CHAVEZ AS HE SEES HIMSELF - THE REVOLUTIONARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 000422

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV SNAR PTER VE
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ AS HE SEES HIMSELF - THE REVOLUTIONARY
BATTLING THE EMPIRE

REF: A. CARACAS 000355

B. CARACAS 000367

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
FOR REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: President Chavez claims that he wants to
improve relations with the new U.S. administration (Reftel),
but his intolerance for what he perceives as criticism and
his radical worldview continue to pose major hurdles to
bettering bilateral relations. His perennial (mis)treatment
of the United States appears to stem largely from his demand
for unconditional "respect" and his desire to be recognized
as an important "revolutionary" Latin American leader. It
also draws on his resentment at his visa denial resulting
from his 1992 coup attempt and his perception that the US was
witting, if not complicit, in the 2002 attempted coup against
him. His stance also is part and parcel of his trademark
political strategy of creating conflict to rally his
supporters against domestic and foreign "enemies." While the
USG will never be able to satisfy the Venezuelan president's
outsized ego, we will continue to work to establish normal
relations with Venezuela, featuring an end to harassment of
Embassy operations in Caracas and improved communication on
routine matters. End Summary.

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THIN SKIN
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2. (C) President Chavez enjoys full control over all
branches of the Venezuelan government. He also fosters a
personality cult requiring adulation from cabinet members to
his grassroots supporters. Despite his overwhelming
executive power, Chavez remains hypersensitive to any
opposition, particularly perceived criticism from the United
States. The Venezuelan president is quick to react to
criticism with irrational counterarguments and name-calling,
often seeking to portray himself as the recipient of
unprovoked, groundless attacks from Washington. He and other
senior Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
(GBRV) leaders scrupulously avoiding engaging on the
substance of domestic or foreign criticism, and instead try
to discredit the messenger.


3. (C) One of Chavez's most frequent rhetorical demands is
for "respect," for him personally and his government. For
example, after calling President Obama a "poor ignorant man"
during his March 22 weekly "Alo, Presidente" TV broadcast
(Reftel),Chavez nevertheless said, "if Obama respects us, we
will respect him. If he tries to continue to disrespect
Venezuela, we will confront the American empire in whatever
terrain." Chavez also tries to reframe US criticism, which
is frequently picked up and amplified by local
opposition-oriented media, as a "sovereignty" issue. Using
the "respect" angle in that way plays to the nationalism
among Chavez's poor supporters. For example, Chavez recently
claimed to be outraged by the Department's 2009 Human Rights
Report and International Narcotics Strategy Control Report
(INCSR) which he characterized as personal attacks by
President Obama and Secretary Clinton, although the findings
of these annual reports should hardly have come as a
surprise.

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WORLD LEADER WANNABE
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4. (C) Chavez travels extensively and doles out substantial
foreign assistance in an effort to achieve international
status as Latin America's foremost leader. He jealously
guards his exaggerated self-perception, and reacts negatively
to other Latin American countries' receptivity to USG
initiatives and USG attention focused on other Latin American
heads-of-state. Chavez, for example, conducted his own
"shadow" tour when then President Bush visited several Latin
American countries in 2007. More recently, he insisted that
he did not need Brazilian President Lula to broker improved
Venezuelan relations with the new U.S. Administration, but he
nevertheless gave Lula "permission" to discuss Venezuela
during Lula's recent call on President Obama.


5. (C) Chavez also seeks to be perceived internationally as
a world spokesperson for the "downtrodden." He has
specifically chosen to form odd alliances in order to both
raise his personal profile and burnish his "revolutionary"

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credentials. In forging close ties with Cuba, Chavez has
been trying to position himself internationally as Castro's
heir. The Venezuelan president has also deliberately forged
alliances to counter US influence in the region, including
with China, Iran, Sudan and Russia, ostensibly to foster a
more "multi-polar" world. Chavez's anti-American dogmatism
also leads him to embrace far-flung authoritarian regimes,
such as Belarus, Syria, and Zimbabwe. Under the rubric of
his ALBA initiative, Chavez contends that Venezuela, Cuba,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Dominca constitute
a single "Bolivarian" bloc. Chavez has convoked an ALBA
Summit in Caracas immediately preceding the Summit of the
Americas, where he will likely try to enlist the other
presidents attending to be more antagonistic towards the USG
during the Summit of the Americas.

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DAVID, NOT GOLIATH
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6. (C) Although he wields almost complete control over
state resources and institutions, Chavez rallies his base by
exaggerating and sometimes fabricating internal and external
threats. More specifically, Chavez deliberately creates
conflict with perceived "enemies," depicting himself as the
underdog fighting for the Venezuelan people against the U.S.
"empire" and its lackeys ("pitiyanquis"). Chavez has framed
his many successful electoral campaigns on this simplistic
formula. Moreover, Chavez sees himself as someone who has
survived perceived attempts against his government, his
person and his life by the United States Government. Thus,
by extension, he regularly blames the United States, however
implausibly, for domestic woes, from shortages to basic food
staples to high crime rates.


7. (C) Chavez picks public fights with other countries, not
just the United States. In recent years, he has temporarily
severed diplomatic ties at the ambassadorial level with
Colombia, Peru, and Mexico. He dispatched troops to the
Colombian border in 2007 in the wake of the Colombian attack
on the Raul Reyes camp along the Ecuadorian border with
Colombia before reversing course and improving bilateral ties
with President Uribe. He expelled all Israeli diplomats
after Israel intervened in Gaza. Some of his supporters are
urging Chavez to expel the Papal Nucio for granting refuge to
an opposition student leader in the Holy See Mission.
Chavez's ongoing enmity with the United States, however,
attracts a great deal more domestic and international
attention than his spats with other countries.

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OVER HERE
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8. (C) A number of local pundits argue that Chavez wants
U.S. attention most of all. They argue that Chavez purposely
makes provocative and insulting statements about U.S.
officials in an effort to elicit responses from senior USG
officials. The Venezuelan president uses any running public
dispute with the USG to try to elevate his international
stature. But there is also a personal element to his antics
rooted in his own insecurities and his ambition to be
accepted as a world leader. At multilateral fora, Chavez
inevitably tries to become the center of attention, prompting
even the Spanish King to exclaim "Why don't you shut up?"
when the Venezuelan president would not stop heckling the
Spanish Prime Minister during the 2007 Inter-American Summit.
We expect Chavez to seek center stage at the Summit of The
Americas and to be jealous of the attention paid to President
Obama by other leaders and the media.
CAULFIELD