Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CARACAS270
2009-03-03 16:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Caracas
Cable title:  

VENEZUELA'S RICE INDUSTRY THREATENED FOR POLITICAL GAIN

Tags:  ECON PGOV ETRD EINV EAGR VE 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 031647Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2676
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
DEPT OF COMMERCE
DEPT OF TREASURY
HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000270 


HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MMALLOY
COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO
SECSTATE PASS AGRICULTURE ELECTRONICALLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2024
TAGS: ECON PGOV ETRD EINV EAGR VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S RICE INDUSTRY THREATENED FOR POLITICAL GAIN

Classified By: Randall Hager, Agricultural Attache, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 000270


HQ SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
TREASURY FOR MMALLOY
COMMERCE FOR 4431/MAC/WH/JLAO
SECSTATE PASS AGRICULTURE ELECTRONICALLY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2024
TAGS: ECON PGOV ETRD EINV EAGR VE
SUBJECT: VENEZUELA'S RICE INDUSTRY THREATENED FOR POLITICAL GAIN

Classified By: Randall Hager, Agricultural Attache, for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: President Chavez announced on February 28,
that the government would intervene in the domestic rice
processing industry, ostensibly to stop millers from
contravening its food price control policy. The Venezuelan
National Guard occupied one of the plants on February 27 -
the day before Chavez's announcement. The announcement also
violates the government's February 12 decree mandating a
90-day period for industry consultations. The government
purchases the vast majority of domestically produced rice and
has also been aggressively importing US rice. To bolster its
standing as a defender of the poor, the government has become
the best source of staple foods through its chain of stores
offering price-controlled products. Chavez seems to be
stepping up his pressure on industry "oligarchs" to keep food
prices unsustainably low. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On February 28, President Chavez announced that the
government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (GBRV)
would intervene in Venezuela's rice processing industry,
claiming a need to stop the industry from "messing" with the
government and the people by creating derivative products
that fall outside of price control regulations. Several
leading plants have been or are in the process of being,
occupied or monitored by the National Guard in the name of
public welfare. Government officials indicate the National
Guard presence may continue for 90 days. (NOTE: Several
occupied plants mill government-imported rice under tolling
agreements and package it under the CASA/MERCAL label for
government-run, price-controlled stores. Any operational
slowdown will paradoxically reduce stocks on government
shelves for the lower income classes. END NOTE.)


3. (C) Industry reaction has been swift and pointed, with
commentators lamenting the need and legality of the
government action, and expressing concern about rice

availability in the medium and long term. According to Tulio
Burgos (protect),President of the Guarico Rice Farmers
Association, government intervention in the industry has the
potential to reduce domestic rice output even further, as
farmers consider switching to more profitable crops. (NOTE:
Domestic rice production has been under pressure for several
years; controlled farm gate prices and rising input costs
have forced farmers to plant alternatives. The gap between
production and increasing demand results in greater imports,
mostly from the United States. END NOTE.)


4. (C) As always, businesses under controlled-price regimes
demonstrate creativity in avoiding the controls. Noting that
the consumer defense law only applies price controls to base
products such as plain white rice, processors developed
flavored or premium rice products. These new products fell
outside of government price regulations and allowed the
industry to charge a true market price. To close this
loophole, the government issued a new decree on February 12,
2009, to include any food derived from base products, and to
allow the government essentially to mandate the percentages
of basic and derivative products sold. (NOTE: According to
the Rice Processors Association, millers were following the
regulations as they stood, but the government jumped the gun
by its recent intervention before implementation parameters
had been settled. END NOTE.)


5. (SBU) Carlos Osorio, the GBRV Director of Silos and
Storage, said at a March 2 press conference that the
government has no intention of taking over any company,
rather it is complying with its "revolutionary duty" to
ensure citizens' basic food supplies. Osorio noted that
while there was no written agreement, leading rice processors
were violating the verbal understanding they reached with the
government late last year. The processors, he said, agreed
to manufacture 80-90 percent of rice as a basic product at
regulated prices, and only 10-20 percent outside regulation.


6. (C) Guillermo Bolinga, (protect) legal director for
leading food processor Alimentos Polar, said that the
President's intervention was premature. He did not wait the
90 days stipulated in the February 12 decree for industry
consultations on resolving production quota issues. Although
Osorio took a softer approach, other BRV officials, including
Chavez himself, have said that the government could take
severe measures up to "expropriation" paid for by "paper"
(i.e., Venezuelan government bonds) not "real money."
Although Polar represents a smaller market share, about six
percent to leading rice processor Arroz Mary's 24 percent,
many believe that the government's real target is Polar. The
Mendoza family, the owners of Polar, are staunchly in
opposition to the Chavez administration. Industry contacts
suggest the government would love to nationalize the company
if it could figure out how to run Polar's extensive
operations without severely reducing the food supply during
the transition.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Although the government has pressured various
agricultural enterprises by harsh words and constant
inspections over the years, this action is more serious. For
the first time, Chavez has involved the military, sending it
to operational headquarters with a threat to hold plants for
90 days. If the government believes a plant is not complying
with its wishes, it may replace upper management. In past
interventions, government officials have installed their
cronies in key positions, dramatically reducing technical
know how in complicated plant operations. Such actions could
result in lower domestic rice output and greater government
market control. The effect on US food exports may be
positive, however, as the GBRV will still need to maintain
its social contract with the poor.


8. (C) In light of Venezuela's looming financial crisis,
some analysts hoped Chavez would be more willing to work with
the private sector following his victory in the February
referendum abolishing term limits. However, sending in the
National Guard and threatening to "expropriate" plants in the
agricultural sector suggests Chavez has instead opted for
confrontation rather than conciliation.


GENNATIEMPO