Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CARACAS854
2009-07-07 21:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

VENEZUELA: AMERICAN OIL AND SERVICE COMPANIES

Tags:  EPET EINV ENRG ECON VE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7930
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH
DE RUEHCV #0854/01 1882148
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 072148Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3341
INFO RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 1021
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8016
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6162
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 2912
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA 1195
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 3735
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3009
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 4139
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 0667
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000854 

SIPDIS

ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR RJARPE
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
NSC FOR RKING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: EPET EINV ENRG ECON VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: AMERICAN OIL AND SERVICE COMPANIES
ENGAGE AMBASSADOR

REF: CARACAS 827

Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CARACAS 000854

SIPDIS

ENERGY FOR CDAY AND ALOCKWOOD, DOE/EIA FOR MCLINE
HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR RJARPE
COMMERCE FOR 4332/MAC/WH/JLAO
NSC FOR RKING

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2019
TAGS: EPET EINV ENRG ECON VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA: AMERICAN OIL AND SERVICE COMPANIES
ENGAGE AMBASSADOR

REF: CARACAS 827

Classified By: Economic Counselor Darnall Steuart, for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Executives representing U.S. companies
involved in Venezuela's oil sector briefed the Ambassador on
the status of the industry, highlighting problems all face in
securing payments from PDVSA; difficulties maintaining
positive relationships with PDVSA, the Ministry for Energy
and Petroleum (MENPET),and the GBRV in general; and the
challenge of working in this environment. They extrapolated
their experiences to all oil companies, including the
politically expedient national oil companies, such as CNPC
and PetroPars. All agreed that current working conditions in
Venezuela, including the recent round of service company
expropriations, would have a short to medium term impact on
Venezuelan crude production. They also agreed that aside
from current challenges, their long-term goal is to find a
way to stay in Venezuela as the potential of its reserves
outweighs short-term challenges. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ambassador hosted a July 6 luncheon with Carlos Blohm
(Vice President) and Carlos Tejera (Executive Director) of
the Venezuela ) American Chamber of Commerce (VenAmCham);
Ron Lubojacky (Chevron General Manager for Eastern
Venezuela); Mauricio di Girolamo (Harvest Vinccler Vice
President); Juan Castenada (Halliburton Venezuela President);
Jose Aparcedo (Exterran Venezuela President); and Mikael
Jacob (Tidewater Venezuela Country Representative) (strictly
protect all throughout). Exterran and Tidewater's assets
were expropriated under the May 7 oil services sector law.
Harvest Vinccler's only investment is in a mixed company,
PetroDelta, which operates in Eastern Venezuela. Halliburton
is the largest U.S. services company in Venezuela (see
reftel).

Challenge of Expropriations
--------------

3. (C) Carlos Tejera pointed out constitutional difficulties
arising from the GBRV's oil service sector expropriations in

May and June. He noted that in apparent contravention of the
Venezuelan constitution and standing laws, the May 7 oil
service sector law allows MENPET (1) to expropriate companies
and assume control over operations prior to providing fair
market compensation, (2) to pay for expropriated assets with
instruments other than cash (e.g., PDVSA bonds/debt
issuance),and (3) to pay book value rather than fair market
value for seized assets. Finally, Tejera added that the May
7 law appears to be vague enough to be applicable to sectors
other than hydrocarbons. Others, however, noted that the
constitutionality of the law is irrelevant in the current
Venezuelan legal environment. In fact, Halliburton,s
Castenada added that he no longer believes Halliburton is too
large for PDVSA to seize, but rather that some elements of
its operations in Venezuela are now vulnerable.

PDVSA ) Conflicting Agendas within Management Structure
-------------- --------------

4. (C) Executives agreed that one of the problems with PDVSA
is that even though the operational staff understands both
the private sector and PDVSA's needs, it has no power to
effect change. Technical personnel attempt to raise issues
to PDVSA middle management, but middle management is unable
to resolve the conflict between technical needs and the
politicized mandates it receives from senior levels. Thus,
PDVSA's senior levels may or may not understand the problems
companies are facing, but this is not material as the GBRV's
political agenda supersedes all other interests. Tejera

CARACAS 00000854 002 OF 003


pointed out that the GBRV governs with a top-down political
agenda rather than from the bottom-up. He also reminded
lunch participants that the current regime ran the risk in
the 2002/2003 strike of allowing PDVSA to "burn to the
ground" and more importantly, was willing to let it do so.
Jose Aparcedo, stated and all agreed, that it is unclear who
in PDVSA is a decision maker. There was disagreement for
example, whether PDVSA Vice President Eulogio del Pino is a
decision maker or simply an "executioner" or implementer.

Impact on Production
--------------

5. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question on the impact
of recent GBRV, MENPET, and PDVSA actions on production,
interlocutors agreed that crude oil production would
decrease. Carlos Blohm shared that SIMCO General Manager
Dave Beacham, told him at the U.S. Embassy's July 4
Celebration, that there is a direct link between PDVSA's
inability to maintain water injection platforms formerly
operated by SIMCO and crude production on Lake Maracaibo.
Juan Castenada added that PDVSA has allowed all coiled tubing
contracts on Lake Maracaibo to expire, a function critical to
basic oil well maintenance. Failure to maintain the wells
will result in lost wells and decreased production. He added
that PDVSA could try to re-open lost wells sometime in the
future, but it will be costly, will take time, and will
require oil service company assistance. Finally, Castenada
noted that, according to Halliburton's own internal drill rig
count, there are only 67 drill rigs on station in Venezuela
(as compared to around 100 last year). Of those rigs, only
41 are actively drilling and of those 41, only 30 are
operating efficiently. Castenada compared this level of
activity to that in Ecuador. According to industry experts
this level of drill rig activity is insufficient to maintain
current production levels and indicates that new production
possibilities are severely limited. He predicted that PDVSA
production would decrease within the next six months because
of the May and June expropriations.


6. (C) The business representatives agreed that no one knows
the real level of Venezuelan crude production but that it is
not over 3 million barrels/day as claimed by the GBRV. PDVSA
claims that it implemented fully the September 2008 and
December 2009 OPEC quota cuts of over 300,000 barrels/day,
but industry participants have confirmed that PDVSA has
quietly re-activated production from fields where production
was curtailed. (NOTE: It is unclear what Venezuelan
production statistics include. Some production figures
include natural gas liquids and condensates (which are not
included in OPEC production estimates). PDVSA claims
synthetic crude produced in the Faja is not included in OPEC
figures, which runs counter to OPEC's statements. Thus,
there is consensus that Venezuela is not producing more than
3 million barrels/day (even when aggregating all liquids),
but no agreement on the real level of production. END NOTE.)

What Message Should the Ambassador Deliver to the GBRV?
-------------- --------------

7. (C) The Ambassador asked if an opportunity should present
itself under ideal circumstance, and if it were possible to
deliver a message to the GBRV, from the point of view of the
companies, what elements would a message include. The
business representatives reached no consensus on a message to
the GBRV. Tidewater Country Representative Mikael Jacob
offered a two-part suggestion. First, tell the GBRV to pay
its debt to the service companies. Second, return the
expropriated assets to service companies and they will go
back to work. Harvest,s Mauricio di Girolamo suggested a
message summarizing the complexity of the industry and noting

CARACAS 00000854 003 OF 003


the diversity of industry actor interests coupled with need
for PDVSA to consider the ramifications and impacts that
blanket actions have on all parties. He stated that a
message from the USG underlining a long-term vision for
Venezuela, the opportunity to manage the relationship anew
with the return of the bilateral Ambassadors to post, and the
need to remove business from political considerations would
be helpful. Chevron,s Ron Lubojacky added that PDVSA and
MENPET need to understand that they are sending all the wrong
messages to the private sector at a time when the GBRV is
clearly trying to court new investment in the Carabobo heavy
oil bid round. Tejera stated that the USG should not adopt a
narrow strategy of defending particular companies in
particular cases, because the GBRV cares little for the
private sector. Rather, the USG should point out that the
GBRV's actions have consequences and that its actions run
counter to its stated goals. The representatives disagreed
whether U.S. firms were specifically targeted, but agreed
that other foreign oil companies (including politically
expedient national oil companies, such as CNPC and PetroPars)
confronted similar challenges. They also agreed that all
companies in the sector are facing payments problems with
PDVSA.


8. (C) COMMENT. This was the first opportunity U.S. oil
production and services companies have had to discuss the
current situation since the Ambassador returned to post.
They used this meeting to underscore the on-going
difficulties of doing business in Venezuela and their
long-term commitment to finding a business model that will
permit them to stay to support Venezuela's exploitation of
its abundant oil reserves. The companies understand that
they need to align their economic interests with the stated
political goals of the Chavez administration in order to
survive here in the long-term. That said they hope the USG
can convey to the GBRV that its actions will likely erode
production levels and not just affect private sector profits.
The GBRV's actions demonstrate its belief that the business
community will continue to work in Venezuela under nearly any
condition. The question remains how long companies will
continue operating in this environment given on-going
difficulties, all in the hope of future profits. END COMMENT.
DUDDY