EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING

UNCLAS CAIRO 001411

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA (IRWIN) AND PM (ARCHETTO)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: EGYPT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT FOR A CLASSIFIED BRIEFING
ON MK 54 LIGHTWEIGHT TORPEDO IN VIEW OF FUTURE PROCUREMENT TO
SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT NATIONAL DEFENSE MISSION

REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST (09-319)

Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU). Please protect accordingly.


1. (SBU) Description. In ref (a),the Government of Egypt (GOE)
submitted a Letter of Request (LOR) for a classified briefing for
the MK 54 Lightweight Torpedo (LWT). The primary mission of the MK
54 LWT is ship and force self defense against submarines. This
torpedo would eventually replace the MK 46 Mod 5A Surface Warfare
(SW) Torpedo in the Egyptian Navy (EN) inventory and potentially
replace other torpedo systems in EN vessels. The EN is currently
also searching for a replacement for the Chinese and British Made
LWT in the Hainan Class Fast Attack (Anti-Submarine) Craft.


2. (SBU) Reason the purchaser desires the articles and services.
The EN already possesses the US made MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT.
According to NAVSEA briefings to the EN the MK 46 LWT will be phased
out of the USN inventory and become increasingly unsupportable in
the next 15 years. The EN needs to develop a long range replacement
for the MK 46 LWT. LWT are primarily a self-defense weapon critical
to the Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Mission of the EN. The EN is
considering LWT from other countries including German and British
made weapons.


3. (SBU) How the articles or services would affect the recipient's
force structure. The MK 54 LWT would not significantly change EN
force structure but provide the EN with a more modern and
supportable variant of an existing weapon. The MK 54 incorporates
digital electronics in the seeker head and fire control system but
retains the same warhead and propulsion as the existing MK46 LWT.
The MK54 is produced in an export variant.


4. (SBU) How the articles or services would contribute to both the
U.S. and the recipient's defense/security goals. The MK 54 LWT is
currently being fielded in the USN and will be supported as the only
LWT in the USN inventory for the foreseeable future. Having a common
torpedo would potentially increase interoperability and ensure that
EN systems and maintenance infrastructure were supported in the case
of a need for shared assets or combined operations.


5. (SBU) Justification for the type and quantity of articles or
services requested. THE EN currently maintains an inventory of one
hundred fifty-four (154) MK 46 Mod A (SW) LWT. These torpedoes are
currently fully supported by the USN. However, this support will
decrease over the next 15 years and the current technology will be
obsolete by the early 2020's. The classified brief is the first
step in procuring a follow-on weapon. No other LWT is US made or in
the USN inventory.


6. (SBU) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction of a
new warfighting capability to the nation or region. Combatant
Commander's concurrence will be provided separately.


7. (SBU) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations.
We do not anticipate negative reaction from neighboring countries.
The MK 54 torpedo is a defensive weapon and would not present a
significant increase in EN Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability.



8. (SBU) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for,
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles. The EN has
a history of being able to account for, safeguard, operate,
maintain, and support the MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT they currently
possess. They employ the MK 46 Mod 5A (SW) LWT from two different
platforms.


9. (SBU) Training required either in-country or in the United
States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S.
trainers in country. There would be a limited amount of both
in-country and U.S. based training for this eventual purchase. All
the operators and maintenance personnel would need to travel to the
United States for initial training. The training received in the
United States is only preliminary training and must be followed up
with in-country training. No negative reaction from any neighboring
country with regards to the training would be expected. Egypt
currently does extensive training in the United States. There are
also several Follow-on Technical Support teams for Ex-USN assets
already in country.


10. (SBU) Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might
be required as a result of providing the article. The impact of
U.S. presence required by this acquisition in Egypt will be minimal.
There is already a heavy American footprint in Egypt supporting the
US weapon systems Egypt currently possesses. Permanently assigned
teams of long- and short-term contractors are in country already.
The amount of US personnel required in country for the purchase of


the MK 54 LWT would be an extremely small portion of the overall
footprint and go virtually unnoticed.


11. (SBU) Source of financing and the economic impact of the
proposed acquisition. Egypt plans to use Foreign Military Financing
to cover all the costs associated with the acquisition, transport,
supply, infrastructure, and training for the purchase of the MK 54
LWT. Egypt will only be able to make the purchase if the amortized
payment schedule can fit within the FMF budget for Egypt. Further,
Egypt will budget to fully cover the Total Package Approach for this
acquisition and maintain the Total Package Approach for the other
GoE programs.


12. (SBU) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed
acquisition. None.


13. (SBU) A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced
warfighting technology and the SAO's plan for compliance
verification. The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt has a
robust Golden Sentry Program. The Golden Sentry Program
representative and Security Assistance Officer (SAO) responsible for
the program will coordinate for review and maintenance of required
documentation. All parties will maintain serial number logs of all
components within or transferred from the inventory and will conduct
the mandated inspections as required. This coordination will ensure
that historical copies of all EUM inspection results and customer's
physical security and accountability control plans remain on file.
The Egyptian military currently has 154 MK 46 Mod A LWT in country.
Egypt has maintained accountability and security of these weapons
without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to date. The GOE has
expressed the willingness to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability
and security of these new aircraft, and the Office of Military
Cooperation will conduct End Use Monitoring of all required
components if this request is approved.


14. (SBU) Recommendation whether the USG should approve transfer of
the article and justification. The country team endorses the
Egyptian procurement of MK 54 LWT. The MK 54 is a robust, modern
lightweight Torpedo produced in an export version that would enable
the EN to continue long-term use of a US Anti-Submarine (ASW)
weapons system and would allow for maintaining situational awareness
and influence in the EN ASW program. This eventual purchase would
also better enable Egypt's ability to engage in coalition operations
as the number of other US allies, friends and partners who possess
the MK54 increases. This provides inherent interoperability which
benefits both the United States and the Government of Egypt.