Identifier
Created
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09CANBERRA181
2009-02-23 04:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Canberra
Cable title:  

CORRECTED COPY: AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 000181 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA AND EAP
GENEVA FOR CD
VIENNA FOR IAEA
USUN FOR POL
USNATO FOR POL
USEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM MNUC KTIA PREL AS
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

REF: A. STATE 6970

B. 08 CANBERRA 1026

C. 08 CANBERRA 671

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 CANBERRA 000181

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/MNSA AND EAP
GENEVA FOR CD
VIENNA FOR IAEA
USUN FOR POL
USNATO FOR POL
USEU FOR POL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM MNUC KTIA PREL AS
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

REF: A. STATE 6970

B. 08 CANBERRA 1026

C. 08 CANBERRA 671

CORRECTED COPY - This message is being retransmitted to add
USMISSION GENEVA as an info addressee and to include
additional slug lines.


1. In response to our January 30 demarche (reftel),John
Sullivan, Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and
Counter-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (DFAT),provided the following responses to our
specific questions, drawn from a GOA interagency review. We
have not yet received media and NGO views. Refs B and C are
post's earlier reporting that illuminate GOA thinking on the
NPT and related matters.


2. Following are written responses provided by DFAT:

Begin text:

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
--------------

A. What are Australia's objectives for the NPT in general,
and for the current review process in particular?

--Australia wants the NPT review process to restore the NPT
consensus through an affirmation of the treaty's core
benefits.

Australia's main objective for the NPT and the current review
cycle is to ensure the maintenance of the security benefits
provided by the treaty (that is the near universal commitment
by non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) not to acquire nuclear
weapons).

Australia therefore aims to prevent further violations of
treaty obligations by states parties who develop covert
nuclear programs. Another important objective for Australia
is affirmation by NPT parties of the universal adoption of
the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Additional
Protocol (AP) as the key to strengthening IAEA safeguards and
thus a key measure to strengthen the treaty.

Australia also seeks recognition by states parties that the
'inalienable right' under Article IV is linked to compliance
with the non-proliferation and safeguards obligations of
Articles I, II, and III.

The current review cycle needs to avoid the rancor and lack
of consensus that plagued the previous review cycle.
Recognition by states parties of the benefits the NPT
provides to all members would go some way to achieving this

goal. Australia will be looking to develop a strategy to
convince countries of the benefits the treaty provides,
focusing as a first step on our own region.

Additionally, a priority objective for Australia is for
states parties to reach agreement on disincentives or
punitive measures for states that would seek to reach a
'break out' capability and then withdraw (under Article X)
from the treaty to develop a nuclear weapons program.

The Australian Government is strongly committed to nuclear
disarmament. A further objective for Australia is a
demonstration by nuclear weapon states (NWS) that they are
actively working to fulfill their commitments under Article
VI.

The issue of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone has the
potential derail the current review cycle should Egypt, or
other Arab states, choose to play a spoiler role. Member
states will need to give early consideration to how to avoid
this occurring. One possible option might be for states
parties to urge Israel and Egypt to agree to an agenda for
Qparties to urge Israel and Egypt to agree to an agenda for
the Middle East Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control
and Regional Security.

CANBERRA 00000181 002 OF 005




B. What policies or actions regarding the NPT does Australia
hope to see from the United States?

--Australia strongly believes that United States leadership
is vital in the lead up to and at the 2010 NPT Review
Conference.

The United States has an important leadership role to play in
helping the NPT move forward from the debate over disarmament
that brought the 2005 NPT RevCon to an impasse. Australia
strongly encourages the early articulation of US policy
positions for the NPT, as well as strategic engagement with
like-minded states to develop ideas to promote shared
objectives and strategic engagement with all others to find
areas in which progress might be possible.

Australia recognizes the significant reductions the United
States has made to its nuclear arsenal.
However, we also note that failure to recognize prior
disarmament commitments, the ongoing failure of the
Conference on Disarmament to begin work and the inability to
bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) into
force have allowed hard-line NNWS (predominantly from the
Non-Aligned Movement) to claim that NWS are not fulfilling
their Article VI obligations and hold hostage much needed
progress on stronger non-proliferation measures.

It is important that NWS recognize the genuine concerns of
many NNWS about the pace and scale of nuclear disarmament. In
this context, it is critical that the United States work with
other NWS to address concerns that they have not honored
their side of the bargain agreed at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference.

The United States has an opportunity to demonstrate (with
Russia) leadership on this issue through an agreement which
has deep reductions in arsenals, is irreversible, transparent
and coupled with confidence-building measures such as the
de-alerting of nuclear forces on high alert. Demonstrable
progress in the negotiations on a successor arrangement to
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) would reinforce
the seriousness with which the United States takes its
obligations. If such a successor cannot be negotiated prior
to START's expiration in 2009, the extension of START until a
new arrangement is complete would be a strong demonstration
of both states' commitment.

Australia believes that recognition by the NWS of disarmament
commitments made in previous review cycles coupled with an
understanding that those commitments need to be reformatted
to suit present realities (references to START II and III are
clearly no longer relevant) would help defuse the impasse.

Australia also considers it important that the United States
demonstrate determination to make progress towards
ratification of the CTBT. A clear statement in the Conference
on Disarmament that the United States is willing to commence
negotiations on a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
(FMCT) would be also be a demonstration of the United States'
commitment to Article VI of the NPT.

While recognizing that the issue of Arab states' frustration
regarding the resolution on the Middle East cannot be
addressed in isolation from broader Middle East developments,
the United States will need to play a central role in efforts
Qthe United States will need to play a central role in efforts
to ensure the issue does not lead to derailment of the review
conference.

The United States should also consider whether statements on
no first use and/or negative security assurances in the NPT
context (i.e. offered to NPT parties in good standing) could
be a part of the package for 2010.


C. What does Australia believe would represent a
successful outcome to the current NPT cycle ending with the
2010 Review Conference? How important is it for Parties to

CANBERRA 00000181 003 OF 005


reach consensus on substantive matters?

--A consensus outcome is high priority for Australia.

As indicated above, the ideal outcome for Australia would be
one in which there had been reaffirmation of the security
value of the NPT, affirmation of the need to universalize the
AP, agreement on strong disincentives to withdrawal from the
treaty, and reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon-states of
their commitment to Article VI.

However, a Review Conference that avoided the rancor of 2005
and was able to produce a consensus outcomes document that,
at minimum, reaffirmed the central role of the treaty in
international security and the security benefits the treaty
provides to all member states, would be a successful outcome.

Australia places a high priority on a consensus outcome from
the 2010 Review Conference.
Failure to reach consensus on at least the basic tenets of
the NPT will further undermine it, potentially leading to a
weakening of states' commitment to their obligations under
the treaty.


D. Does Australia believe that NPT parties should take
action to address the NFT issues described below? If so, what
actions would it support?

--Non-compliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and
North Korea.

Australia believes that NPT parties should take action to
address this issue. However, the, treaty itself does not
address what represents non-compliance. Debate on this issue
could lead to states unhelpfully arguing that nuclear weapon
states are in non-compliance with their Article commitments.
Australia would prefer to see the Review Conference reaffirm
the need for strict compliance with safeguards commitments
and the role of the IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security
Council in addressing, and if necessary punishing,
non-compliance.

--The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing from
the Treaty.

Australia would like to see NPT states parties agree on
strong disincentives to states withdrawing from the treaty.
These could include, inter alia, recognition that withdrawal
represents a threat to international peace and security and
therefore merits immediate referral to the UN Security
Council, and agreement that all benefits of the treaty
(transfers of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes)
accrued while a party to the treaty be returned or otherwise
made inoperable.


--The lack of NPT universality.

Australia would like to see continued commitment by all
states parties to the universalization of the NPT and to call
on all non-NPT states to accede to the treaty as soon as
possible as non nuclear weapon states and without
preconditions.

In the absence of treaty membership Australia believes that
all NPT states should call on non-NPT states to act as though
party to the treaty. This could include: placing IAEA
safeguards on all civil nuclear facilities; adopting an AP;
helping to stem proliferation by adopting the strongest
possible national export controls; and adopting all non-NPT
disarmament and non-proliferation multilateral treaties such
as the CTBT.

--The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and
the Additional Protocol.
Qthe Additional Protocol.

Australia would like to see an NPT consensus document stating

CANBERRA 00000181 004 OF 005


that the universal adoption of safeguards agreements, along
with an AP, should form the basic standard of verification
for all states. The document could reinforce that the AP on
strengthened safeguards serves all States' interests by
enhancing the IAEA's ability to provide assurances about the
peaceful nature of nuclear a state's nuclear activities - and
more particularly to provide credible assurance that there
are no covert nuclear activities. That assurance contributes
to the climate of confidence conducive to progress on
non-proliferation, disarmament and further cooperation on
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Australia would like to see NPT states agree on a mechanism
and timeline to enable the introduction of a safeguards
agreement with an AP as the safeguards standard for all
states.

--The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to
additional countries.

Australia strongly believes that the transfer of the most
proliferation sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle -
enrichment and reprocessing - should be subject to the
strictest possible controls. Australia actively supports the
ongoing process within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to
strengthen controls under which transfers of proliferation
sensitive technologies could be made.

Australia would support endorsement by NPT parties' of the
NSG's strict criteria, when finalized, under which the supply
of enrichment and reprocessing technologies between states
might take place.

--Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest possible
international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy consistent with the Treaty's non-proliferation
obligations.

As one of the world's major uranium suppliers, Australia
recognizes the rights of all NPT parties to peaceful nuclear
energy, but notes that these rights are not unqualified.
Australia would like to ensure NPT parties recognize in 2010
NPT Review Conference documentation that rights to peaceful
nuclear energy is linked to conformity with Articles I, II
and III of the Treaty (the NPT non-proliferation
commitments).

Many NNWS feel that they have not received their part of the
NPT bargain enshrined in Article IV. How to secure access to
clean, safe and reliable energy, including in the context of
the so called "nuclear renaissance", without fuelling
proliferation must be tackled by the 2010 Review Conference.
Broad agreement by member states on issues such as
multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle would help
progress this issue.

--Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations
relating to nuclear, disarmament.

NWS should make joint declaratory statements of their
commitments to honor Article VI obligations and the abolition
of nuclear weapons. These statements must be supported by
demonstrable disarmament initiatives including continued
reductions in arsenals and ratification or negotiation of
disarmament and non-proliferation mechanisms complimentary to
the NPT such as the CTBT or FMCT.

Australia believes that all NPT parties can take further
action to bring about negotiations, on nuclear disarmament.
QIn the NPT review process NNWS should state their commitment
to help build an international security environment conducive
to negotiations by adopting the strongest non-proliferation
measures possible and by recognizing that complete nuclear
disarmament will occur through balanced, progressive and
mutually reinforcing steps.

--Transparency on the part of nuclear weapon states with

CANBERRA 00000181 005 OF 005


regard to their nuclear weapons forces and policies.

Australia recognizes the transparency measures the United
States has taken with regard to its nuclear doctrine and
arsenal. The United States displays welcome transparency
through the accountability of its Congressional and other
processes. The defined numbers of both START and the Moscow
Treaty also shed light on the numbers of strategic weapons
the United States has deployed.

Nonetheless, Australia would welcome further action from the
United States and all nuclear-weapon-states in making their
nuclear policies more transparent. Specifically, Australia
would welcome from nuclear-weapon-states greater transparency
on warhead numbers (both deployed and stockpiled) and greater
transparency on non-strategic reductions. Australia would
also like to see a more transparent approach by NWS to weapon
modernization programs. Finally, Australia would welcome - as
far as practicable given national security concerns - a more
transparent approach to nuclear doctrine including alert.

End text.

CLUNE