was
stopped in 2008 under the Samak and Somchai governments, due to
the opposition of the then NSC SYG. End Note). The RTG,
however, is unwilling to put anything in writing. Through a
high-level Foreign Ministry channel, the Thais do inform the
Malaysians about each round of talks, but Tamthai doubts this
then gets conveyed to other relevant players in the Malaysian
bureaucracy, particularly the security authorities. The Manila
meeting did not produce a way forward on this.




6. (S) Malaysia's desire to be part of the peace process is
both a problem and an opportunity for Thailand, Tamthai
observed. He said the RTG held the latest round of talks in
Manila - instead of Jakarta, the usual venue - specifically to
dispel Malaysia's concern that the Indonesian Government is
somehow involved. He also commented on Malaysian Prime Minister
Najib Razak's late October remark that some form of autonomy for
Thailand's southernmost provinces could serve as a solution to
the violence (Ref D). Tamthai said his insurgent contacts of
course loved Najib's quote, whereas Democrat Party leaders, the
RTG, and particularly the Royal Thai Army were more circumspect
(though largely silent, per Ref D). He expects the two Prime
Ministers to again discuss the South on the margins of the
upcoming APEC Summit, in part to prepare for their recently
announced joint visit to southern Thailand in December (a topic
that Tamthai said was not discussed during the Abhisit-chaired
November 2 meeting on southern security policy).



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Local Empowerment: Political Football or A Way Out?

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7. (S) Not long after Najib's "autonomy" comments, opposition
Puea Thai leader Chavalit stirred the pot with his proposal to
create an autonomous "Pattani City" to administer the three
southernmost provinces. Tamthai believes Chavalit's engagement
could be either very helpful to the peace process, or very
harmful. On the one hand, Chavalit's suggestion adds another
(and powerful) voice to an idea that has long been discussed in
various Thai circles as an essential element in ending the
southern insurgency. Tamthai himself is a proponent of
empowering local communities in the South, often pointing out
that the notion is workable within the framework of the Thai
constitution, which provides for a special administrative status
that is currently accorded to the cities of Bangkok and Pattaya.
He also notes that PM Abhisit has consistently stated his
openness to any solution in the South that fits within the
constitution. On the other hand, Tamthai is concerned that in
the current ultra-charged state of Thai politics, any proposal
by an opposition leader is sure to be rendered dead on arrival
by the governing side (see Ref A - our sense is that Chavalit's
statement was aimed more at domestic political gaming than at
resolving the southern conflict). Tamthai is also worried that
Chavalit's plan to travel to Malaysia to meet with PM Najib will
further enflame the passions of those who oppose the
autonomy/local empowerment concept. He hopes Najib will
delegate the meeting to a subordinate.




8. (SBU) Regarding Tamthai's advocacy of the autonomy/local
empowerment concept, he said the matter would be explored in
depth at a November 30 seminar at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn
University. The three featured speakers at this public event
would be Tamthai, Deputy Minister of Interior responsible for
the South Thaworn Senneam, and recently retired Armed Forces
Supreme Commander Boonsrang Niumpradit.



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Key CBMs Still Stalled

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9. (S) Tamthai reported scant progress on any of the major or
minor confidence-building measures we last discussed in early
October (Ref B):



-- June 8 mosque attack investigation. Tamthai believes the
RTG is sincere in saying it simply cannot find the subject of an
arrest warrant in the case (who is widely assumed, Tamthai
admitted, to be hidden and protected by a Royal Aide de Camp to
the Queen). This makes the RTG look feckless in the eyes of the
insurgent negotiators, he rued. (Note: Sunai has shared with us
a copy of a "Wanted Dead or Alive" poster that has circulated in
the South in recent weeks. The poster has photos and bio
details from the national ID cards of six suspects, and is not
information the insurgents could have obtained on their own.
Sunai suggested the poster was the result of security force
personnel frustrated at the lack of progress and wanting to push
the issue, sending a signal that some authorities do wish for
the perpetrators to be found/punished. End Note).



-- Prisoner release. The possible "good faith" release of an
elderly Muslim spiritual leader, along with two former insurgent
commanders imprisoned with him about 12 years ago, remains mired
in a complex legal process. All three cases are under (lengthy)
appeal to the Supreme Court, which precludes the possibility of
petitioning for a Royal pardon. Tamthai has pitched the idea of
dropping the appeals in order to pursue Royal pardons, but
representatives of the incarcerated have turned down this option
since no one in the RTG is in a position to guarantee that
pardons would indeed be granted. (Note: The Democrat Party's
Choonhaven told the Embassy in October that he took up the
release issue with the Justice Minister at Abhisit's request,
but got the same Catch-22 response. End Note).

CHIANG MAI 00000171 004.2 OF 004





-- Academic study group/Track II approach. Such a group, to
consist of three scholars from each "side" who would serve as a
think-tank arm of Tamthai's National Security Council team, is
expected to be formed in the not-too-distant future. Tamthai,
who will chair the group and select its members, noted two
difficulties, however. Firstly, given the consensus that the
three ethnic Malay Muslim scholars should be closely linked to
and able to speak for the insurgent movement, nearly all
credible candidates are living in exile, which would complicate
the body's ability to meet. At the same time, any such scholars
still living inside Thailand (Tamthai knows several) are at risk
of arrest or worse should they become identified with the
insurgency. Secondly, some Thai scholars approached by Tamthai
have refused to serve if it means having to work with ethnic
Malay Muslim academics linked to the armed insurgent groups.



-- Joint development project. There has been little movement
on this notion of formulating a development project in the South
that would marry RTG resources with local community involvement
- and be backed by a local cease-fire in the locality of the
project activity. Although the King's Royal Project has
expressed interest in engaging in the effort, it does not want
its involvement to be linked to the broader peace process. To
Tamthai and the insurgent negotiators, this condition would
defeat the purpose of demonstrating the fruits of the peace
process. (Note: the joint development project concept has
largely replaced long-standing efforts by Tamthai's team to push
a more ambitious pilot cease-fire in Yala province. Tamthai
said there is still some consideration of setting up a pilot
peace zone, not in Yala but in four districts of Songkhla
province that have historical links to Pattani. But since
Songkhla is not one of the three southern provinces where the
insurgency is focused, Tamthai lacks enthusiasm for the idea as
he doubts it would have the public impact of the now-shelved
Yala plan. Sunai also lamented that the November 2 group had
shifted the locale from Yala to Songkhla for the same reason,
and suggested Army opposition was the deciding factor. End
Note).




10. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok.
MORROW