Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CHIANGMAI141
2009-10-02 07:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Chiang Mai
Cable title:
BURMESE EXILES APPLAUD USG POLICY REVIEW, URGE SKEPTICISM
how-toVZCZCXRO0164 PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM DE RUEHCHI #0141/01 2750756 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P R 020756Z OCT 09 ZFF4 FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1165 INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0072 RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1249
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000141
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMESE EXILES APPLAUD USG POLICY REVIEW, URGE SKEPTICISM
CHIANG MAI 00000141 001.6 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
--------------------------
Summary and Comment
--------------------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000141
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NSC FOR WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMESE EXILES APPLAUD USG POLICY REVIEW, URGE SKEPTICISM
CHIANG MAI 00000141 001.6 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------
1. (C) In a wide-ranging discussion with CG and P/E Chief,
three prominent Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles warmly welcomed
the outcome of the USG's Burma policy review, but urged us to
proceed cautiously and with a healthy dose of skepticism. They
expressed concern that the U.S. might take big steps in response
to small concessions by the regime. Also, they encouraged us to
focus on the 2010 electoral process, and to reassure the Burmese
people that our engaging in dialogue with the regime does not
mean we are abandoning the Burmese people.
2. (C) Comment: We were encouraged by the positive reception
to the roll-out of the policy. Since many Thai-based Burmese
exiles wield influence in Congress, we believe having their
support for the new approach is important. We will continue to
emphasize in our outreach to the exile community that while we
are changing our tactics, our core strategic goals in Burma
remain the same. End Summary and Comment.
--------------
Good Policy, Proceed Cautiously
--------------
3. (C) On October 1, CG hosted a coffee for three prominent
Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles - Irrawaddy Editor Aung Zaw, Win
Min from the Vahu Development Institute, and Toe Zaw Latt, the
Director of the Democratic Voice of Burma's Thailand Bureau.
Drawing from the background/talking points provided in the
Department's September 30 press guidance, CG opened the meeting
by emphasizing the key elements of our new approach. He
emphasized that while we were using new tactics, our core
strategic goals in Burma had not changed.
4. (C) All three interlocutors expressed support for our
decision to start a dialogue with Burma, but encouraged us to
proceed cautiously, fearing that the U.S. might respond by
taking significant steps (i.e. scaling back sanctions) in
response to disproportionate, small concessions by the Burmese
regime. The package is "really good, even too good," opined
Aung Zaw, cautioning that he did not expect the regime to take
steps that addressed our core concerns. "You need a Plan B and
Plan C," he added, stating that nevertheless, "talking is better
than shouting." Toe Zaw Latt praised engagement and noted that
the impact would not be immediate, but asked what our
expectations were, whether we had a timeline/benchmarks in
place, and whether the Burmese military really wanted to engage.
--------------
Elections Hold the Keys
--------------
5. (C) Win Min focused on the 2010 elections, advocating for
the U.S. to lay down strong markers about the process. Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK) still enjoys strong support inside Burma, he
noted. He highlighted the importance of coordinating next steps
with her, and of electoral monitoring. The regime wants her
party - the National League for Democracy - to participate in
the elections, but only in a weakened state, he said. Aung Zaw
opined that whereas the West would only accept a credible
election, other countries in the region would accept even a
rigged one. CG responded that we recognize the 2010 elections
are unlikely to be fully free and fair, and that the USG is
taking a long-term approach toward change in Burma. This
underscores the importance of having the dialogue include other
issues (i.e. counter-narcotics, non-proliferation),where
CHIANG MAI 00000141 002.6 OF 002
near-term progress could serve as a confidence-builder that in
turn could enable progress on bigger-picture political concerns
in the future.
6. (C) Aung Zaw opined that World War II remains recovery might
be an issue on which cooperation could begin soon. Toe Zaw Latt
cited releasing ASSK as one step the regime could take to build
confidence, though Aung Zaw noted she could be used as a pawn
and rearrested. "It is important to state clearly where you
stand on key issues (release of ASSK, counternarcotics
cooperation),especially for people inside who need to know that
USG dialogue with the regime does not mean America is abandoning
them," he stated. "People want to manipulate the U.S., and U.S.
businesses `want in'," he cautioned, urging us to proceed
gingerly in response to any regime concessions.
7. (C) Win Min underscored the importance of the U.S. talking
to someone who can influence Senior General Than Shwe. Aung Zaw
surmised that if the regime sees the 2010 elections as its "exit
strategy," Than Shwe may be willing to make several concessions
in the run-up. The regime may see the elections as entrenching
military rule, thereby making other issues of concern to the
U.S. less significant to Rangoon and therefore negotiable, since
the regime is on the verge of achieving what it sees as its
ultimate goals, he added.MORROW
SIPDIS
NSC FOR WALTON
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/2/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM BM TH
SUBJECT: BURMESE EXILES APPLAUD USG POLICY REVIEW, URGE SKEPTICISM
CHIANG MAI 00000141 001.6 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai.
REASON: 1.4 (d)
--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------
1. (C) In a wide-ranging discussion with CG and P/E Chief,
three prominent Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles warmly welcomed
the outcome of the USG's Burma policy review, but urged us to
proceed cautiously and with a healthy dose of skepticism. They
expressed concern that the U.S. might take big steps in response
to small concessions by the regime. Also, they encouraged us to
focus on the 2010 electoral process, and to reassure the Burmese
people that our engaging in dialogue with the regime does not
mean we are abandoning the Burmese people.
2. (C) Comment: We were encouraged by the positive reception
to the roll-out of the policy. Since many Thai-based Burmese
exiles wield influence in Congress, we believe having their
support for the new approach is important. We will continue to
emphasize in our outreach to the exile community that while we
are changing our tactics, our core strategic goals in Burma
remain the same. End Summary and Comment.
--------------
Good Policy, Proceed Cautiously
--------------
3. (C) On October 1, CG hosted a coffee for three prominent
Chiang Mai-based Burmese exiles - Irrawaddy Editor Aung Zaw, Win
Min from the Vahu Development Institute, and Toe Zaw Latt, the
Director of the Democratic Voice of Burma's Thailand Bureau.
Drawing from the background/talking points provided in the
Department's September 30 press guidance, CG opened the meeting
by emphasizing the key elements of our new approach. He
emphasized that while we were using new tactics, our core
strategic goals in Burma had not changed.
4. (C) All three interlocutors expressed support for our
decision to start a dialogue with Burma, but encouraged us to
proceed cautiously, fearing that the U.S. might respond by
taking significant steps (i.e. scaling back sanctions) in
response to disproportionate, small concessions by the Burmese
regime. The package is "really good, even too good," opined
Aung Zaw, cautioning that he did not expect the regime to take
steps that addressed our core concerns. "You need a Plan B and
Plan C," he added, stating that nevertheless, "talking is better
than shouting." Toe Zaw Latt praised engagement and noted that
the impact would not be immediate, but asked what our
expectations were, whether we had a timeline/benchmarks in
place, and whether the Burmese military really wanted to engage.
--------------
Elections Hold the Keys
--------------
5. (C) Win Min focused on the 2010 elections, advocating for
the U.S. to lay down strong markers about the process. Aung San
Suu Kyi (ASSK) still enjoys strong support inside Burma, he
noted. He highlighted the importance of coordinating next steps
with her, and of electoral monitoring. The regime wants her
party - the National League for Democracy - to participate in
the elections, but only in a weakened state, he said. Aung Zaw
opined that whereas the West would only accept a credible
election, other countries in the region would accept even a
rigged one. CG responded that we recognize the 2010 elections
are unlikely to be fully free and fair, and that the USG is
taking a long-term approach toward change in Burma. This
underscores the importance of having the dialogue include other
issues (i.e. counter-narcotics, non-proliferation),where
CHIANG MAI 00000141 002.6 OF 002
near-term progress could serve as a confidence-builder that in
turn could enable progress on bigger-picture political concerns
in the future.
6. (C) Aung Zaw opined that World War II remains recovery might
be an issue on which cooperation could begin soon. Toe Zaw Latt
cited releasing ASSK as one step the regime could take to build
confidence, though Aung Zaw noted she could be used as a pawn
and rearrested. "It is important to state clearly where you
stand on key issues (release of ASSK, counternarcotics
cooperation),especially for people inside who need to know that
USG dialogue with the regime does not mean America is abandoning
them," he stated. "People want to manipulate the U.S., and U.S.
businesses `want in'," he cautioned, urging us to proceed
gingerly in response to any regime concessions.
7. (C) Win Min underscored the importance of the U.S. talking
to someone who can influence Senior General Than Shwe. Aung Zaw
surmised that if the regime sees the 2010 elections as its "exit
strategy," Than Shwe may be willing to make several concessions
in the run-up. The regime may see the elections as entrenching
military rule, thereby making other issues of concern to the
U.S. less significant to Rangoon and therefore negotiable, since
the regime is on the verge of achieving what it sees as its
ultimate goals, he added.MORROW