SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE

S E C R E T BUJUMBURA 000103


NOFORN

DS/TIA/ITA, DS/IP/AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: ASEC PTER BY
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
BUJUMBURA, BURUNDI - SPRING 2008

REF: A. STATE 13023

B. 2006 KAMPALA 1804

C. 2006 BUJUMBURA 805

Classified By: Charge, JoAnne Wagner; Reasons 1.5 (c) 1.


1.(U) Embassy Bujumbura's responses are keyed to reftel A:

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(U) POLITICAL VIOLENCE
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I. (U) DEMONSTRATIONS


A. (U)Anti-American sentiments are not pervasive within any
of Burundi's ethnic or religious communities. The ruling
CNDD-FDD party received monetary and political support from
Sudan during Burundi's 1993-2005 civil war. Sudanese support
continues, invigorated by a May 2007 visit by Sudanese Head
of State Omar al-Bashir to Burundi. Burundi has a small,
moderate Muslim minority. This minority is almost entirely
located within Bujumbura and is strongly factionalized. The
former head of the ruling CNDD-FDD political party, Hussein
Radjabu, is a Muslim who has previously made the pilgrimage
to Mecca. Radjabu has courted and received monetary support
from Islamic nations such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, the Sudan
and Iraq in the past. In April, 2007 Radjabu was arrested and
sentenced to 13 years for sedition; he is appealing his
conviction. Allegedly, Radjabu was recruiting former rebels
for the purpose of destabilizing the current government.
Despite being a prisoner, Radjabu maintains influence and
some control over his Muslim loyalists. The real extent of
Radjabu's resources, authority and potential is unknown, as
is his exact disposition with respect to the United States.
That said he likely retains some ability to influence the
political and religious environment.

Overall Burundi's Muslim population is of the more tolerant
variety. Many of Burundi's Muslims originate from either
India or Pakistan and are active within their ethnic
communities, which also include many Christians.

i. There have been no anti-American demonstrations within the
last 12 months.

ii. There have been no anti-American demonstrations near or
in front of U.S. diplomatic facilities within the last 12
months.

iii. There have been no anti-American demonstrations of any
size within the last 12 months.

iv. There have been no anti-American demonstrations as a
result of U.S. foreign policy initiatives, military actions,
or domestic issues within the last 12 months.


B. (U) Demonstrations are infrequent, are generally
nonviolent and are well controlled by the police. However,
any demonstration or spontaneous gathering has the potential
to become violent. For example, in March 2008, a United
Nations car transporting an American citizen employee was
stopped by former UN workers protesting a contract
termination. When the driver tried to push the vehicle
through the crowd, the demonstrators attacked the vehicle
with rocks. The vehicle was badly damaged but no one was
injured. Similarly, in July, disgruntled ex-UN workers
staged two simultaneous grenade attacks on UN vehicles. In
September motorcycle taxi drivers staged a violent
demonstration against new licensing restrictions. They
damaged passing vehicles and temporarily shut down traffic in
the center of town until the demonstration was violently
dispersed by the police.

i. There have been no violent demonstrations that have
resulted in damage to USG property or injuries to USG
personnel.

ii. There have been no violent demonstrations that have
penetrated the perimeter security line.


C. (U) In May, 2008 students demonstrated at UNESCO, the
Ministry of Education and the president's office to demand
unpaid allowances promised by the government. Students threw
stones, injuring two of their own and one police officer. The
police fired live ammunition into the air and launched tear
gas to disperse the mob.

i. This student protest took place one block away from the
United States Embassy, and on the same street.

ii. Each of the two demonstrations in this reporting period
numbered between 100 and 200 participants.

iii. Demonstrations have been generally nonviolent and well
controlled by the police, with no damage to USG property.
However, any demonstration or spontaneous gathering has the
potential to become violent.

iv. Anti-government demonstrations did not result in damage
to USG property.

II. (C) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS


A. (C) The Burundian government is working to finally resolve
a protracted intrastate conflict and is currently attempting
to implement the last details of a ceasefire agreement with
the FNL, the country,s remaining rebel group. The FNL and
the GoB signed a cease-fire agreement in September 2006, but
in April 2008, the FNL staged simultaneous small unit attacks
with small arms and mortars on police and military position
around the capital of Bujumbura. When the FNL fired 130mm
rockets into the city a few days later, the military began to
drive the rebels from their previous positions surrounding
the city. After 20 days of daily fighting in the areas
surrounding Bujumbura a new cease-fire declaration was
signed, followed by subsequent declarations detailing
timelines for implementing the ceasefire. The FNL has made
some movements towards beginning the demobilization process,
but its commitment to the process remains suspect. The bulk
of the individuals who have begun reporting to the
demobilization camps is believed to be new recruits; the
majority of the FNL,s actual fighters remain in the field.
The conflict has again assumed the characteristics of the
low-level insurgency it resembled prior to the fighting in
April 2008. The FNL has frequently engaged in small clashes
with FDN (Burundi National Defense Forces) and police
positions, mostly in response to FNL criminal rather than
insurgent related activity. Looting, ambushes against
vehicles, extortion, armed robbery and grenade attacks
against the civilian population are the continuing and
preferred method of obtaining logistical support for the FNL
in the field. The FNL is again active in the area surrounding
Bujumbura but this may be a last attempt to gather logistics
in advance of demobilization. Further fighting is possible
but not expected at this time.


B. (C) The FNL generally have freedom of movement throughout
the interior of the country; however they are more
concentrated around Bujumbura in Bujumbura Rural, the
northern regions of Cibitoke and Bubanza, and the southern
regions near Nyanza Lac.


C. (C) There are no U.S. diplomatic facilities located in
these regions, other than in Bujumbura, the capital.


D. (C) No factions have specifically targeted American
interests or advocated an anti-American political philosophy
or orientation.

III. (S) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES


A. (S) Burundi's National Police (PNB) is staffed by former
rebel fighters, police and gendarmerie. The majority of the
police force has just completed its first formal week-long
training course in basic human rights and policing. Two more
week-long courses are underway but the average police officer
still has had little training. Mid-level officers have some
training but do not aggressively seek to enforce the law
without specific orders to do so. The highest echelon of the
PNB is well-educated and well-trained but seems unable to
pass relevant knowledge to their subordinates.

In general, the level of professionalism and competence is
sufficient to deter petty criminal activity where police are
continuously present in sufficient numbers. In cases of more
serious crimes not committed in the actual presence of
police, reaction times are too slow to help the victims;
serious investigations are only undertaken in the most
notable cases and legitimate prosecution rare. In fact,
serious crimes are often attributed to the police, other
government actors, or the FNL. The police are not generally
active outside of cities during hours of darkness so
criminals operate in rural areas with impunity at night.

Although the investigative capacity of Burundian law
enforcement personnel is very limited, they are cooperative,
willing to learn and generally eager to assist the U.S.


B. (S) The second officer of the PNB to attend the
Investigator Training Program at the FBI National Academy has
recently graduated. Efforts are underway to enroll officers
of the PNB and inspectors into the International Law
Enforcement Academy (ILEA)in Botswana. Officers have already
attended a drug course and a cyber-crime course at ILEA.
Although Post's training initiatives are still in their
infancy, PNB effectiveness and willingness to cooperate have
improved. The PNB have also received significant training
from the UN, the Netherlands, China, France, Belgium and
Egypt.


C. (S) Corruption is widespread throughout the PNB. The
assimilation of demobilized rebels from various groups active
during the civil war undermines the capabilities of the PNB.
Low pay, inadequate training and the fact that many current
police formerly made their living through criminal means have
created a situation in which crimes are committed without
consequences and in some cases the police are implicated in
criminal activity.


D. (S) The host country intelligence service (Service
Nationale de Renseignement (SNR)) may be capable of deterring
transnational terrorist activity. However, the SNR focuses
its efforts more on influencing national politics in favor of
the ruling party rather than on monitoring potential external
threats. It is additionally burdened by issues similar to
those confronting the National Police. The SNR is are
allegedly behind assassinations of local businessmen,
opponents of the ruling party and other persons.


E. (S) Host country intelligence services have been
cooperative in the past on those rare occasions when the
Embassy has had to ask for assistance. In general, however,
rumors that those at the head of the SNR are deeply involved
in extra-judicial actions including assassination, detentions
and intimidation cause the Embassy to limit its interaction
with the intelligence service.


F. (S) Burundi was specifically threatened by Somalia-based
terror groups for its participation in the African Union,s
peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Although Post is
unaware of any major GoB anti-terrorism successes, they have
vigorously pursued investigations into individuals or events
suspected of being linked to terror when prodded by the
international community.


G. (S) The host country is generally responsive to U.S.
requests to provide additional police forces for protective
security functions. Our requests are limited to providing a
few extra police for large social occasions and occasional
protective motorcades. Post does not utilize local police as
bodyguards.


H. (S) Post assesses the overall security of Bujumbura,s
International Airport as good/average. Airport security has
improved significantly over the past year. The international
airport complies with international standards. In the event
of conflict the UN mission currently in Burundi would augment
security at the airport and on the road leading to the
airport. Should the security environment deteriorate, small
arms fire from FNL forces directed against commercial
passenger and cargo aircraft is likely.


I. (S) Burundian customs officials and immigration agencies
are generally thought to be ineffective and corrupt. It is
easy to obtain fraudulent Burundian or regional identity
documents and passports. The Bujumbura international airport
is considered to be the easiest place regionally to pass
fraudulent documents en route to Europe. The airlines have
recently employed contractors who scrutinize travel documents
and as a result security has tightened significantly.


J. (S) Border patrol forces are ineffective. Burundi's
borders are porous. The border police typically exercise
control only at official entry and exit points. Uncontrolled
foot and waterborne traffic from neighboring countries is
commonplace. Border security has improved in response to
specific terror threats against the GoB, and consequently
some individuals have recently been detained attempting to
cross the border illegally.

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INDIGENOUS TERRORISM
--------------


I. (SBU) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS


A. (SBU) There are no indigenous anti-American terrorist
groups in Burundi. The FNL is a Hutu-dominated rebel group
which could conceivably harbor a grievance against the U.S.
for its support of the Tutsi-led government in neighboring
Rwanda; at this time there is no indication that this is the
case.


B. There have been no attacks against American targets in
Burundi.


C. There have been no attacks against American targets in
Burundi.


D. There have been no attacks against American targets in
Burundi.


E. There have been no attacks against American targets in
Burundi.


F. There have been no attacks against American targets in
Burundi.


G. There are no indigenous anti-American terrorist groups in
Burundi.

II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS


A. (SBU) The FNL (formerly PALIPEHUTU-FNL) is the only
indigenous group being tracked by Post that might be
considered a terrorist organization. The government of
Burundi informally considers the FNL a terrorist group, and
has used the threat of formally labeling as such as leverage
during ongoing peace negotiations. At present, the FNL is
generally considered a &negative force,8 and not a
terrorist group.


B. (SBU) In April 2008 the FNL used small arms and mortars to
stage simultaneous small unit attacks on police and military
positions. These attacks took place within two km of Embassy
housing. A few days later the FNL fired three 130 mm rockets
into the city. One of the rounds landed within 400 m of two
Embassy residences, another rocket landed within 400 m of a
separate Embassy residence. Embassy residences were not the
target of the attacks, but their relative proximity to
high-profile targets and the gross inaccuracy of the rockets
put the properties in the line of fire.


C. (SBU) The April attacks were indiscriminate and lethal;
over 100 people were killed.


D. (SBU) To date, Americans have not been killed or injured
in FNL attacks.

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TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM
--------------


I. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS


A. (S/NF) In 2008, the GoB received specific threats against
the government and president of Burundi from the
Somalia-based terror group Al-Shabaab for the country's
support of the AMISOM mission. In September 2006 Post became
aware of surveillance being conducted on our facilities by
Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, an East Africa-oriented
Al-Qaeda-affiliated group (reftel B and C). The size and
activities of these groups in Burundi are unknown.


B. (S/NF) Al-Shabaab is an operational organization that has
threatened to attack in Burundi. Post believes that
AL-Shabaab lacks the resources to stage an attack in Burundi
at this time. The group has carried out lethal attacks on
Burundian troops in Somalia and will likely continue to focus
their efforts there. Post assesses Al-Ittihad Al-Islami as an
operational group limited in its activities and potential at
this time.


C. (S/NF) The GoB is not sympathetic to extremist Islamist
ideology. It is possible that the GoB is unaware that an
Islamist terrorist group is operating in Burundi due to the
GoB,s limited control of its borders and investigative
capabilities.


D. (S/NF) It is unknown whether any NGOs operating in Burundi
are affiliated with this group. Most NGOs operating in
Burundi are affiliated with western nations. The activities
or presence of Muslim or Middle Eastern NGOs is unknown, but
not estimated to be significant. If there are Middle Eastern
NGOs operating in Burundi it is possible that they could have
a relationship with these groups.


E. (S/NF) As noted in paragraph 2A, there is a Muslim
minority active in Burundi. This minority is largely
comprised of Indian and Pakistani expatriates. There are also
some Sudanese and East African Muslims. The radical Islamic
ideology of an Islamic terrorist group is not likely to
appeal to the small moderate Muslim community here.


F. (S/NF) Post assesses the level, intent and scope of
hostile intelligence services in-country to be low. Hostile
intelligence services are not particularly active in Burundi.
However, Post has noted surveillance of official U.S.
facilities perpetrated by apparent Chinese nationals on
several occasions. Within the government of Burundi, there
are those who have links to Muslim countries in the Middle
East, in particular to the former head of the CNDD-FDD
political party Hussein Radjabu. It is unknown whether he has
established a relationship with the intelligence services of
these nations. Post has no direct information to indicate
that a relationship between Burundi's intelligence services
and those of Sudan has been established, but high ranking
officials in the SNR admit that lack of contact with western
nations may drive them to seek other partners. Considering
the relationship between the two countries, it would be
unwise to rule out such a relationship after high-level
meetings between the presidents of Burundi and Sudan. In
November of 2008 a discreet Iranian delegation met with the
president of Burundi in Bujumbura. Reports suggest that the
delegation was soliciting votes against an anti-Iranian
resolution in the UN Security Council but what the GoB was
offered for its support is unknown.


G. (S/NF) Weapons and explosives are readily available in
Burundi. The Burundian military and police do not adequately
secure their weapons and ammunition, and rampant corruption
means official weapons and ammunition are often used by
criminals. The possibility that a terrorist group could
obtain Burundian military and police weapons and explosives
using overt or covert means is high. In late July 2008, a
soldier working at a logistics base in Musaga attempted to
sell 40 RPG-7 rockets and 600,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition
to the FNL. Burundi's porous borders provide an opportunity
for weapons and explosives to be smuggled undetected from
neighboring countries, including eastern neighbor Democratic
Republic of Congo. The surrounding region is host to a
vibrant black market in small arms and grenades, and weapons
of this type are always available at low cost. Grenades and
automatic weapons are in common use by criminals for crimes
as petty as cell phone theft; it would be quite simple for a
terrorist element to acquire a significant arsenal.


2. (U) Point of contact is RSO Christopher A. Bakken (257)
22-207-000 x7305


Wagner