Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09CAIRO118
2009-01-23 15:33:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Cairo
Cable title:  

ASSESSMENT OF EGYPT'S REGIONAL ROLE IN THE WAKE OF

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPAL IS EG 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1438
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000118 

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR SHAPIRO AND PASCUAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF EGYPT'S REGIONAL ROLE IN THE WAKE OF
GAZA

REF: A. CAIRO 98

B. CAIRO 1206 (2008)

C. CAIRO 2475 (2008)

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey
Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary and Introduction
-------------------------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000118

SIPDIS
NOFORN

NSC FOR SHAPIRO AND PASCUAL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF EGYPT'S REGIONAL ROLE IN THE WAKE OF
GAZA

REF: A. CAIRO 98

B. CAIRO 1206 (2008)

C. CAIRO 2475 (2008)

Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey
Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary and Introduction
--------------


1. (S/NF) The serious intra-Arab rifts exposed by the Gaza
crisis also highlighted both the extent and limitations of
Egypt's role in leading the moderate Arab position. The Gaza
crisis was only the most recent, and significant, event to
expose the polarization of Egypt and Saudi Arabia at one end
of the Arab political spectrum, and Syria and Qatar at the
other. The impasse has exposed erosion of Egypt's ability to
drive a common Arab position, especially in dealing with
smaller, affluent Arab states within the consensus-based Arab
League system. The Egyptians and moderate Arab partners have
also struggled to manage the searing impact of domestic and
regional public criticism.


2. (S/NF) However, Egypt retains a significant comparative
advantage as one of the few Arab states with stature in the
West and within the Arab world, and the only major player
that has communication with both Israel and Hamas. If the
Egyptians can come to fully understand that their role as the
"indispensable Arab state" is contingent on being pro-active
on key regional issues, including containing Iranian
influence, we will continue to have an effective partner to
work with, alongside other regional states such as Saudi
Arabia and Jordan. End Summary.

The Egyptian Foreign Policy Approach
--------------


3. (S/NF) Egypt seeks to be the "go to" Arab ally for
Western powers and at the same time be appreciated in the
eyes of the Arab public as defending Arab interests against
post-colonial foreign domination. This strategic dichotomy is
becoming increasingly difficult to maintain as seen in the
string of regional crises (e.g. Iraq, Sudan, Lebanon and the
intra-Palestinian conflict) and intra-Arab strife. The U.S.,
in particular, has not been satisfied that Egypt is doing
enough, while the Egyptian and regional public increasingly
criticizes the GOE for "abdication" of its role as Arab

leader (Reftel a)


4. (S/NF) At the same time, the Egyptians are concerned at
the emerging Arab bloc of states that they see as
increasingly webbed into Iran's strategic aim of obtaining
regional dominance. Unfortunately, the Egyptian response has
often been inadequate or flatfooted. For example, during the
2007 Lebanese political impasse, the GOE, along with the
Saudis, were largely outmaneuvered in the Arab League by a
pro-Syria bloc. Although the Egyptians did not object to the
substantive result of the March 2007 Doha conference on
Lebanon, our interlocutors laid down a clear marker that
neither the Qataris nor anyone else would take away the
Egyptian lead on the Palestinian issue (Reftel b). A
subsequent Qatari foray into the Sudan political conflict
elicited similar Egyptian disdain, but no counter-approach or
strategy (Reftel c).


5. (S/NF) When Egypt came through on the six-month "tahdiya"
(calming) in June 2007, it reaffirmed its centrality on Gaza.
But the recent Gaza crisis opened the door for Arab
diplomatic competitors, and despite the full attention of
EGIS Chief Omar Soliman, the Egyptians and Saudis have barely
held the line against those who wish to seat Hamas at an Arab
League meeting. Although Arab League Secretary General
Moussa is supportive of Egypt's primacy on the Palestinian
question, the Arab League itself appears to have lost the
ability to manage intra-Arab dynamics at least for the moment.

Maintenance of Egyptian influence
--------------


6. (S/NF) Egypt is traditionally risk-averse, driven in
large part by Mubarak's personality, as well as the desire
for stability. But the Egyptians may be waking up to the
need for a more dynamic approach. In the run-up to Israel's
military action in Gaza, Soliman was well aware of Egypt's
political vulnerability, including exposure to withering
domestic and regional criticism, but told us that the
Egyptian strategic interest was tied to increased pressure on
Hamas. Throughout the IDF action, our Egyptian interlocutors
privately focused their ire on Syria and Qatar, as opposed to

CAIRO 00000118 002 OF 002


Israel. The GOE publicized the arrest of terrorist cells
connected with Iran in mid-January. We assess that the
Egyptians believe their primary strategic threat is Iran,
that the current theater of combat is the intra-Arab struggle
for primacy, and the current battle is the intra-Palestinian
dispute.


7. (S/NF) The Egyptians, along with its traditional Arab
partners, have the ability to prevail, but the victory of the
moderate Arab position is not a foregone conclusion. If
Egypt fails to maintain its influence, the Arab regional
consensus may tilt toward Hamas and Iran, and away from
support for PA President Abbas and the two-state solution.
If Egypt cedes its position as "champion of the
Palestinians," it will cement the current domestic opposition
charge (Reftel a) that the GOE has failed to deliver on this
account, something that could have lasting negative
consequences. For these reasons, we should assist Egypt and
its partners in the current intra-Arab power struggle however
we can.


8. (S/NF) In the short term, the Egyptians will need to
establish control of the Arab debate over the
intra-Palestinian dispute heading into the Arab League annual
summit, which is scheduled for late March in Doha. The
Egyptian donors conference for Gaza, expected to be held in
February, is a good way to maintain the initiative following
the Sharm el Sheikh Summit of January 18, but more will be
needed.


9. (S/NF) Within our bilateral relationship, we need to
increase Egyptian confidence that we will support a more
assertive GOE approach to blunting Iranian momentum, which
extends beyond the current intra-Arab Hamas standoff. The
Gaza crisis has demonstrated that Egypt appreciates U.S.
support but prefers it more often than not to be quiet and
helpful, not public and prescriptive. The Egyptians have
requested we consult with them first prior to any new USG
regional policy initiative, especially if it involves Syria.
We should honor this request, and seek to involve the
Egyptians (as well as other regional partners such as Saudi
Arabia) in implementation of any new policy approach. For
their part, the Egyptians should be pressed to move forward
with naming an ambassador for Iraq and reopening the embassy
in Baghdad, and we should urge them to work with the Saudis
on supporting the Lebanese Government as parliamentary
elections approach.


10. (S/NF) The disarray within Arab ranks provides Iran a
strategic opening to back extremist groups and move the
centrist position away from negotiations and a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian. Ultimately it is Egypt,
and more specifically President Mubarak's leadership, that
will be critical if we are to support the moderate Arab
position. The recent crisis over Gaza brought into focus
some of the vulnerabilities in Egypt,s leadership role, but
also highlighted the fact only Egypt was willing and able to
step forward with an aggressive diplomatic, propaganda, and
political counter-attack against Iran and its proxies.
SCOBEY