EU DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO FIGHTING PIRACY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000878

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PASS TO NAVCENT POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2019
TAG: PREL, EWWT, KCRM, MARR, MOPS, PINS, XF, XW, EN
SUBJECT: EU DEVELOPING COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO FIGHTING
PIRACY

REF: A. USEU BRUSSELS 810

B. USEU BRUSSELS 839

C. USEU BRUSSELS 819

D. USEU BRUSSELS 692

E. STATE 44005

F. USEU BRUSSELS 869

G. USEU BRUSSELS 133

H. USEU BRUSSELS 725

BRUSSELS 00000878 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Christopher Murray for reasons 1
.4(b) and (d).


1. (C//NF) Summary: In several recent meetings, in the
run-up to the GAERC's decision to extend the Atalanta mission
to December 2010, EU Officials outlined to us the thinking
behind High Rep Solana's effort to prompt discussion among
member states on a bigger EU role in Somalia. The EU is
further developing its "comprehensive approach" to combat
piracy off Somalia by: reinforcing EU naval action;
supporting additional African nations' judicial and penal
authorities; providing financial and military planning
support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM);
training Somali security forces; and pursuing development
activities. The EU Council Secretariat and the European
Commission are writing a joint paper for EU Foreign Ministers
that will propose EU initiatives to address the root causes
of piracy. The EU cannot solve the crisis in Somalia on its
own, and our contacts are looking for opportunities to
partner with the U.S. One EU Council Secretariat official
informally suggested considering a joint program whereby the
U.S. would equip, and the EU train, Somali security forces in
Djibouti. End Summary.


2. (SBU) As reported Ref A, EU High Rep Javier Solana wrote
EU Member States on May 28 to urge that they consider
initiatives to address the root causes of Somali piracy. In
his letter, Solana recommends EU actions on six fronts: the
appointment of an EU Special Representative to the region;
regional maritime capability development; reinforced support
to the African Union; capacity building for the Somali
security sector; a long-term development assistance strategy;
and a reinforced international legal framework to change the
cost-benefit calculus for would-be pirates. In early June,
the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors
tasked the EU Council Secretariat and European Commission to
prepare a joint options paper for consideration by Member
States before the next foreign ministers, meeting in late
July. This paper is to use Solana,s six lines of action as
a point of departure. We note that the recent violence in and
around Mogadishu seems to have intensified EU discussion on
new initiatives but may also make reaching a final decision
more difficult.

CHANGING PIRATES, COST-BENEFIT CALCULUS


3. (SBU) Solana,s May 28 letter begins by urging EU Member
States to extend the mandate for the EU,s naval operation,
and on June 15, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to extend its
mandate until December 2010 (Ref B). The decision was taken
early in order to facilitate future force generation. The
force currently numbers twelve ships supported by three
maritime patrol aircraft.


4. (C) On June 12, Didier Lenoir, Head of the EU Council
Secretariat's Operations and Exercises Unit, told USEU

BRUSSELS 00000878 002.2 OF 004


PolOffs that industry must also be involved in anti-piracy
efforts. Echoing U.S. arguments, he said this could mean
embarking armed security guards on ships. Because ransom
payoffs are often in cash, Lenoir is considering creative
approaches to tracking pirate finances. He suggested, for
example, that the international community could scan the
region for overt signs of wealth, such as villa purchases.


5. (C) Lenoir also suggested that increasing the risk and
decreasing the rewards for piracy mean complementing the EU's
action at sea with legal arrangements for the prosecution of
pirates. He said the EU,s agreement with Kenya and pending
agreement with the Seychelles would be insufficient in just a
few months; however, there is no EU agreement on domestic
prosecution of pirates or an international court (Ref C).


6. (SBU) USEU PolOffs also heard on June 17 from Michael
Doyle and Dilarde Teilane from the Commission's Directorate
General (DG) for External Relations. Doyle, who was deeply
involved in managing the EU's provision of 1.75 million euros
of support to the Kenyan government (Ref D),expressed
concern about Kenya bearing the burden for pirate
prosecutions, saying that Kenyan Muslims have begun to
criticize the government,s involvement in piracy
prosecutions. He suggested alleviating the political strain
on Kenya by increasing support from other regional
governments for Kenya,s role. Solidifying judicial
mechanisms for prosecuting pirates may be one focus of the
joint Council-Commission options paper. On June 24, Italian
PSC Ambassador Andrea Meloni called Charge to ask about
alternatives to landing pirates in Kenya for prosecution. He
was aware that the Kenyans are now overwhelmed, and the
Italians were at a loss on what to do with some Somali
pirates held aboard an Italian ship near Mombasa.

AID FOCUSED ON SECURITY, EDUCATION, AND AGRICULTURE


7. (SBU) As reported in Ref E, the European Commission is
making a substantial contribution to development in Somalia,
including pledges of up to 60 million euros for AMISOM and 12
million euros to a UNDP-implemented Rule of Law mission that
trains Somali police forces. Since 2003, the Commission has
provided 278 million euros of development aid to Somalia,
focusing projects on three sectors: governance and security;
social sectors, including education and healthcare; and
agriculture, livestock, and food security. For the period
2008-2013, the Commission has allocated 215 million euros to
these projects. In addition, since 2005 the Commission has
provided 87 million euros in humanitarian assistance to
Somalia. On June 12, Roger Moore, DG Development's Director
for the Horn of Africa and East and Southern Africa, in a
meeting with Acting USAID Assistant Administrator Earl Gast,
also confirmed that the Commission is working on a major
Somalia policy statement covering piracy, security, and
development issues, which should be available by the end of
June (Ref F).


8. (SBU) According to Lenoir, the appointment of an EU
Special Representative (EUSR),as Solana recommended, would
bring greater coherence to the EU,s development, political,
and security efforts. Our Commission contacts, however,
questioned how the EUSR,s role would be defined and how much
impact the person would have.

REINFORCING AMISOM

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9. (SBU) Our contacts are confident the EU can make a
difference by supporting AMISOM and regional security forces.
The Commission already supports AMISOM on two fronts: by
providing direct support to defray the cost of the AU force,
and by helping to stand up a capable AMISOM strategic
planning unit in Addis Ababa. On June 17, Jens Moeller,
Principal Administrator of the Commission-run African Peace
Facility (APF),told PolOffs that the APF has not yet begun
spending the 60 million euros it pledged at the April
donors, conference.


10. (SBU) The Commission cannot begin to disburse funds
until the African Union indicates what the funds will be used
for. The AU, Moeller said, will make a specific request to
the Commission once it determines what needs will be met by
the UN,s funding mechanism. Moeller indicated, however,
that funds from the APF can be used to fund troop allowances,
vehicles, communications gear, medical equipment, and other
support material, but not rifles, ammunition, or other purely
&military8 equipment.


11. (C) The Commission,s support to the AMISOM planning
unit is funded separately through the EC's Instrument for
Stability. Michael Doyle described to us how the Instrument
for Stability supports a strategic planning unit for AMISOM
in Addis Ababa. The project, launched in 2007 with 4.75
million euros, was weakened by the AU,s inability to recruit
enough African personnel to staff the unit. The Commission,
which, because of these problems, had not spent all the money
initially allocated, extended the term of support for this
planning unit and is supplementing that support by recruiting
and paying for four military planners from EU Member States
to deploy to Addis to help stand up the unit.

BUILDING REGIONAL COAST GUARD, LAND FORCE CAPACITY


12. (C) Both the Council and Commission are considering how
to support regional coast guards in order to reduce the
burden on European naval forces. The Council,s Lenoir
suggested that the EU could help train regional coast guard
forces, mentioning Kenya, Yemen, and Somalia specifically.
Improved coast guards would not replace naval fores, he
argued, but they could take over some counter-piracy tasks,
allowing naval forces to concentrate on high-risk areas.
(Note: Lenoir has expressed concerns in the past that some
coast guards could use their training to engage in piracy
themselves. End Note) Meanwhile, the Commission plans to
allocate 14 to 18 million euros from 2009 to 2011 for its
CriticalMaritime Routes initiative (Ref G). Commission desk
officer Pierre Cleostrate has told USEU that, among other
projects, the program could help fund the coast guard
training center in Djibouti and the information exchange
center in Yemen, both envisioned under the Djibouti Code of
Conduct.


13. (C) In the latest development in the EU,s
comprehensive approach to piracy and Somali security, Member
States are discussing providing training support to Somali
land forces by launching a new European Security and Defense
Policy (ESDP) security sector reform mission. As reported in
Ref H, the French began this discussion by circulating a
non-paper recommending the &Europeanization8 of France,s
pledge to train Somali military forces in Djibouti.
Commenting on the proposal, Lenoir stressed the need for an

BRUSSELS 00000878 004.2 OF 004


overarching security sector reform strategy for Somalia.
France,s proposal is a good start, he said, but that
initiative alone will not solve the Somali security problem.


14. (C) The EU effort to consider how to do more in Somalia
appears to be a "top-down" effort, not driven by Secretariat
defense planners. Didier Lenoir, who was initially skeptical
about the EU taking on the anti-piracy mission, asserted that
successful security sector reform could require an
&Afghanistan-like8 commitment on the part of the
international community, including an increased international
footprint in Somalia. AMISOM, he argued, does not have the
capacity to provide for security while the Somali security
institutions mature. Lenoir questioned whether the EU or the
international community has the political will to provide a
serious on-the-ground commitment, but said that any options
paper circulated to Member States would make clear the
magnitude of commitment required for success.

SEEKING U.S.-EU COOPERATION AND DIVISION OF LABOR


15. (C//NF) Given the size of the problem, Lenoir opined
that the EU cannot successfully address the root causes of
piracy on its own, even if it increases its commitment to the
problem. He informally suggested exploring a joint EU-U.S.
effort to train, equip, and transport Somali security forces
that would allow the U.S. and EU to unify efforts and
capitalize on one another,s strengths. He floated the idea
of a cooperative program whereby the EU would provide
training to Somali forces in Djibouti while the U.S. would
equip and help transport those forces. The Commission's
Michael Doyle has also repeatedly stressed the need for
international cooperation, including U.S.-EU coordination, to
address the shortfalls in the region,s judicial and military
planning capacity. Both the Council Secretariat and the
Commission expressed interest in consultations with U.S.
officials, either in Brussels or via video-conference, to
ensure that our efforts are coordinated and mutually
reinforcing.
MURRAY
.