Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CANBERRA320
2009-03-30 05:49:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO, AND VIEWS

Tags:  AS PINR PREL ZR 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBY #0320 0890549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300549Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1289
S E C R E T CANBERRA 000320 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO INR/TCA J. BARNES AND INR/TCA K. TELLEEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2034
TAGS: AS PINR PREL ZR
SUBJECT: REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO, AND VIEWS
ON, POTENTIAL U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT

REF: STATE 25892

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JAMES F. COLE. REASON: 1.4 (c) and
(d)
S E C R E T CANBERRA 000320

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO INR/TCA J. BARNES AND INR/TCA K. TELLEEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2034
TAGS: AS PINR PREL ZR
SUBJECT: REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO, AND VIEWS
ON, POTENTIAL U.S.-IRAN ENGAGEMENT

REF: STATE 25892

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JAMES F. COLE. REASON: 1.4 (c) and
(d)

1.(C/NF) Post's senior USIC Reps discussed Ref message during
a 24 March 2009 biweekly meeting. Reps were present from CIA,
NSA, NRO, NGA, FBI, DIA, and the State Department. By way of
background, the USIC's primary Australian counterparts on
matters involving Iran include the National Security Advisor,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT),Australian
Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS),Office of National
Assessments (ONA),Defence Intelligence Organization (DIO),
Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),Australian Security
Intelligence Organization (ASIO),Defence Imagery and
Geospatial Organisation (DIGO),Office of the Undersecretary
of Defence for Intelligence (aDoD USDI),and the Defence
Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).


2. (C/NF) Following is a summary of USIC observations, based
on their regular engagement on Iran:

(S/NOFORN) The Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) has
increased its collection and analytic efforts on Iran over
the past decade, demonstrating Australia's strategic
commitment to engage substantively as a significant US
partner on Iran. Given the USIC's broad engagement across the
AIC, we can say with high confidence that the Government of
Australia and the AIC will pose no specific objections to
efforts by the United States to increase its level of
engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran.


3. (S/NF) While Australian troops remain stationed in
Afghanistan and Iraq, we predict the Australians will look to
increased US engagement with Iran to improve upon creating a
realistic framework for an accelerated reduction and eventual
cessation of Iranian support to the Taliban, al-Qa'ida and
related groups, and Hizballah. Simultaneously, Australia will
look for increased US-Iranian engagement to lead to a more
stable governance environment for Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Iraq, and the Levant. We assess that the AIC and GOA will
have the patience to take a long-view on these hard topics.


4. (S/NF) The AIC's leading concerns with respect to Iran's
nuclear ambitions center on understanding the time frame of a
possible weapons capability, and working with the United
States to prevent Israel from independently launching
uncoordinated military strikes against Iran. They are
immediately concerned that Iran's pursuit of nuclear
capabilities would lead to a conventional war-or even nuclear
exchange-in the Middle East involving the United States that
would draw Australia into a conflict. Canberra is more
broadly concerned about the potential for renewed nuclear
proliferation in the Middle East, driving Southeast Asian
states to abandon the NPT and pursue their own nuclear
capabilities-which could introduce a direct threat to the
Australian homeland.

RICHE