Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BUJUMBURA689
2009-12-17 10:43:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Bujumbura
Cable title:  

NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT

Tags:  ASEC BY KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PTER 
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VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJB #0689/01 3511043
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171043Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1898
UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 000689 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC BY KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PTER
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT
BUJUMBURA

REF: A. STATE 030541

B. BUJUMBURA 00302

UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 000689

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/WMDT AND PM/ISO/PMAT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASEC BY KCRM KNNP MNUC PARM PINR PTER
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR SMUGGLING INCIDENT/PORTAL DETECTION AT
BUJUMBURA

REF: A. STATE 030541

B. BUJUMBURA 00302


1. (SBU) Post wishes to alert the Department and Washington
agencies per reference A that it has received a report
indicating a potential incident of illicit trafficking in
nuclear and/or radiological materials. The report was
generated by the Defense Attache (DATT) after a walk-in,
Nawab Chakaar, offered to sell a canister of purported
uranium to Post at 0915 on 17 December; the same walk-in was
involved in a previous presentation of hoax material to the
DATT in 2007. The purported material and backstory fit the
profile of the common "basket" hoax and Post does not believe
the source to be credible.


2. (SBU) Details of the incident follow:

--------------
Location and Description of Material
--------------

A) The material is purportedly stationary, stored somewhere
in Uvira, DRC, approximately 1-2 hours from Bujumbura.
Source reports the material is in the hands of unnamed
business associates; he claims there are layers of middle-men
between the owners of the material and himself. (NFI)
B) A plaque on the container identifies the contents as U238.
C) Source stated the material was previously verified
radioactive by an unnamed Burundian geological official
through use of a Geiger counter; source was unable to provide
any evidence or report to back up this claim. Post notes
that in a previous "basket case," (reference B) Burundian
officials claimed to have no means to detect radiation.
D) See (B) above.
E) The identifying plaque indicates 19 kgs of "raw weight"
and 3 kgs of "net weight."
F) Source provided photos of the suspect container. It is a
cylindrical metal vessel with an orange/red domed top and an
apparently locally-produced woven fiber carrier with handle;
a plaque with identifying information on the cylinder is
visible through an opening in the basket. Post has provided
PMAT scans of the photos via email.
G) The material is stationary.
H) The material is stationary.
I) There is no manifest.
J) The material's origins are unknown.

--------------
Alarm and Detection Details
--------------

K) The report originates from the DATT following a walk-in.
L) The DATT's meeting with the walk-in occurred at the
Chancery at 0915 local time on 17 December 2009.
M) There was no radiation alarm, and no other technical
inspection of the material has taken place.
N) No spectral file is available.
O) Only the material, the canister, and the woven fiber
carrier have been reported.
P) See (L) above.
Q) No radiation detector was used, and none are available to
Post.

--------------
Host Government Response
--------------

R) Source claims to have been in contact with the Burundian
government concerning this item in the past, but does not
claim to have any current dealings with them. Post has not
notified the host government, as the incident reported in
reference B calls into question the host government's motives
and ability to manage incidents of this type.
S) Unknown.
T) Not applicable.
U) Not applicable.
V) Post does not know who else might know about the material.
W) Not applicable.
X) Post does not know whether the IAEA has been alerted to
the material's presence.
Y) There is no investigation at present.
Z) No criminal charges have been involved to Post's
knowledge.

--------------
Details on the individuals involved
--------------

AA) Individuals involved:

-- DATT: LtCol Thomas Miller USAF, ( 257) 22 207 311;

-- Walk-in: Nawab Chakaar, ( 257) 079939232 Burundi mobile,
( 255) 763 444 999 Tanzania mobile, email
nawabchakaar@yahoo.com. Chakaar claims to be associated with
a sub-contractor supporting Barak Gold mining in Tanzania,
and with a tour company, Miombo Safaris
(www.miombosafaris.com). Post has provided photos of Chakaar
to PMAT via email.

BB) Source claimed there were other businessmen involved
with the material, but did not give any names or contact
information aside from Dr. Salvator Kamanyero. (See item
(CC) below.)

CC) Source indicated he wished to establish a relationship
with Post, stating he was willing to travel through the
region to find other radiological items to sell to Post.
Source presented the DATT with a letter vaguely outlining
this proposal and referencing his earlier dealings with the
previous DATT; this letter was attributed to "Nawab Bahram,"
not Nawab Chakaar, and also inluded the name "Dr. Salvator
Kamanyero (Africa Relief Agency)." The letter had no
signatures. A scan of the letter has been provided to PMAT
via email.

DD) Source did not claim associations with any other groups,
and stated he did not wish the material to fall into the
hands of terrorists or a corrupt government. Source stated
he had contacted the US Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam concerning
the material, and that the Pentagon was interested in the
material as well, but that transportation was a problem, so
he decided to contact Post due to its proximity to the
material. Post will follow up with Dar-es-Salaam and update
PMAT via email.


3. (SBU) Action officer at Post for handling incident is DATT
LtCol Thomas Miller, at IVG 472-7311.
Slutz