Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BUDAPEST113
2009-02-09 11:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Budapest
Cable title:  

HUNGARY: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Tags:  PGOV PREL PARM NPT MNUC ENGR HU 
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DE RUEHUP #0113/01 0401117
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R 091117Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3876
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0128
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0450
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0062
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0533
C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000113 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA AND EUR/CE JAMIE LAMORE, GENEVA
(CD),UNVIE (IAEA),USUN (POL),USNATO (POL),USEU (POL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM NPT MNUC ENGR HU
SUBJECT: HUNGARY: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

REF: A. SECSTATE 6970

B. BUDAPEST 99

Classified By: P/E Counselor, Eric Gaudiosi, reasons 1.4 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUDAPEST 000113

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/MNSA AND EUR/CE JAMIE LAMORE, GENEVA
(CD),UNVIE (IAEA),USUN (POL),USNATO (POL),USEU (POL)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM NPT MNUC ENGR HU
SUBJECT: HUNGARY: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
BACKGROUND INFORMATION

REF: A. SECSTATE 6970

B. BUDAPEST 99

Classified By: P/E Counselor, Eric Gaudiosi, reasons 1.4 (b and d)


1. (U) This is an action request, see paragraph 5.


2. (U) Post provides the following responses provided by the
MFA's Security and Non-proliferation Department, keyed to
questions outlined in ref A, paragraph 8.


3. A. (C) What are the host government's objectives for the
NPT in general, and for the current review process in
particular?

Hungary is firmly interested in a healthy, robust, and
well-functioning NPT. Since the failure of the previous
review cycle, the Treaty has been in a crisis of confidence.
Our goal should be to gradually rebuild trust in the "grand
bargain" that forms the basis of the NPT regime. As far as
the prospects are concerned, we are cautiously optimistic.
The current review process should lead to the adoption of a
consensus outcome document of substance, but first, State
parties should be able to start meaningful discussions on the
issues at hand. The 2008 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) was
a good first step towards achieving this goal.


B. (C) What policies or actions regarding the NPT does the
host government hope to see from the United States?

As a major nuclear power and a depository of the Treaty, the
U.S. clearly has a defining role in the review process of the
NPT. Hungary agrees with the concerns that have been
expressed by the United States at various NPT meetings in the
past; e.g. on clandestine nuclear proliferation,
non-compliance with Article II, and the ill-defined
provisions on withdrawal (Article X). Pogress on these
issues would be accelerated if previous commitments - made at
the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference (RevCons) - were not
questioned. The United States could make clear this year
that it still supports the outcome of the above-mentioned
RevCons. Progress on nuclear disarmament, which in the case

of the United States and Russia is still primarily a
bi-lateral issue, would also help in creating a positive
climate for NPT negotiations. The common statement by the P5
countries was a welcome development of the 2008 PrepCom,
which will hopefully be repeated in 2009.


C. (SBU) What does the host government believe would
represent a successful outcome to the current NPT cycle
ending with the 2010 Review Conference? How important is it
for Parties to reach consensus on substantive matters?

Given the failure of the previous cycle, consensus on - at
least some - substantive issues at this time seems to be
essential.


D. (C) Does the host government believe that NPT parties
should take action to address the NPT issues described below?
If so, what actions would it support?

All of the issues described are of great importance to the
functioning of the Treaty, and all of them will probably be
discussed in depth at the PrepCom and the RevCon meetings.

Specific comments:

-- Noncompliance with the NPT, e.g., on the part of Iran and
North Korea.

We need to address non-compliance and the spread of
enrichment and reprocessing capabilities in a definite manner
in order to tackle the "crisis of confidence" surrounding the
Treaty. The 2008 U.S. Working Paper (WP 27) presented very
useful ideas in this regard.

-- The prospect of Parties violating and then withdrawing
from the Treaty.

Hungary would support a decision on Article X in order to
clarify the issue of withdrawal.

-- The spread of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to
additional countries.

We see great merit in the proposals that aim to

"multilateralize" the nuclear fuel cycle. Hungary, together
with the European Union, will actively support the idea of an
international fuel bank supervised by the IAEA. Such a fuel
bank, and the guarantees it implies, would render mute the
arguments for a national enrichment capacity.

-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligation for the fullest
possible international cooperation for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy consistent with the Treaty's nonproliferation
obligations.
-- The lack of universality of NPT safeguards agreements and
the Additional Protocol.
-- The lack of NPT universality.
-- Fulfilling the Treaty's obligations to pursue negotiations
relating to nuclear disarmament.

At the 2008 PrepCom, as part of the "Group of 10," Hungary
presented proposals on the practical implementation of the
Treaty's provisions. The basis for all the proposed steps is
the IAEA's safeguards system. The G-10 also presented new
ideas on the physical protection of nuclear materials, export
controls, and other relevant matters (WPs 12,13,14, 15, 16,
17, 18). We would like to see follow-up on these initiatives.


4. (C) Hungarian MFA response continued. Other issues
Hungary would like to see discussed, and possibly agreed
upon, include the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT),
Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty's (CTBT) entry into force. Hungary has also
traditionally supported efforts on non-proliferation and
disarmament education, and we hope to see new ideas in this
regard.


5. (C) Our Hungarian interlocutors requested to know where
the USG stands on its previous commitments to the 1995 and
2000 REVCONS, specifically querying as to the U.S. commitment
to the "13 practical steps" developed at the 2000 REVCON.


6. (U) Post previously provided Embassy and Hungarian POC
information in ref B.
Foley