REFERENDUM: CHAVEZ'S ELECTION TO WIN OR LOSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 CARACAS 000200

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: REFERENDUM: CHAVEZ'S ELECTION TO WIN OR LOSE

CARACAS 00000200 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
REASON 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary. The February 15 referendum on eliminating
term limits is accentuating political polarization and
virtually splitting Venezuela's electorate in two. Both the
"Yes" and "No" camps are focused on motivating and mobilizing
their core supporters to overcome voter fatigue and
abstentionsim in what will be the fourth nationwide election
since December 2006. President Chavez and his supporters
have engaged in a well-funded, state-supported, and at times
violent, "Yes" campaign that frames the upcoming vote as a
plebiscite on the Venezuelan president and his popular social
programs.


2. (C) The overconfident, strapped, and fractious opposition
has relied heavily on the student movement to try to frame
the referendum as a vote to safeguard Venezuelan democracy
from what they believe is Chavez's bid to become
president-for-life. They hope that voters will vote "No",
while the GBRV is actively pursuing "Yes" supporters. As a
result, the ability of Chavez's United Socialist Party of
Venezuela (PSUV) to deliver pro-government supporters, as
well as the participation rate of nonaligned voters, will be
the determining factors in a race that is currently too close
to call. Whatever the outcome February 15, the campaign has
produced a more divided Venezuela in which Chavez may be
forced to resort to increasing repression to maintain
control. End Summary.

--------------
Ever More Polarization
--------------


3. (C) President Chavez has accentuated the already marked
political polarization in Venezuela by pressing for another
referendum on term limits. The elimination of presidential
term limits was a core element of the constitutional reform
package that voters rejected in December 2007. Moreover,
President Chavez has tried hard to make the referendum on
eliminating term limits a plebiscite on him. Chavez has
primarily played to his base of socioeconomically
disadvantaged Venezuelans. He and "Yes" campaign leaders are
trying to persuade his traditional supporters that the
opposition, backed by the United States ("the empire"),is
plotting to destabilize the GBRV and roll back popular social
programs ("missiones").


4. (C) Militant pro-Chavez groups, such as the "la Piedrita"
collective and Lina Ron's small pro-government party, have
launched numerous attacks on opposition political parties and
independent media outlets over the last month. They have
done so with impunity. Only in the final week of the
campaign has President Chavez distanced himself from such
groups, although he also is publicly and implausibly
suggesting the CIA is responsible. More so than in 2007, but
less so than in 2004, the Venezuelan National Guard, police
forces, and pro-Chavez militants have confronted and
dispersed student demonstrations and "No" campaign activities
in Caracas and other university cities. The largest of the
rallies, February 7, however, was peaceful.


5. (C) In addition, pro-Chavez state and municipal
governments who made way for opposition successors engaged in
"scorched earth" transitions in December, sacking state
supplies and resources and leaving such administrations in
shambles. A case in point is Caracas, where Mayor Antonio
Ledezma is still unable to work from his downtown office
because pro-Chavez militants, whose contracts expired on
December 31 and were not renewed, vandalized and occupied
that office building. Venezuela's Vice President Ramon
Carrizales met with some of the contract workers'
representatives and publicly declared that no take-over of
city buildings has occurred, but rather the "fascist mayor
abandoned" his downtown office.

--------------
"Yes" Campaign: The Bigger Base
--------------


6. (C) President Chavez's United Socialist Party of Venezuela
(PSUV) claims over five million members, although many local
pundits believe that figure is inflated. The "Yes" campaign
also claims that some seven million voters signed petitions
in support of eliminating term limits. Critics point out
that there was no independent verification of any of the
signatures, let alone the total. That said, some 5.4 million

CARACAS 00000200 002.2 OF 004


Venezuelans voted the PSUV ticket in the November 2008 state
and local elections, a considerable improvement over the 4.3
million voters who supported Chavez's constitutional reform
package defeated in the December 2007 referendum. Moreover,
President Chavez polled 7.3 million votes in the December
2006 presidential elections, his political high-water mark,
according to the National Electoral Council (CNE). There are
also approximately 4.5 million Venezuelans (2 million
Venezuelans who receive social benefits and 2.5 million
government employees) who directly depend on the government.


7. (C) The opposition, on the other hand, has not been able
to generate much more than four million votes. Only four
million Venezuelans voted to remove Chavez from power in the
failed 2004 recall referendum and consensus 2006 opposition
presidential candidate Manuel Rosales polled just 4.2 million
votes. The "No" camp narrowly defeated Chavez's
constitutional reform package by polling 4.5 million votes.
Consequently, the "Yes" campaign is less focused on
attracting votes across the political spectrum, than it is in
motivating and mobilizing Chavez's base, which they believe
will outpace the opposition's. Chavez's early January
decision to expand his proposed amendment to include
eliminating term limits for all elected officials is also
likely to motivate local pro-government leaders to work
harder for a "Yes" win. Given the numbers, the opposition
needs to expand its base, but the parties have focused, like
Chavez, on consolidating the existing base.


8. (C) Chavez has spared no expense in promoting a "Yes"
victory. State media outlets have been almost entirely
dedicated to promoting the amendment to eliminate term limits
-- as well as to vilifying and discrediting its opponents.
State media seized on the early January visit of opposition
leaders to Puerto Rico, as well as the Charge's coincidental
and concurrent private trip to San Juan, to allege a U.S.
conspiracy to plot the "No" campaign strategy and to
destabilize the GBRV. Moreover, the GBRV is dedicating
considerable personnel and resources to the "Yes" campaign.
Government social programs, the Caracas Metro, PDVSA
vehicles, and even prescription pads in public hospitals, are
being used to promote the "Yes" campaign. The National
Assembly suspended work in mid-January after approving the
amendment proposal in order to let members and staff work on
the "Yes" campaign.


9. (C) The "Yes" campaign has worked hard to frame the
amendment as a plebiscite on the Venezuelan president and his
popular social programs. Stark "Yes" campaign ads are
suggesting that Venezuela's social security system will be
privatized, subsidized government food markets closed, and
public education ended if the "No" vote wins. President
Chavez has also repeatedly argued that only he can guarantee
domestic peace, a point his most violent supporters have
reinforced via repeated election-related attacks. In
addition, government leaders are arguing that eliminating
term limits gives more power to the people to "reward"
effective administrators, and stress that all Venezuelan
elected officials can be subject to recall votes mid-way
through their terms. In fact, the question on the referendum
makes no mention of eliminating term limits, but instead
refers to "extending political rights" by changing five
articles of the 1999 Constitution.

-------------- -
"No" Campaign: Late Rally - Will it Be Enough?
-------------- -


10. (C) Venezuela's opposition has been slow to organize and
oppose Chavez's efforts to eliminate presidential term
limits. Opposition parties report that they are broke in the
aftermath of November's state and local elections. They may
also be saving their scarce resources for nationwide
municipal council elections later this year and parliamentary
elections in 2010. Moreover, many of the opposition's most
credible leaders won gubernatorial and mayoral elections in
December 2008. They have been focused on governing, and in
many cases, overcoming the obstacles put up by PSUV
predecessors and pro-government supporters. In addition, the
"No" campaign has no clearly identifiable leader, let alone a
spokesperson who enjoys anything close to Chavez's political
popularity or as an effective, unifying political strategy.


11. (C) Venezuela's student movement has been at the
forefront of the "No" campaign. Students have led numerous
demonstrations in Caracas and key cities, including the
massive February 7 Caracas "No" march and rally. They have

CARACAS 00000200 003.2 OF 004


also spearheaded creative voter education campaigns.
Nevertheless, local pundits believe that the student movement
is not likely to be as big a political factor as it was in
the December 2007 constitutional referendum due to some
student leaders' open identification with opposition
political parties. Civil society NGOs remain active,
particularly in get-out-the-vote and protect-the-vote
efforts. The "No" camp believes it will deploy poll watchers
to over 90 percent of voting tables, although as of February
10, the CNE had reportedly accredited "No" camp election
monitors for some 60 percent of voting tables.


12. (C) "No" publicity is dwarfed in comparison to the
well-funded "Yes" effort, particularly in pro-Chavez
neighborhoods and outside of Caracas. Nevertheless, the "No"
camp is trying to frame this election as a decision on
indefinite reelection, arguing that Chavez intends to make
himself president-for-life. They have also popularized the
slogan "No is No!," reinforcing the opposition's argument
that Venezuelan voters already turned down eliminating
presidential term limits in the 2007 referendum. Opposition
parties and legal experts have also questioned the skewed
wording of the draft amendment and suggested the proposal
itself as well as the CNE's accelerated election schedule are
illegal. They are also arguing that the GBRV should be
focusing on resolving the country's pressing social problems
rather than devoting some much time, energy, and resources on
this initiative.


13. (C) Opposition leaders were comparatively slow to gear up
for the February 15 referendum, ceding early momentum to the
"Yes" campaign. Many would-be opponents were likely
overconfident based on voters' rejection of Chavez's reform
package in 2007 and December polls that showed considerable
opposition to indefinite presidential reelection.
Ironically, the heavy-handed efforts of the GBRV and its most
militant supporters to win public approval for the draft
amendment appears to have stiffened the backs of Chavez's
critics and spurred a late opposition effort. The large
turn-out at the February 7 "No" rally in Caracas was
generated with little logistical support and on a shoestring
budget. Opposition pundits remain hopeful that many
pro-government voters will either vote "No," or more likely,
stay home. They also hope that they will be able to motivate
non-aligned voters, whom they believe will break two to one
against the proposed amendment.

--------------
Comment
--------------


14. (C) A "Yes" win would clear the way for Chavez, who first
became president in 1998, to run again in 2012 for a six-year
term. Chavez would likely accelerate his Bolivarian
revolution and concentrate even more authority in the
executive, making it even more difficult for the fractious
opposition to mount a credible effort in the 2010 legislative
and 2012 presidential campaigns. Chavez must still weather
an impending economic crisis due to lower oil prices and his
popularity is sure to suffer if he is forced to cut up on
social spending. Nevertheless, Chavez's charisma and ability
to convey a sense of hope far outstrips that of any of the
eligible and competing would-be opposition presidential
candidates. A "No" win would be a significant victory for
the democratic opposition and civil society and would
represent their third consecutive electoral gain.
Nevertheless, Chavez is not likely to accept defeat, and will
likely step up repression against the opposition and revisit
eliminating term limits. He has already said he could put up
an amendment up for multiple votes; alternatively, he could
call a constituent assembly to write a new constitution (and
also delay the 2010 legislative elections until after the new
Constitution is drafted).


15. (C) In this referendum, the "Yes" and "No" camps are not
so much competing against each other as they are vying to
motivate and mobilize their core constituencies to vote. In
that respect, the opposition is playing into the GBRV's
hands, as it enjoys a tremendous resource and logistical
advantage. The PSUV, by and large, delivered voters to the
polls in 2008, but many pro-Chavez voters stayed home in

2007. The "No" camp believes opposition voters understand
that they have a better chance of defeating the elimination
of term limits than they have in defeating Chavez in another
presidential contest. In the absence of a well-funded "No"
campaign, they are betting that opposition voters have
greater incentives to participate and hoping that a sizable

CARACAS 00000200 004.2 OF 004


portion of pro-government voters sit this election out.

16 (C) In general, the opposition is not trying to reach out
to disaffected Chavez supporters by providing a democratic
alternative. In fact, they are perceived to be doing the
opposite, as borne out by the example in Sucre municipality
where opposition supporters drove away Cuban doctors from a
Barrio Adentro clinic the day after the opposition's victory.
The opposition seems to be pinning its hopes on persuading
Venezuela's significant population of non-aligned voters
("ni-nis"),the group least likely to vote, to go to the
polls. Local polling shows two-thirds of non-aligned voters
would vote "No." In what is expected to be a very tight
race, their votes could prove decisive.

CAULFIELD