TIBET EXPERT ON BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC; BEIJING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHENGDU 000220

SIPDIS

BANGKOK FOR USAID

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/8/2024
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ECON SOCI CH
SUBJECT: TIBET EXPERT ON BREAKDOWN IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC; BEIJING
OPPOSES U.S. TIBET ASSISTANCE, NGO PRESENCE

REF: A) CHENGDU 184, B) CHENGDU 189, C) CHENGDU 181

CHENGDU 00000220 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: David E. Brown, Consul General, U.S. Consulate
General Chengdu.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Both the Dalai Lama and the PRC leadership are
to blame for the breakdown in Tibetan-China negotiations, the
Director of the Mountain Institute's China Program told us.
This Amcit Director, a seasoned Chinese and Tibetan-speaker,
said irredentist Tibetans fail both to focus on the long-term
survival of their culture, and to discern a split within the PRC
leadership on whether to negotiate now or wait for the Dalai
Lama's death. With an emerging China no longer feeling as
vulnerable to international pressure on human rights, Tibetans
should try to raise non-confrontational issues and look for
negotiating space within the current PRC constitution, he
suggested.


2. (C) The PRC does not want USG-funded programs in the Tibetan
Autonomous Region (TAR),nor is it really comfortable with any
NGOs operating there, he felt. Tensions following last year's
unrest in Tibetan areas remain high, while participation in the
economy remains extremely challenging for Tibetans. End Summary.


3. (C) CG and PolEconOff met September 30 with Christopher La
Due, Director for Asia and Country Director for China of The
Mountain Institute (TMI),the first international NGO allowed to
operate in the TAR (starting in 1986). La Due is a Chinese and
Tibetan-speaking investment banker turned NGO manager who did
PhD work at Columbia University and spent six years living in
Lhasa as part of his total of ten years in China. Because of
his educational background and China experience, La Due offered
an insightful take on prospects for negotiations between the
Dalai Lama and the PRC leadership and the challenges faced by
NGOs in Tibetan areas.

Both Sides to Blame for Stalled Negotiations
--------------


4. (C) La Due found fault with both the Dalai Lama and the PRC
leadership for stalled talks. The PRC, for its part, feels it
has the United States and Europe "over a barrel" due to the
current economic climate, but could gain respect on the world
stage by negotiating with the Dalai Lama, he said. Tibet is
kind of "small potatoes" in terms of China's emergence onto the
world stage ("they're going global"),he felt, but remains a key
issue in relations with the West, and therefore presents an
opportunity for China to gain the international credibility it
seeks.

Tibetans "Blew Their Chance", Don't See PRC Split
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Parceling out equal blame to the Tibetans, La Due said
the fact that China does not feel vulnerability to foreign
pressure on such issues as it had in the past means the Tibetans
"blew their chance" for real progress during negotiations in the
late 80's during the time of Party Secretary Hu Yaobang. (Note:
In the early 1980s, Hu Yaobang, following a fact-finding trip to
Tibet that led him to severely criticize PRC policy, advocated a
two-prong solution of increasing investment, while also
increasing Han respect for Tibetan culture. The reforms were
cut short by 1987 riots in Lhasa, leading to martial law in
1989, and the abandonment of the strategy's second prong. End
Note.)


6. (C) In the current environment, the Tibetans and PRC leaders
continue to engage in positional bargaining without a focus on
outcomes, La Due felt. In discussing goals, for example,
Tibetan exile leaders often begin by showing him a map of areas
of the PRC they want restored to Tibetan control, rather than
focusing on the outcome of actual Tibetan survival. Asked by
the Dalai Lama while sitting on his couch in Dharamsala whether
the Tibetan strategy was rational and fair, La Due replied,
"Yes, it's rational and it's fair, but it's not realistic."


7. (C) Further, the Tibetans do not understand that there is a
division, at least in La Due's view, within the PRC leadership.
There are those who would prefer to just wait to take action
until after the Dalai Lama dies, and those who believe it would
be better to attempt to resolve issues while the Dalai Lama is
still alive -- otherwise China will see more unrest like that of
March 2008, and may realize its worst fears of seeing synergy
between the Tibetans and other restive groups like Xinjiang's
Uighurs, he said.

So, Where to Begin?
--------------


8. (C) In La Due's opinion, there is room for negotiation within
the current Chinese constitution and room for dialogue on issues
that are non-confrontational. They could find space to
negotiate within Chapter I Article 4 (stating all nationalities

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are equal) or Article 31 (allowing for establishment of special
administrative regions like Hong Kong and Macao),for example.
More importantly, he says, the Tibetans should put aside the map
and start with things that affect Tibetans today: health, jobs,
education, the environment, religion. More intractable issues
could be tabled in the short-term while progress is made on
issues that ultimately affect the survival of Tibetan culture.

"The PRC Doesn't Want These Programs in Tibet"
-------------- -


9. (C) Commenting on the difficulty of working in Tibetan areas
with USG funding (Ref A),La Due said the PRC would prefer to
see no such programs. In his view, however, PRC leaders feel
compelled to allow such activities to continue, mainly as a
means of satisfying U.S. Congressional interest. LaDue recalled
a meeting in Beijing four years ago with then Vice Minister of
Foreign Affairs Zhou Wenzhong (current PRC Ambassador to the
United States),who told him, "We're not comfortable with you
getting money from Congress. The Special Coordinator is a bad
idea. U.S. foreign policy is stupid." In response, La Due
asked, "So, is your position that this money from the American
people is not welcome in China?" "No, that is not my position,"
Zhou conceded.

Nor Any NGOs in Tibet, For That Matter
--------------


10. (C) La Due agreed with the assessment offered by other
observers that NGOs (domestic and international) are being
forced to shut down or relocate outside the TAR (Ref B),saying
so many have gone that he could not begin to name them all. TMI
left the TAR in 2005, relocating its projects to Yunnan and
Sichuan Provinces, a move that pleased the central government,
La Due reported. (Note: Though La Due did not offer a specific
reason for the move, Country Director for the Tibet Poverty
Alleviation Fund Tony Gleason told CG in an August meeting in
Shangri-la that TMI had essentially been forced out of the TAR
after accepting USG funds (Ref A). End Note.) At the same
time, TMI opened an office in Beijing, which "made the central
government more comfortable," La Due added.

On Tensions, Tourism, Government, and Economics
-------------- --


11. (C) Commenting on trends in Tibetan areas, La Due said that
since March 2008 unrest in Tibetan areas things have been
"tighter" and more sensitive, and that Chinese decision-makers
are less likely to make risky choices. Having done a great deal
of work with monks, he said he has not observed a particular
fervor among them for getting into the tourism business, though
he said sometimes they do welcome the money, and at other times
they wonder where all the money goes. As for relations with the
government, the monks would simply prefer to not have the police
or military stationed nearby and would like to be able to make
their own decisions regarding the size of the monastic
community, he says.


12. (C) Economically, La Due argued that Tibetans are more able
to compete in areas where they traditionally have had contact
with Han Chinese, where they can access the education system,
and where they have grown up using Chinese. "Language is really
at the heart of the issue," he said. (Note: See Ref C for more
on these issues. End Note.)
BROWN