India Semi-Annual Fraud Update

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 16 CHENNAI 000077

CA/FPP FOR JILL NYSTROM
DS/CR/CFI FOR GALEN NACE
DS/CR/VPAU FOR TIM LONGANACRE AND YVETTE COLMAN
Pass to DHS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC IN
SUBJECT: India Semi-Annual Fraud Update

REF: A) 07 State 171211, B) 08 New Delhi 2915, C) 08 Mumbai 17, D)
07 Chennai 695, E) 08 Chennai 372, F) 07 Chennai 704, G) 08 Chennai
212, H) 07 Chennai 487, I) 08 Mumbai 367, J) 08 Kolkata 73, K) 08
Chennai 91, L) 08 Mumbai 111, M) Chennai 13, N) New Delhi 175, O) 08
Chennai 351, P) 08 Kolkata 291, Q) 08 Chennai 227, R) New Delhi 7

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A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS
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1. India-wide consular operations are among the busiest in the
world. In FY-2008, Mission India processed more than 756,000
non-immigrant visa applications and 27,000 immigrant visa
applications. The majority of applicants from India are bona fide
travelers and migrants. Despite a relatively low per capita
incidence of fraud, however, India's high demand for consular
services, even with the recent economic downturn, results in
thousands of fraud investigations every year. Some areas of India,
such as the states of Gujarat and Punjab, are traditional sources of
migration out of India and fraudulent applications from these areas
are more common than from other regions of India. The state of
Andhra Pradesh, and in particular its capital of Hyderabad, has been
identified as a large center of documentary fraud which affects all
India posts.


2. The world economic crisis affected the travel environment in
India in FY-2008. The domestic civilian aviation industry is
struggling to manage costs amidst slower traffic and rapid
expansion, with even the traditionally most successful airlines
looking for alliances and partnerships. Discretionary travel -
including international travel -- is off and has affected Mission
India NIV demand. Economic observers in India predict that the
global slowdown will reduce India's GDP growth from about 9.0
percent to around 6.5 percent this fiscal year and 5.5-6 percent
next fiscal year (starting April 1). While U.S., Indian, and
multinational businesses with strong ties to the U.S. economy have
slowed down their expansion plans, they mostly are continuing to
hire - albeit at a slower pace.


3. Despite this difficult economic climate, the demand for visa
appointments from the intending immigrant population in northern
India has remained strong. An opinion poll published in the popular
Times of India in January 2007 noted that 37 percent of the 1.1
billion Indians would emigrate if they had the chance. Many Indians
have tried to migrate using non-immigrant visas, and a greater
number of Indian nationals apply for employment-based H and L visas
than any other nationality worldwide. Mission India processed
192,332 H and L visa adjudications in FY-2008 and 190,087 in
FY-2007. The worldwide total for work-related visa applications was
627,950, meaning that Mission India alone processed nearly 31
percent of all employment visas. We expect this trend to continue.
Chennai, Mumbai and New Delhi have been the three busiest H-1B visa
processing posts in the world for the past five fiscal years. The
new Consulate General in Hyderabad will quickly join that threesoe
as it ramps up visa operations in the near futue.


4. In FY-2008, the non-immigrant visa classe most often targeted

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for fraud were B1/B2 business travelers/tourists, H-1B temporary
workers, F1 student visas, P3 culturally unique artists and R-1
religious workers. The most commonly targeted immigrant visa classes
were IR/CR in Delhi and F-2B and F-2A visas in Mumbai and Chennai.
During the six month period from September 2008 through February
2009, Mission India's consular sections identified a total of 3,053
cases of suspected visa fraud (Chennai - 1,285, Mumbai - 843, New
Delhi - 816, Kolkata - 109).


5. Most of India's fraudulent applicants come from specific and
easily defined regional areas within each consular district. These
states have some of the most mobile populations in India and the
largest concentrations of expatriate communities overseas, including
in the United States. In New Delhi, cases originating from the
Punjab comprise the majority of its IV and fraud caseloads, while
the same can be said in Mumbai with Gujarat. Chennai's NIV and
documentary fraud comes principally from Andhra Pradesh, while IV
fraud comes mainly from Kerala.
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B. NON-IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD
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6. Fraudulent NIV applications make up a small portion of the total
NIV cases but the vast majority of cases referred to FPU. During
the reporting period, Mission India noted 2,548 total cases of NIV
fraud. Nearly half of those cases resulted in a finding of
confirmed fraud (Chennai - 1,214 cases , 48 percent confirmed fraud
rate of completed investigations; Mumbai - 680, 56 percent; New
Delhi - 545, 35 percent; Kolkata - 109, 49 percent). The reported
fraud rate is down dramatically from the 3,996 cases identified
during the last reporting period, especially in our highest fraud
categories detailed below.


7. B1/B2 visa fraud is the most commonplace. Regionally-based fraud
rings throughout the country, but especially in Hyderabad, continue
to produce fraudulent documents for visa application and travel
purposes. Some visa "consultants" and travel agents specialize in
fraudulent experience letters and fake document packages, which
include passport copies of false relatives, bogus financial
documents, and affidavits of support. In the last six months the
number of reported B1/B2 fraud cases has dropped throughout the
Mission from 2,043 to 1,089. Since the total number of cases
dropped at every single post in Mission India, the decline may be
due to the overall lower B1/B2 applicant volume due to the economic
decline. In FY-2008, Mumbai confirmed an overstay rate of less than
one percent for male B1/B2 applicants between ages 20 and 35 (ref
C).

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H-1B Visa Fraud
--------------


8. H-1B fraud is one of the top two visa categories for fraud
throughout Mission India. All posts regularly encounter inflated or
fabricated educational and employment qualifications. The vast
majority of these documents come from Hyderabad. FPU Chennai has
investigated 150 companies in Hyderabad over the last 18 months, 77

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percent of which turned out to be fraudulent or highly suspect (ref
D). Most of the cases slated for field investigations were to
verify the experience letters for H-1B applicants who did not meet
minimum educational qualifications.

9. The state of Andhra Pradesh, and Hyderabad in particular, has
long been the hub for fraudulent document vendors in South India.
Hyderabadi applicants comprised over one-third of Chennai's total
visa workload in FY-2008, but well over half of the FPU workload.
FPU Mumbai has identified a Hyderabad-based fraud scheme whereby
Hyderabadi applicants were claiming to work for fictitious companies
in Pune in order to apply in Mumbai's consular district and avoid
Chennai. During recent field investigations in Bangalore (ref E),
FPU Chennai encountered several fictitious companies staffed by
Hyderabadis. The Hyderabadis claimed that they had opened shell
companies in Bangalore because "everyone knows Hyderabad has fraud
and Bangalore is reputable."

10. Mission India continues to be at the forefront of H and L
adjudications and training. Officers from multiple posts have
visited Mission India for H and L training, and over twenty posts
communicate regularly with Chennai to seek its expertise in
adjudicating problematic H and L cases. At the end of FY-2007,
Mission India hosted a countrywide H and L fraud conference in New
Delhi (ref F) and in May 2008 hosted an H and L fraud conference in
Chennai (ref G) attended by DHS, KCC, CA/VO, CA/FPP, DS and multiple
posts that adjudicate large numbers of Indian H-1B applicants.
Presentations from that conference are available on the intranet at
http://intranet.ca.state.gov/ fraud/resources/niv/hl/20107.aspx.


11. Several posts have started initiatives to combat H and L fraud,
the most substantial of which is the actual start-up of a new
consulate general in Hyderabad. New Delhi utilizes an H and L case
management system called HERO (H-1B Evaluation Revocation and
Organization) to manage the work flow of cases under review for
fraud indicators. HERO also includes a revocation memo generator
and archival tool. A presentation on HERO is available on the
CA/FPP intranet site. Kolkata now has an A/RSO-I and doubled the
size of its FPU with H&L funded staff.


12. FPU Mumbai identified a recent trend of "mix-and-match" couples
where multiple H-4 spouses pretended to be married to the same H-1B
spouse resident in the United States. These applicants were to pay
approximately $70,000 upon issuance to the smuggler that arranged
their documentation.

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Religious Workers
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13. India detects considerable fraud among applicants for R-1 and
R-2 visas traveling to the U.S. for religious purposes. During the
last two years, most R-1 fraud was detected amongst Tibetan
refugees, Sikh raagis, and Hindu priests. Mission R-1 fraud
includes both fraudulent beneficiaries and fictitious inviting
parties. Since DHS began requiring petitions for R-1 applicants in
November, R-1 fraud referrals have completely dried up as cases are
still working their way through the petition approval process.
Since DHS requires a 100 percent on-site verification of

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petitioners, we expect the volume of R-1 cases will diminish
greatly. During the reporting period, Mission India identified 222
cases of R-1 fraud. Although that was a nearly 50 percent decrease
from the previous period, all but fourteen of those cases came in
the three months prior to the November petition requirement.


14. Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata have all recently reported on R-1
fraud trends (refs H, I and J). Mumbai noted that following
numerous FPU investigations in the states of Gujarat and Maharashtra
in which none of the purported Sikhs were legitimate religious
workers, CY-2008 R-1 visa refusals have climbed to nearly 70
percent. Mumbai and Kolkata noted similar findings that Sikhs and
Tibetan monks had the highest percentage of confirmed fraud during
this period. Kolkata confirmed that 85 percent of R-1 Buddhist monks
from the Northern District of West Bengal did not belong to the
monasteries as they claimed. Most of these fake priests were from
Nepal or from the south Indian state of Karnataka. FPU Kolkata
observed that Buddhist priests and monks from this region all speak
Hindi, and Buddhist monks who claim to speak only Tibetan are not
from West Bengal.


15. Coordination between the FPUs throughout Mission India has been
highly effective in preventing fraud in many R-1 visa cases. An
astute catch by the FPM in Kolkata caught several fraudulent R-1
applicants applying the same week in Mumbai and New Delhi. Based on
an A/RSO-I investigation in New Delhi that uncovered fake stamps for
an organization in Michigan, Chennai arranged the arrest of three
fake Sikhs, and the astute Kolkata FPM used Watch Phrase to alert
U.S. Mission New Zealand about its applicants connected to the same
Michigan organization. These cases are now under investigation by
DS. Technology tools, such as Watch Phrase and Text Search, have
proven invaluable in combating R-1 fraud.

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Student Visas
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16. Many student applicants, even legitimate ones, are taken in by
document vendors. They present fraudulent packages of bank
statements and land documents in their interviews, and they are
guided by advertising and new articles, such as the one in Hyderabad
which declared, "Study Part-Time, Work Full-Time" on an F-1 student
visa. In June 2008, Chennai conducted an open house for local
journalists to dispel the myths surrounding the visa process and to
encourage students in particular not to rely on visa facilitators.
CA/FPP has been instrumental in identifying schools that have a bad
track record of students not maintaining status once in the U.S.
Since most students apply in July/August for the fall semester, the
fraud referral rate was understandably lower during the last six
months.

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Performer Visas
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17. Chennai, Mumbai and New Delhi have all been active in combating
fraud of cultural performers. The highest rate of fraud is in New

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Delhi. FPU New Delhi has developed an active and successful
prescreening program for all P3 applicants, which in the last
reporting period exceeded 250 cases.


18. An investigation by the Chennai FPU in 2008 uncovered a visa
fraud racket through which famous Tamil film actors and industry
associates assisted mala fide applicants to obtain B1/B2 visas,
purportedly to scout movie locations (ref K). Over two hundred
applicants applied for visas under this scheme, and 95 were issued.
Thirty-eight of those applicants are confirmed overstays who are
currently illegally present in the United States. FPU revoked the
visas of 56 other individuals, mostly Tamil film stars and industry
associates, for their direct role in this visa scheme. The case
generated significant press attention throughout India and appeared
on all of the major news networks, thereby creating a very
high-profile anti-fraud awareness campaign.


19. Mumbai also conducted a validation study of P-3 performers (ref
L) which confirmed a 99 percent return rate of all P-3 applicants.
Mumbai requests that most P-3 performers present themselves in
person to the consulate to confirm their return.

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C. IMMIGRANT VISA FRAUD
--------------


20. During the reporting period, Mission India identified 505 cases
of IV fraud (New Delhi - 271, 33 percent confirmed fraud rate;
Mumbai - 163, 31 percent; Chennai - 71, 28 percent). Kolkata, which
does not process IVs, assisted with several field investigations in
its consular district. Although all posts face the major abuses
associated with IV fraud (i.e. fraudulent relationships, fake civil
documents, etc.),the volume of IV cases in New Delhi and Mumbai is
significantly larger than that of Chennai.


21. The F and CR categories are particularly troublesome throughout
Mission India, and posts see false family relationships and
fictitious marriages and divorces every day. The Indian custom of
arranged marriages makes adjudicating IR and CR cases particularly
difficult, as the husband and wife often do not meet until just
before their marriage. Many of the IV fraud referrals in Mumbai are
CR-1 or F-21 cases stemming from "arranged" marriages between U.S.
citizens or LPRs and Indian nationals. Thus, much of the FPUs' time
is dedicated to determining the legitimacy of the family
relationships that sustain the claim to immigrant status.


22. New Delhi FPU investigates cases through a combination of
Lexis-Nexis and PIERS checks on the petitioner side, and CCD checks,
voters ID checks and pretext calls to the villagers. Over the past
year New Delhi FPU has broken numerous cases in which the
beneficiary provided a false Voter's ID by searching the official
voter registration on-line at http://www.ceopunjab.nic.in/. The
official lists indicate who lives in the house, their ages and
marital status and/or father's name. Local police accepted three
such cases of Voter's ID fraud for investigation. Pretext calls are
still the unit's most valuable resource. Using the online phone
lists, investigators can locate phone numbers in the area in which

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the applicant lives and call those neighbors for information about
the beneficiary and sometimes petitioner. This is more effective in
rural areas; city residents are less informed/less willing to talk
about their neighbors.


23. Posts also frequently encounter misrepresentations of marital
status in order to benefit from earlier "current processing dates"
(e.g. falsely claiming to be single by denying the applicant has a
spouse and children in order to qualify for F1 classification) and
misrepresentations of the age of children in order to qualify as
part of the family eligible to immigrate. Chennai has seen the
largest number of these cases originating from the state of Kerala
(ref M).

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D. DIVERSITY VISA FRAUD
--------------


24. Although Indians are generally ineligible to participate in the
Diversity Visa program, Kolkata conducted five DV investigations for
Nepalese nationals. All five cases were confirmed fraudulent.

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E. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD
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25. Although passport and CRBA-related fraud exists, it has been
very minor. During the rating period, New Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata
reported fifteen investigations, eleven of which were DNA checks.
Only one of these cases resulted in a confirmed fraud finding.

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F. ADOPTION FRAUD
--------------


26. During the reporting period, only Mumbai referred any adoption
cases for investigation (eight). Recent media accounts have focused
attention on reportedly fraudulent adoptions in India by Australian
parents. Other countries have also expressed concerns about cases
stemming from questionable orphanages in the late 1990s and early
2000s. Indian authorities are investigating these claims (Ref N).

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G. Use of DNA Testing
--------------


27. Mission India does not have any particular concern with DNA
testing. Guidance for all posts is to utilize DNA testing as a last
resort, and most cases are resolved through interviews and fraud
investigations. Each post has a panel physician and affiliated lab,
and a cleared American is always present when a blood sample is
taken. During the rating period, Mission India conducted DNA
testing in 82 cases (Mumbai - 38, New Delhi - 33, Chennai - 10,
Kolkata - 1),and in eleven cases fraud was confirmed. This does
not include DNA tests in New Delhi and Mumbai on behalf of DHS, or
cases for which DNA was recommended but the applicant did not submit
a sample.

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H. Asylum and Other DHS Benefits Fraud
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28. All posts now refer FDNS investigation requests to FDNS HQ for
appropriate dissemination. Since those cases should be routed to
the USCIS, ICE and CBP representatives at Embassy New Delhi, the
number of DHS referrals has decreased significantly in the past six
months to only 71 cases (New Delhi - 50, Mumbai 20, Chennai - 1).
Fifty-five of those requests from New Delhi and Mumbai were for DNA
tests. Beginning in the next reporting period, DHS will begin
processing its own DNA cases. Four investigations for DHS in Mumbai
were confirmed fraudulent.

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I. Alien Smuggling, Trafficking, Organized Crime, Terrorist Travel
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29. Alien smuggling from and through India using fraudulent travel
documents is one of the most serious challenges facing posts in the
region. Smuggling ranges from individual document vendors to
sophisticated criminal organizations that move hundreds of people to
the U.S. each year. Delhi and Mumbai have become key transit points
for illegal migrants proceeding to the U.S. from India. DS/CR/VPAU,
in consultation with DRSO/I New Delhi, and the Austrian, Canadian,
British, and New Zealand High Commissions have noted an upsurge of
third-country nationals transiting New Delhi with counterfeit
documents. Individuals of numerous nationalities, including
Armenians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Georgian, Bangladeshi, Congolese,
Nepalese, and Sri Lankans have been intercepted attempting to
transit New Delhi with fraudulent documents. Other Indian airports
have also been reporting similar patterns.


30. Trafficking in persons (TIP) remains an area of considerable
concern. India is a source, destination, and transit country for
men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of commercial
sexual exploitation and forced labor. Internal trafficking of women
and girls for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation and
forced marriage is prevalent. The GOI estimates 90 percent of
India's sex trafficking is internal, although estimates on the
number of trafficking victims vary widely and are generally
unreliable. Recent years have seen an increase in trafficking to
medium-sized cities and satellite towns of large cities. One NGO
reports a rising trend of girls coming from single-parent homes and
from families where fathers have remarried. India is also a
destination for women and girls from Nepal and Bangladesh trafficked
for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation.

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J. DS Criminal Fraud Investigations
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31. The single greatest development in combating fraud in India has
been expansion of the RSO-I program and the close relationship
between A/RSO-Is and FPMs throughout Mission India. All posts have
an A/RSO-I, and several are due to receive a second A/RSO-I in 2010.

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All of the RSO-Is and FPMs attended the H and L fraud conference at
the end of FY-2007 and the H and L Conference in Chennai in May
2008, except for those from Hyderabad which was not open at that
time. All RSO-Is and FPMs are included in a common email group that
is used daily, and the D/RSO-I and Country Coordinator for Fraud
Prevention Programs plan their quarterly trips to each post in
consultation with one another.


32. As the A/RSO-I/FPU program expands in India to move beyond
arrest statistics and personnel growth, the program has inevitably
encountered challenges in another stage of criminal prosecutions;
court trials. Permission to testify in foreign courts must be
sought and obtained according to international treaty standards and
stringent FAM regulations. Seeking such permission has been an
infrequent requirement since most officers are long gone by the time
cases reach their court dates. However, these summons are
anticipated to occur much more frequently now, particularly given
the high volume of arrests in FY-2008. In a recent case, ARSO/I
Mumbai obtained such approval after much guidance and consultation
with D/RSO-I and L/DL and was able to testify in January 2009 in a
large-scale smuggling case involving H4 visa fraud. A procedure has
since been established to facilitate future summons delivery,
immunity, and testimonial issues.


33. A/RSO-Is have also sought to address the "transferred officer"
syndrome, by encouraging the use of FSNI's as complainants in fraud
cases brought to local law enforcement for investigation; a practice
in use by other A/RSO-I/FPU programs in Indonesia and Colombia.
Based on initiatives by A/RSO-Is in India, L/DL recently made an
important decision to allow FSNs to sign and file the initial police
reports with Indian law enforcement. By the time these cases reach
the courts, there is a much greater likelihood that the FSNs on the
report will still be available to act as witnesses than there is for
the A/RSO-I. This will help ensure that cases generated by A/RSO-I
and FPU efforts will complete the full cycle of crime detection,
investigation, and prosecution.


34. Finally, as a result of an increasing amount of pressure both
from the U.S. government and from other diplomatic missions,
primarily the U.K., Canada, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand,
Indian law enforcement is slowly beginning to address smuggling and
trafficking issues in India. Recently, A/RSO-I Mumbai met with the
Joint Commissioner of Police to discuss alien smuggling schemes.
The meeting resulted in the creation of a Special Cell for Human
Trafficking and Smuggling within the Mumbai Crime Branch. The
result is that cases referred from the US Consulate will now be
worked by trained investigators as opposed to local constables who
do not have the training or experience to deal with complex document
fraud cases.

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K. Indian Passport, Identity Documents, and Civil Registry
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35. Indian Passport fraud is a significant and continuously
worrisome fraud challenge. For all of the security features and
improvements in quality control of current Indian passports, quality

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and issuance control are lax and penalties are so inadequate that
virtually anyone can obtain a genuinely issued, but fraudulent
passport with near impunity.


36. The design of the Indian passport incorporates many good
security features that would normally lead to a more favorable
rating of this document's vulnerability. The problem lies in
production inconsistency and vulnerable source documents. Quality
control is lax at production locations. Thus, genuine passports
sometimes are partially or completely missing security features.
Genuine passports issued on the same day at the same place can look
entirely different - a different batch but the numbers are
sequentially close.


37. The only documentation required for a passport is proof of
birth and proof of residency. Easily reproduced school records can
suffice for the former, while a bank statement or utility bill can
be used to "prove" the latter. Although police are supposed to
verify the information on each application by visiting the
applicant's neighborhood and interviewing neighbors, such checks are
often cursory at best. In most cases, police officials will only
check warrant records and then hand over a clean record to passport
authorities. Notwithstanding these problems, the fact the
application process requires a police check is positive.


38. Ironically, another positive is the cumbersome Indian
bureaucracy. The application process for a passport can be
extremely time consuming and laborious. Anyone with an urgent
desire for a fraudulent Indian passport may thus pursue an
alternative to acquiring a legitimate passport with fake source
documents. Finally, Indian passports are issued through regional
offices. One benefit of this is that individuals applying outside of
their 'normal' region would attract additional attention and
scrutiny.


39. Fraudulent civil documentation is common in India, both in
terms of documents that have been fabricated outright, and documents
issued improperly. Posts see a myriad of fraudulent documents,
including fake civil registry documents, counterfeit entry/exit
stamps and third-country visas, employment letters, sponsorship and
financial documents, bogus degrees and entrance examination scores,
and altered marriage and site photographs. Visa consultants sell
such documents to applicants who seek their advice about how to
qualify for visas. Peddlers of fraudulent documents abound and
operate quite openly in major Indian cities and even some of the
smaller towns. Government officials are not above fraudulent
issuances either. Virtually all birth certificates, death
certificates, and marriage registration documents can be purchased
from corrupt local government officials or brokers.

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L. Cooperation with Host Government Authorities
--------------


40. All posts have increased efforts to work more closely with
Indian authorities in a number of areas of common interest, such as
making Indian documents more secure, establishing fraud prevention

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strategies, verification of civil registry information, and the
apprehension of criminals. Airport police and immigration
authorities in Mumbai have been aggressive in detaining individuals
who DHS deported for fraudulent documents. Law enforcement in New
Delhi has been actively involved in arresting visa vendors but has
not taken a general interest in arresting persons denied boarding at
the airport for presenting fraudulent documents, in part due to the
absence of a U.S. presence at the airport.

41. In Mumbai, the consulate established a close relationship with
the Mumbai Joint Commissioner of Police in combating both U.S. visa
fraud and Indian passport fraud following a smuggling operation
connected to Jet Airways. The arrest of several visa applicants,
including Jet Airways employees, led to ten other arrests of
vendors/ facilitators. More importantly, two of those ten
facilitators were Passport Office officials, and this has put more
urgency and attention on cleaning up the corruption in local
passport offices.

42. In Chennai, law enforcement officials investigate cases
involving Chennai applicants but are hesitant to do so with
applicants from other states. The opening of Consulate General
Hyderabad will greatly improve interaction with local government
officials. The Chairman of the State Board of Education in Andhra
Pradesh has been instrumental in developing and maintaining the
integrity of OLIVE, the Online Verification system for high priority
educational degrees in the state. A similar program, MARTINI, has
been set up in the state of Karnataka.

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M. Areas of Particular Concern
--------------


43. Mission India appreciates the considerable support it has
received from the Department in support of combating visa fraud.
All Mission FPUs are now better equipped, and most will soon have
appropriate offices from which to operate. The Chennai and Kolkata
FPUs have completed their physical expansion, while phase one of the
New Delhi reconstruction project was completed in March. All of
consular section Mumbai eagerly awaits the completion of a new
consulate compound, currently scheduled for FY2009. Consulate
General Hyderabad will officially begin visa processing in March.

44. The possibility of submitting large validation studies for
entry/exit checks with the USVISIT program has significantly
enhanced Mission India validation studies. In FY-2008, Mission
India conducted three countrywide validation studies for referrals
(ref O),the Business Executive Program (ref P),and M-1 flight
school students (ref Q),in addition to Post-specific studies, such
as a review of Bhutanese travelers in New Delhi (ref R). Providing
ADIS access to posts has been a considerable boon to fraud reporting
throughout Mission India.

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N. STAFFING AND TRAINING
--------------


45. Mission India lists below for each post the names, position
titles and consular-specific training each FPU member has received.
Each post has a full-time FPM, except for Kolkata where the FPM is a

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part-time portfolio, and an A/RSO-I. The FPM in Chennai is also the
Country Coordinator. Due to staffing gaps, the FPM positions in New
Delhi and Mumbai are encumbered by second tour officers until Summer
2009 and Summer 2011, respectively. Each post has its own in-house
training for new FPU staff. All officers have taken basic consular
training.

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Chennai
--------------

John A. Ballard
Country Coordinator for Fraud Prevention Programs/Fraud Prevention
Manager
PC-126 Advanced Consular Name Checking, Washington, 8/03
PC-543 Analytic Interviewing, Washington, 6/04
PC-108 Consular Leadership Development Conference, Cyprus, 12/04
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 8/05
Eurasia Fraud Conference, Istanbul, 3/06
PC-532 Advanced Consular Course, Washington, 6/07
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07
The Future of H and L Processing, KCC, 4/08
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08

Kip Francis
Vice Consul/Back-up Fraud Prevention Manager
India H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08

Anthony K. Ramirez
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigations
DTB50100 - DS Management Operations Course 11/2000
I2 - Investigative Database Utilization and Management 03/01
DTB10100 - Basic Special Agent Course 05/02
PC 538 - Non-Immigrant Visa Training 03/04
DS Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigation Training, 08/04
DHS - Document Fraud Detection and Recognition 08/04
OT 101 - DS/RSO Course 05/05
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08
Worldwide A/RSO-I Conference, Budapest, 11/08

Priya Francis
Security Investigator (FSN/I)
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 2002 & 2004
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 3/2005
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08

Ann D'Silva
Consular Investigations Specialist
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 02/99
FSN antifraud course (FSNAC),Bangkok, 11/1999
PA-248 Supervisory Skills Workshop, Dhaka, 07/2003
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training for FSN'S, Washington, 11/2003
H1B Fraud Conference in Boston, 05/06

CHENNAI 00000077 012 OF 016


H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08
PC-106 Regional Workshop for Consular FSNs, Washington, 3/08

Anandan Ramanan
Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 02/99
Supervisory Skills Workshop, New Delhi 04/2000
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 04/2002
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08

Dipti Peteti
Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/07
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08

Rajalakshmi Vasanthakumar
Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 05/02
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 9/08

Preethi Nelson
Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-123 Workshop for Senior Immigrant Visa LES,Washington D.C.
04/2008
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, Chennai, 07/2008
PC-123 Workshop for Senior Immigrant Visa LES,Washington D.C.
09/2004
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations, Chennai, 09/2004
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations, Chennai, 05/2002

Srinivas Vadagepalli
Consular Investigations Clerk
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post 10/07
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, Chennai,
3/08

--------------
Kolkata
--------------

Alan Smith
Fraud Prevention Manager

Anne Brunne
FLETC CITP, 11/1998
DS BSAC, 02/1999
PC-530, 6/2008

Partha Banerji
Consular Assistant (also handles small IV workload)
NEA/SA Consular FSN Workshop (PC-106),FSI Washington, 02/2000

CHENNAI 00000077 013 OF 016


FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop, Hotel Park-Hyatt, Washington, 04/2002

FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 3/2005
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 11/2008

James P Rozario
H and L Consular Assistant
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 03/09

--------------
Mumbai
--------------

Dean Tidwell
Acting Fraud Prevention Manager
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, 02/2009

Meera Doraiswamy
Vice Consul (FPU Rotation)
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, 12/2008
PC 126A Adv Consular Name checking March 2008
H and L and Anti-Fraud Training, Chennai, January 2009

Corynn Stratton
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigations
FLETC CITP - 03/04
DS BSAC - 05/04
Evidence Management, Int'l Assoc for Property and Evidence 04/06
Basic Con/Gen 07/2007
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08
Worldwide A/RSO-I Conference, Budapest, 11/08

Mehjabeen Chougle
Security Investigator (FSN/I)
Basic FSNI Course at Dunn Loring, Virginia 11/05
PC-542 FSN Fraud Prevention Course, Washington 11/2005
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi 10/07

Shiraz Mehta
LES Supervisor
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/2003
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations
PC-128 Detecting Imposters
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent documents
Business writing- The Fundamentals

Harji Saparia
Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/2005
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post
PC-106 General NIV training
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent documents
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/07

Suma Jogi

CHENNAI 00000077 014 OF 016


Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-542, Fraud Prevention Training, Washington, 11/2007
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post

Karishma Kika
H and L Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post
H and L On-site training, Chennai, 10/07
PC-128- Detecting Imposters.

Kaushal Worah
H and L Consular Investigations Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operation at post
H and L On-site training, Chennai, 10/07

Deepa Chandran
Consular Investigation Assistant
PC-102 Immigration laws and Regulations

Issaki Venkat
Consular Investigations Clerk
H and L On-site Training, Chennai, 10/07

Jennifer Vajifdar
Fraud Clerk

--------------
New Delhi
--------------

Christene Hendon
Fraud Prevention Manager
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08

Jeniffer Fasciglione
Consular Associate
Basic Con/Gen- FSI 2000
Customer Service Training - Bern, Switzerland 2001/2002
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08
DAFWG Document Fraud Workshop - New Delhi 12/08

Lalmuongpui (Mai) Landymore
Consular Assistant
PC102 - Immigration Law and Visa Operations, Guangzhou

Eric A. Nordstrom
Deputy Regional Security Officer - Investigations
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Criminal Investigation
Training Program (CITP),08/1998;
Diplomatic Security Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC),09/1998
DT 250, DS Criminal Supervisors Course, (24 hrs),10/2004
Diplomatic Security Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigation
Training Course (24hrs) - 06/2005
USDOJ / OCDETF Financial Investigations Seminar (30 hours) 10/2006
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, FSI, 08/2007

CHENNAI 00000077 015 OF 016


H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, 10/2007
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08
Worldwide A/RSO-I Conference, Budapest, 11/08

Richard Seipert
Assistant Regional Security Officer - Investigations
FLETC, Criminal Investigation Training Program (CITP),10/03
Diplomatic Security Basic Special Agent Course (BSAC),03/04
DS Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigation Training Course,
11/04
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi, Oct 07
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08
Worldwide H and L Fraud Conference, Chennai, 5/08

Jyoti Sapra
FPU Visa Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post
Fraud Prevention Workshop in Washington.
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08
PA-248 FSN Supervisory Skills Workshop
PC-103 - Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents

Rajender Marwaha
FPU Visa Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operations at post
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post, 2007
Fraud Prevention Training: At post, on-the-job training.
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08
PC-542 LES Fraud Prevention Assistants Course, 11/08

Charu Kathuria
FPU Visa Assistant
PC-102 Immigration Law and Visa Operation at post
PC-103 - Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post
Fraud Prevention Training: At post, on-the-job training and briefing
on passport fraud detection.
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08

Sanjeev Tyagi
Security Investigator (FSN/I)
Basic FSNI Course at Dunn Loring, Virginia 10/04
H and L Fraud Conference, New Delhi 10/07
PC-126A Advanced Consular Namechecking Techniques Overview, New
Delhi, 3/08
FSN Fraud Prevention Workshop (PC-542) FSI Washington, 03/09

Ritika Sawhney
FPU Investigations Assistant
PC-103 - Nationality Law/Consular Procedures at post

Megha Singh
FPU Investigations Clerk

CHENNAI 00000077 016 OF 016



--------------
Hyderabad
--------------

Jason B. Rieff
Fraud Prevention Manager
PC-541 Fraud Prevention for Consular Managers, Washington, 7/08
PC-540 Consular Review and Automation, Washington, 8/08
PC-127 CA Review for Consular Officers, Washington, 8/08
PC-137 Automation for NIV, Washington, 8/08
PC-116 Automated Systems for Consular Managers, Washington, 8/08
PC-139 Automation for ACS Unit, Washington 8/08

Gregory N. Rankin
Vice Consul/Backup Fraud Prevention Manager
PC-128 Detecting Impostors, 2/2009
PC-530 Basic Consular Course, 12/2008
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, 2/2009

Nathan M. Kim
Assistant Regional Security Officer/Investigations
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center - Criminal Investigations
Training Program, 6/2003
Diplomatic Security - Basic Special Agent Course, 10/2003
Asset Forfeiture Training, 2/2005
PC-530 Basic Consular Course, 10/2008
International Conference on Asian Organized Crime and Terrorism,
3/2009

Chadive W. Reddy
Consular Investigations Specialist
Fraud Prevention training at FPU, U.S. Con Gen, Chennai, 11/2008
PC-102 Immigration Law & Visa Operations, 12/2008
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, 12/2008
PC-104 Overseas Citizen Services, 12/2008
PC-128 Detecting Impostors, 12/2008
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, 01/2009
PC-545 Examining U.S. Passports, 01/2009
PC-542 Fraud Prevention Workshop for FSN's, Washington, 03/2009

Chetan K. Bandari
Consular Investigations Assistant
Fraud Prevention training at FPU, U.S. Con Gen, Chennai, 11/2008
PC-102 Immigration Law & Visa Operations, 12/2008
PC-103 Nationality Law/Consular Procedures, 12/2008
PC-104 Overseas Citizen Services, 01/2009
PC-128 Detecting Impostors, 12/2008
PC-544 Detecting Fraudulent Documents, 01/2009
PC-545 Examining U.S. Passports, 01/2009

SIMKIN