FEBRUARY 15 REFERENDUM - WINNERS AND LOSERS

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SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 15 REFERENDUM - WINNERS AND LOSERS

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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
FOR REASON 1.4(D)


1. (C) Summary: President Chavez and his United Socialist
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) party are the big winners of the
February 15 referendum in which almost 55% of Venezuelans
voted to remove term limits for all elected officials.
Chavez now can run for a third six-year term and currently
faces no real viable opponent. The PSUV mobilized over a
million more voters to the polls than the "No" campaign,
despite the fact that the opposition mobilized their largest
voter turnout in a decade. PSUV Mayor the Libertador borough
of Caracas and "Yes" campaign manager Jorge Rodriguez basked
in the "Yes" camp's electoral victory, and vindicated himself
after managing the unsuccessful "Yes" campaign in the 2007
constitutional reform referendum. University student
activists reasserted themselves as effective and energized
campaign organizers. Perhaps the biggest losers are
opposition political parties, who arrived late to the game
with limited resources and no discernible strategy. In
addition, Chavez's confirmation that he will run again in
2012 effectively undermines any potential succession by any
other senior PSUV leader, such as Infrastructure Minister
Diosdado Cabello. Despite his political momentum, Chavez
still faces the considerable challenge of a very difficult
economic scenario for 2009 and possibly beyond that may
complicate his post-2012 plans. End Summary.

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WINNERS
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2. (C) President Chavez: Chavez is the biggest winner of the
February 15 referendum in which almost 55% of Venezuelans
voted to eliminate term limits for all elected officials. He
now has what he failed to achieve in the constitutional
referendum package that voters rejected just 14 months before
-- a clear path to run for a third six-year term. Before and
after the vote, Chavez confirmed that he is already a
"pre-candidate" for the 2012 presidential election.
Moreover, Chavez right now faces no real rival inside or
outside his PSUV party. Venezuela's fractious opposition
remains very much divided, and within opposition circles,
there are already several possible presidential candidates
trying to position themselves to be the consensus opposition
presidential candidate in 2012, including 2006 consensus
opposition presidential candidate and Maracaibo Mayor Manuel
Rosales. None of the current potential opposition candidates
approach Chavez's popularity and charisma.


3. (C) PSUV: Chavez's PSUV party also emerges a big winner.
The PSUV demonstrated conclusively that it is an effective
electoral machine by mobilizing 6.3 million voters to the
polls -- more than in any previous election in which the PSUV
participated. The PSUV, and its small allied parties,
garnered almost one million more votes that what the PSUV
polled in the November 2008 state and local elections.
Chavez successfully reframed the referendum as a contest over
the continuation of his social programs ("missions"),warning
government workers and beneficiaries that abstention was not
an option. The high pro-government turnout suggests that the
PSUV's combination of stark messaging and organized
grassroots, get-out-the-vote "patrols" worked. The efficacy
of the PSUV machine appears to contradict pundits'
assessments that Chavista "Lites" who did not favor the
removal of term limits -- but who still supported the
Venezuelan president -- would simply stay home, as many of
them did in 2007.


4. (C) Jorge Rodriguez: President Chavez warmly
congratulated "Yes" campaign manager Jorge Rodriguez, who was
by Chavez's side during the Venezuelan president's
nationally-televised victory speech. Rodriguez is now poised
to rise to the forefront of Chavismo as a two-time electoral
winner. While several other key Chavista leaders --
including Jesse Chacon, Diosdado Cabello, and Aristobulo
Izturiz -- failed to win seats in November 2008's state and
local elections, Rodriguez won the mayorship of the
Libertador borough of Caracas with 53 percent of the vote.
Rodriguez may now reap the financial and political benefits
of being the sole PSUV mayor among the opposition-dominated
Caracas municipalities and a proven PSUV campaign strategist.
The "Yes" win also helped erase Rodriguez's poor management
of the "Yes" camp's unsuccessful 2007 effort to win passage
of Chavez's proposed constitutional reform package.


5. (C) Students: University student activists once again

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proved their ability to organize an energetic, creative, and
well-coordinated "No" campaign. Despite stepped-up pressure
from the GBRV and frequent provocations by state security
forces, the students generally demonstrated peacefully and
provided the "No" camp with a credible and politically
appealing voice. Students first took to the streets in 2007
to denounce the closure of opposition-oriented RCTV media
outlet, and were widely credited with helping to defeat
Chavez's first constitutional referendum to allow his
re-election in December 2007. Although they were unable to
overcome the efficiency of the PSUV machine, students were
instrumental this election in leading a well-argued campaign
and going door-to-door to get out the vote. Some 5.2 million
Venezuelans voted "No" on February 15, compared to 4.5
million in 2007.

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LOSERS
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6. (C) Venezuelan Democracy: The elimination of
presidential term limits effectively removes the last
remaining check on Chavez's power and is a major blow to
Venezuelan democracy. Chavez effectively controls all major
state institutions, including the rubber-stamp National
Assembly and Supreme Court, who have repeatedly proven
themselves unwilling to curb even egregious abuses of
presidential authority. Although Chavez undoubtedly will
point to February 15 as a free and fair election -- and
balloting on that day appears to have been -- his
increasingly authoritarian stewardship of the country is now
not even limited by time. Indeed, the removal of term limits
violates the longstanding Venezuelan tradition of alternation
of executive power, which dates back to the nation's
independence. Even Venezuelan strongman Juan Vicente Gomez
stepped down twice to rule by proxy during his reign from
1908 to 1935 so as to give a semblance of democratic
alternation of power. Chavez is now free to continue
"deepening" his Bolivarian revolution, and can turn his full
attention to manipulating state institutions with an eye to
maintaining PSUV dominance in the upcoming local and National
Assembly elections in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Chavez
will still have to face reelection in 2012 and he may face
serious economic problems in the nearterm offering some hope
to opponents that they will have another chance to defeat him.


7. (C) Opposition Parties: Venezuela's opposition political
parties once again succumbed to internal rivalries and
electoral fatigue, coming to the "No" campaign well after the
Christmas holiday season and with few resources. Their poor
showing diminishes what political capital and esteem they
gained following their electoral successes in November's
state and local elections. While Chavez wasted no time in
pressing his supporters to begin campaigning immediately
after announcing his proposed amendment in December 2008, the
opposition repeatedly complained of being broke and did not
begin to mount a serious campaign until over a month later.
With no clear leader or unifying strategy, it appeared that
the parties were content to leave much of the "No"
campaigning to the student activists. The parties' impotency
highlights their failure to expand their base among poor
Venezuelans or a strategy to build one. The opposition has
not learned the main lesson of the past two elections, where
they had record turn-out, but limited success - they can only
win if they reah out beyond their traditional base and if
partis put aside their differences and unite behind a sngle
candidate.


8. (C) PSUV Presidential Asirants: Senior PSUV leaders
routinely stress their fealty to President Chavez and deny
that they hve any presidential aspirations of their own.
Neertheless, local pundits believe there are at leas a
handful of PSUV leaders around Chavez's age o older who
would like to succeed Chavez. With the elimination of term
limits, they are not likelyto get that chance anytime soon.
PSUV leaders wh were unable to win or retain their seats in
theNovember 2007 elections are especially facing limiations
on their political advancement. For example, Diosdado
Cabello, who lost his reelection bidfor the Miranda State
governorship in 2008, usedto be widely considered a possible
successor to Chavez. Moreover, there is likely to be less
room for emerging PSUV leaders to advance as there will no
longer pressure to "rotate" new candidates in after the PSUV
incumbents' terms have expired. Those PSUV officials who are
currently in power are likely to focus on retaining their
seats rather than making way for new faces.


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COMMENT
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9. (C) President Chavez succeeded in removing the
constitutional barrier to seeking indefinite reelection and
further consolidating his power. His win also demonstrates
that he can simply count on the numerical superiority of his
supporters and does not need to attract votes outside his
traditional base. His solid victory has reversed what
appeared to be an electoral streak of losses in the 2007
referendum and 2008 state and local election and provided a
fresh "mandate" or justification to accelerate his Bolivarian
revolution. While the student movement and civil society
proved their continued effectiveness in mobilizing voters,
the opposition political parties right now offer little hope
of being able to mount a serious challenge against Chavez in
either the 2010 legislative elections or in 2012. In the
immediate aftermath of the "No" camp's defeat, opposition
leaders appear mired in complaining about the GBRV's
electoral advantages rather than reconsidering how to attract
voters from Chavez's large political base. Despite his new
momentum and the availability of government resources to
support his potential machine, Chavez will face economic
challenges in 2009 and beyond that still make his indefinite
rule far from a certainty. End Comment.

CAULFIELD