AUSTRALIA DEMURS ON DEMARCHING NAMIBIA OVER

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANBERRA 000202


SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/RA, NEA, AF AND EAP
VIENNA ALSO FOR IAEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY ENRG ETTC EMIN IR AS
SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA DEMURS ON DEMARCHING NAMIBIA OVER
URANIUM SALES TO IRAN

REF: STATE 18236

Classified By: Political Counselor James F. Cole. Reasons: 1.4(b)(d)(f)
(h).


1. (SBU) We presented reftel demarche to John Sullivan,
Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and
Counter-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT),on February 27. Bill Bryson, Executive Officer
for Arms Control, joined on the call.


2. (C) Sullivan reacted with some puzzlement to our points
and non-paper, inquiring whether the U.S. had been prompted
to approach Australia and the UK solely on the basis of the
February 3 press report in The Namibian, or whether it had
additional information suggesting that the GRN was selling
uranium to Iran or, conversely, that Iran was managing to
acquire uranium from the Rossing mine. The GOA was aware of
The Namibian article and had examined the issue, Sullivan
said, but had concluded there was no information to suggest
Namibia planned to reverse its policy and sell uranium to
Iran. Consequently, the GOA would be reluctant to demarche
Namibia based on the strength of the news report alone, he
told us, as it would be too "heavy-handed."


3. (C) Sullivan pointed out that France had recently
demarched Namibia on preventing the sale of uranium to Iran,
and Australia had made similar representations to South
Africa and China. Morover, he went on, Ann Harrap, the new
Australian High Commissioner in Pretoria, who is also
accredited to Namibia, had presented her credentials one week
earlier in Windhoek and had offered to provide the GRN
information on nuclear policies, including assisting it with
ratification of the Additional Protocol. Both DFAT and
Harrap were aware of the February 3 press article, which had
informed her talking points, according to Sullivan.
(Sullivan said he had not received a readout of her meeting,
but would use the occasion of our demarche to ask for it.)
He added that the previous head of the Australian Mission in
Pretoria (Philip Green) had discussed nuclear safeguards,
including the need to prevent Iran from acquiring uranium,
with GRN President Pohamba approximately 18 months ago. One
result was that Pohamba had urged representatives from Langer
Heinrich Uranium Mine, owned by an Australian company,
Paladin Energy Ltd., not to sell uranium to Iran, he stated.


4. (C) Likewise, Sullivan told us, the uranium mining
industry, including Rio Tinto and Paladin, is fully informed
and sensitized to the need to prevent Iran from acquiring
uranium under terms of UNSCR 1737, and the Australian
Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) is in frequent
contact with senior company officials on this issue. He
assessed as "highly unlikely" that either of the two uranium
mines in Namibia were able to process uranium for sale to
Iran in a form, such as pellets, that is permitted under UN
Security Council resolutions. The investment needed to do so
would be prohibitive, he observed, and such a move would be
quickly apparent, especially to South Africa, which had the
resources and pool of trained miners to pick up on it.


5. (C) Sullivan requested the United States to advise the GOA
if it receives further information suggesting that the GRN is
contemplating selling uranium concentrate to Iran, or Iran is
managing to acquire it from Namibia.
Qmanaging to acquire it from Namibia.

CLUNE