Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BUJUMBURA334
2009-07-16 09:23:00
SECRET
Embassy Bujumbura
Cable title:
RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHJB #0334/01 1970923 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 160923Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1595
S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000334
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/WDMT AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: KCRM KNNP ASEC PARM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
REF: SECSTATE 71188
Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000334
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/WDMT AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: KCRM KNNP ASEC PARM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
REF: SECSTATE 71188
Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (S/NF) Post concurs with reftel conclusion that the
purported nuclear material in Bujumbura is likely a hoax.
Despite this, due diligence demands the material be tested,
and Post believes this is a good opportunity for cooperation
with the Burundian government. Note that Post wishes to work
with the Burundian government as a whole, not exclusively
with the intelligence service, on this issue.
2. (S/NF) In response to the questions posed in the
reference, Post has prepared the following answers. Post
notes several conflicts and inconsistencies in the story
surrounding the item as related to the DATT :
Q: Washington is looking into the possibility of an RSO in a
neighboring country providing a radiation detection pager and
radiation identifier to the Defense Attach in Bujumbura; DIA
would provide procedures for use of the equipment. In the
event that Post is unable to locate a radiation detector in
USG custody in Bujumbura, are other avenues available to
obtain this equipment, such as requesting assistance from
allied embassies?
A: An RID is available from Nairobi; however, the DoD's DTK-1
Technical Collection Division is unsure of the proper
calibration of the device and prefers to send a team of
specialists; Post concurs.
Q: Could Burundian authorities confirm the veracity of
reports of health hazards caused by the material?
A: The Burundians confirmed that there have been no known
health issues related to the object. In fact, none of the
deaths related in the anecdotal history of the container
appear to be explicitly linked to the object.
Q: Is it possible to identify the "local citizen" who
provided the material to the host government? A name could
provide some insight on if/how this case could be related to
previous cases that involved similar containers and documents.
A: The Burundian intelligence services named the source as
Ose'e RUSINGIZWA.
Q: Does the host government plan to store or dispose of the
container?
A: Gilbert BULANJE of the Burundian intelligence service
reiterated that the Government of Burundi would prefer that
the U.S. dispose of the item regardless of its nature. Post
concurs, judging that even if the item is not any type of
radioactive material, it is best to take it out of
circulation to avoid having it resurface as part of some
future hoax.
Q: How long has the host government been in possession of the
container?
A: Reportedly 2 or 3 weeks.
Q: Who in the DRC provided the material to the businessman
(seller)?
A: BULANJE related RUSINGIZWA's statement that he personally
removed the item from a residence belonging to former
President Mobutu of Zaire (DRC). Post notes the conflict in
this story with the item's anecdotal history of being passed
from owner to owner.
Q: Who provided the documents to the businessman?
A: BULANJE said RUSINGIZWA claimed that he retrieved both the
documents and the canister at the same time from the Mobutu
residence. Post notes the documents purported to be from
Uganda are dated 2003, approximately six years after Mobutu
fled the DRC.
Q: What extremist associations do the businessman or his
associates have?
A: BULANJE stated that RUSINGWIZA had no such known
associations. Post is passing the name to other agencies for
further checks.
Q: Who has the businessman tried to sell the materials to?
A: BULANJE stated RUSINGWIZA made initial contact with a
low-level intelligence contact, asking the contact to act on
his behalf with the Intelligence Service. Intelligence
officials ultimately insisted RUSINGWIZA be questioned by
BULANJE's office.
3. (S/NF) The DATT continues to work with the DoD's DTK-1
Technical Collection Division in order to provide a team of
two specialists by the end of the month to test and arrange
for appropriate disposal or immediate destruction of the
item. Post supports this approach, as it provides a
definitive answer to the item's status and decisively removes
either dangerous material or another hoax canister from
circulation.
4. (SBU) Action officer for this issue remains Defense
Attache LTCOL Thomas L. Miller, IVG 472-7311.
Wagner
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/WDMT AND PM/ISO/PMAT (24/7)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2019
TAGS: KCRM KNNP ASEC PARM PINR PREL PTER
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE IN
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
REF: SECSTATE 71188
Classified By: CDA JoAnne Wagner for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)
1. (S/NF) Post concurs with reftel conclusion that the
purported nuclear material in Bujumbura is likely a hoax.
Despite this, due diligence demands the material be tested,
and Post believes this is a good opportunity for cooperation
with the Burundian government. Note that Post wishes to work
with the Burundian government as a whole, not exclusively
with the intelligence service, on this issue.
2. (S/NF) In response to the questions posed in the
reference, Post has prepared the following answers. Post
notes several conflicts and inconsistencies in the story
surrounding the item as related to the DATT :
Q: Washington is looking into the possibility of an RSO in a
neighboring country providing a radiation detection pager and
radiation identifier to the Defense Attach in Bujumbura; DIA
would provide procedures for use of the equipment. In the
event that Post is unable to locate a radiation detector in
USG custody in Bujumbura, are other avenues available to
obtain this equipment, such as requesting assistance from
allied embassies?
A: An RID is available from Nairobi; however, the DoD's DTK-1
Technical Collection Division is unsure of the proper
calibration of the device and prefers to send a team of
specialists; Post concurs.
Q: Could Burundian authorities confirm the veracity of
reports of health hazards caused by the material?
A: The Burundians confirmed that there have been no known
health issues related to the object. In fact, none of the
deaths related in the anecdotal history of the container
appear to be explicitly linked to the object.
Q: Is it possible to identify the "local citizen" who
provided the material to the host government? A name could
provide some insight on if/how this case could be related to
previous cases that involved similar containers and documents.
A: The Burundian intelligence services named the source as
Ose'e RUSINGIZWA.
Q: Does the host government plan to store or dispose of the
container?
A: Gilbert BULANJE of the Burundian intelligence service
reiterated that the Government of Burundi would prefer that
the U.S. dispose of the item regardless of its nature. Post
concurs, judging that even if the item is not any type of
radioactive material, it is best to take it out of
circulation to avoid having it resurface as part of some
future hoax.
Q: How long has the host government been in possession of the
container?
A: Reportedly 2 or 3 weeks.
Q: Who in the DRC provided the material to the businessman
(seller)?
A: BULANJE related RUSINGIZWA's statement that he personally
removed the item from a residence belonging to former
President Mobutu of Zaire (DRC). Post notes the conflict in
this story with the item's anecdotal history of being passed
from owner to owner.
Q: Who provided the documents to the businessman?
A: BULANJE said RUSINGIZWA claimed that he retrieved both the
documents and the canister at the same time from the Mobutu
residence. Post notes the documents purported to be from
Uganda are dated 2003, approximately six years after Mobutu
fled the DRC.
Q: What extremist associations do the businessman or his
associates have?
A: BULANJE stated that RUSINGWIZA had no such known
associations. Post is passing the name to other agencies for
further checks.
Q: Who has the businessman tried to sell the materials to?
A: BULANJE stated RUSINGWIZA made initial contact with a
low-level intelligence contact, asking the contact to act on
his behalf with the Intelligence Service. Intelligence
officials ultimately insisted RUSINGWIZA be questioned by
BULANJE's office.
3. (S/NF) The DATT continues to work with the DoD's DTK-1
Technical Collection Division in order to provide a team of
two specialists by the end of the month to test and arrange
for appropriate disposal or immediate destruction of the
item. Post supports this approach, as it provides a
definitive answer to the item's status and decisively removes
either dangerous material or another hoax canister from
circulation.
4. (SBU) Action officer for this issue remains Defense
Attache LTCOL Thomas L. Miller, IVG 472-7311.
Wagner