Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHIANGMAI151
2009-10-13 09:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:
BURMA: MORE REACTION TO USG POLICY REVIEW
how-toVZCZCXRO8285 PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHCHI #0151/01 2860948 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 130948Z OCT 09 FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1176 INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0074 RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1267
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000151
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/5/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA: MORE REACTION TO USG POLICY REVIEW
REF: CHIANG MAI 141 (EXILES APPLAUD)
CHIANG MAI 00000151 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------------------
Summary and Comment
--------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000151
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/5/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA: MORE REACTION TO USG POLICY REVIEW
REF: CHIANG MAI 141 (EXILES APPLAUD)
CHIANG MAI 00000151 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------
1. (C) Former Thai Ambassador to Burma Poksak Nilibul told P/E
Chief on October 5 he welcomed U.S. engagement, but opined that
regardless of what policy the U.S. adopted, the Burmese regime
would always have the upper hand. The U.S. should work
collectively with ASEAN and other interested players to build
pressure on the regime for political reform, he argued. Poksak
also urged the U.S. to determine its stance on key issues (ASSK
release, 2010 elections) now, a sentiment echoed in a separate
meeting with Burmese exile Aung Naing Oo of the Vahu Development
Institute.
2. (C) Comment: Our contacts' comments largely mirrored those
from our earlier meeting with Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles
(Reftel): they welcomed the USG's policy review but were
skeptical about what kind of near-term change could be expected
from the regime; and they urged the U.S. to establish clear
benchmarks that would guide our response to moves the regime
would try to portray as major concessions. End Summary and
Comment.
--------------
Engagement Welcome
--------------
3. (C) Following our recent discussion of the USG's Burma
policy review with Chiang Mai based Burmese exiles (Reftel),we
sought reaction from two additional sources. On October 5, P/E
Chief reviewed the conclusions of the U.S. policy review on
Burma with former Thai Ambassador to Rangoon Poksak Nilibul.
Poksak welcomed engagement, and asked whether U.S. engagement
would be broad-based. He argued that during his Ambassadorship
(1997-2001),ASEAN's constructive engagement had been
one-dimensional, focused exclusively on creating economic
opportunities for ASEAN businessmen. What Poksak advocated for
with the Thai MFA, he asserted, was a broader engagement
strategy that would target democratic opposition groups and
ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, the Ministry didn't listen to
him, he lamented. P/E Chief responded that while the USG was
starting a dialogue with the regime, our goals remained
unchanged, and we would still call on the regime to dialogue
with the democratic opposition and ethnic minorities. He also
told Poksak that our Embassy in Rangoon constantly engages both
the democratic opposition and ethnic minority groups.
4. (C) In a separate meeting on October 6, the Vahu Development
Institute's Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese exile based in Chiang Mai,
echoed the call for broad-based engagement, encouraging the U.S.
to establish a formal dialogue process with Burmese businessmen.
They are very close to the military, he pointed out, and are a
good way for the U.S. to reach top leaders. The USG's aim
should be to focus on the hard-liners - they need to be
convinced of the need to transition to democracy more than
anyone else, he argued. Aung Naing Oo also suggested that in
the future, the U.S. should consider engaging working-level GOB
officials on key issues like a transparent judiciary, security
sector reform, and election procedures. This engagement did not
have to be carried out in the context of formal training, he
opined, but could be as simple as providing speakers to address
those topics, both inside and outside the American and Jefferson
Centers.
--------------
You Need a Roadmap
--------------
CHIANG MAI 00000151 002.2 OF 002
5. (C) Poksak repeatedly stressed the importance of the USG
deciding where it stood on key issues early in the process. How
will the U.S. respond if Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) is released?
What if the regime makes concessions on counternarcotics or
election procedures in 2010? Aung Naing Oo echoed these
sentiments, saying "you need your own roadmap of sorts," and
"you have to be prepared to respond to concessions." That said,
he cautioned that we should not expect much from the regime.
They may release some political prisoners ahead of the
elections, he asserted, and perhaps Aung San Suu Kyi will be
allowed to campaign for the National League for Democracy, even
though she herself cannot run.
--------------
Engagement Alone Won't Work
--------------
6. (C) Poksak noted to us several times that "the regime has
the upper hand." It will only make concessions if it is in its
self-interest to do so, he opined. The regime will also
continue to play countries in the region off against each other
to get the best deal for itself, he asserted. What the U.S.
should do, he argued, is work with China, ASEAN, Russia, India,
Japan and South Korea to build consensus on pressuring the
regime to implement political reform. "It's difficult," he
said, but this is the best way forward. The unfortunate truth,
he asserted, is that the regime has the advantage no matter what
the international community does, and it won't give it up.
Thus, Poksak remains pessimistic about prospects for change in
the short-term.
MORROW
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/5/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMA: MORE REACTION TO USG POLICY REVIEW
REF: CHIANG MAI 141 (EXILES APPLAUD)
CHIANG MAI 00000151 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------
1. (C) Former Thai Ambassador to Burma Poksak Nilibul told P/E
Chief on October 5 he welcomed U.S. engagement, but opined that
regardless of what policy the U.S. adopted, the Burmese regime
would always have the upper hand. The U.S. should work
collectively with ASEAN and other interested players to build
pressure on the regime for political reform, he argued. Poksak
also urged the U.S. to determine its stance on key issues (ASSK
release, 2010 elections) now, a sentiment echoed in a separate
meeting with Burmese exile Aung Naing Oo of the Vahu Development
Institute.
2. (C) Comment: Our contacts' comments largely mirrored those
from our earlier meeting with Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles
(Reftel): they welcomed the USG's policy review but were
skeptical about what kind of near-term change could be expected
from the regime; and they urged the U.S. to establish clear
benchmarks that would guide our response to moves the regime
would try to portray as major concessions. End Summary and
Comment.
--------------
Engagement Welcome
--------------
3. (C) Following our recent discussion of the USG's Burma
policy review with Chiang Mai based Burmese exiles (Reftel),we
sought reaction from two additional sources. On October 5, P/E
Chief reviewed the conclusions of the U.S. policy review on
Burma with former Thai Ambassador to Rangoon Poksak Nilibul.
Poksak welcomed engagement, and asked whether U.S. engagement
would be broad-based. He argued that during his Ambassadorship
(1997-2001),ASEAN's constructive engagement had been
one-dimensional, focused exclusively on creating economic
opportunities for ASEAN businessmen. What Poksak advocated for
with the Thai MFA, he asserted, was a broader engagement
strategy that would target democratic opposition groups and
ethnic minorities. Unfortunately, the Ministry didn't listen to
him, he lamented. P/E Chief responded that while the USG was
starting a dialogue with the regime, our goals remained
unchanged, and we would still call on the regime to dialogue
with the democratic opposition and ethnic minorities. He also
told Poksak that our Embassy in Rangoon constantly engages both
the democratic opposition and ethnic minority groups.
4. (C) In a separate meeting on October 6, the Vahu Development
Institute's Aung Naing Oo, a Burmese exile based in Chiang Mai,
echoed the call for broad-based engagement, encouraging the U.S.
to establish a formal dialogue process with Burmese businessmen.
They are very close to the military, he pointed out, and are a
good way for the U.S. to reach top leaders. The USG's aim
should be to focus on the hard-liners - they need to be
convinced of the need to transition to democracy more than
anyone else, he argued. Aung Naing Oo also suggested that in
the future, the U.S. should consider engaging working-level GOB
officials on key issues like a transparent judiciary, security
sector reform, and election procedures. This engagement did not
have to be carried out in the context of formal training, he
opined, but could be as simple as providing speakers to address
those topics, both inside and outside the American and Jefferson
Centers.
--------------
You Need a Roadmap
--------------
CHIANG MAI 00000151 002.2 OF 002
5. (C) Poksak repeatedly stressed the importance of the USG
deciding where it stood on key issues early in the process. How
will the U.S. respond if Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) is released?
What if the regime makes concessions on counternarcotics or
election procedures in 2010? Aung Naing Oo echoed these
sentiments, saying "you need your own roadmap of sorts," and
"you have to be prepared to respond to concessions." That said,
he cautioned that we should not expect much from the regime.
They may release some political prisoners ahead of the
elections, he asserted, and perhaps Aung San Suu Kyi will be
allowed to campaign for the National League for Democracy, even
though she herself cannot run.
--------------
Engagement Alone Won't Work
--------------
6. (C) Poksak noted to us several times that "the regime has
the upper hand." It will only make concessions if it is in its
self-interest to do so, he opined. The regime will also
continue to play countries in the region off against each other
to get the best deal for itself, he asserted. What the U.S.
should do, he argued, is work with China, ASEAN, Russia, India,
Japan and South Korea to build consensus on pressuring the
regime to implement political reform. "It's difficult," he
said, but this is the best way forward. The unfortunate truth,
he asserted, is that the regime has the advantage no matter what
the international community does, and it won't give it up.
Thus, Poksak remains pessimistic about prospects for change in
the short-term.
MORROW