A/S CARTER'S APRIL 23 MEETING WITH BELGIAN MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000750

SIPDIS

STATE PASS AF/FO, AF/C, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM CG BE
SUBJECT: A/S CARTER'S APRIL 23 MEETING WITH BELGIAN MFA
AFRICA TEAM

Classified By: Charge Wayne Bush for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: The Charge hosted a breakfast April 23 for
visiting Acting A/S for African Affairs Phillip Carter and
NSC Senior Director for Africa Michelle Gavin with the
Belgian MFA Africa Team. The Belgian guests were Deputy
Chief of Cabinet to FM De Gucht Jean-Luc Bodson, Africa
Director Guy Trouveroy, Great Lakes Envoy Karl Dhaene and
Congo Desk Officer Koen Adam. Carter and Gavin said the
Obama Administration's Africa policy would include more
openness and cooperation with partners, and President Obama
has a deep interest in Africa. The Belgians were primarily
interested in challenges facing the DRC. They were
pessimistic that recent Rwanda - DRC cooperation would lead
to a real rapprochement between the two countries. The GOB
is opposed to foreign troops operating on DRC soil outside of
a UN mandate. Belgium approved of neither the Rwandan effort
against the CNDP nor the Ugandan operation against the LRA.
Carter raised the role of former DRC Parliament Speaker
Kamerhe; the Belgians said he may be the only plausible
opposition leader, but his democratic credentials are
uncertain. Carter said the U.S. wanted to renew focus on
security sector transformation (SST),rather than mere
security sector reform (SSR),and would push for a strong
systematic approach with all partners that included the army,
the police, and the justice sector. Carter signaled strong
concern about the EU reaction to coups in Guinea Mauritania,
and Madagascar. The U.S. supported the African Union's (AU)
call to condemn the coups, and is dismayed by EU willingness
to interact normally with the new regimes. Carter argued
that the U.S. and EU should oppose changes of government by
military force. Carter also asked about the EU's large grant
to the regime in Eritrea. Trouveroy said that the countries
in Europe who are truly interested in Africa are limited in
number and often disagree with each other, confusing EU
policy. He said a new scramble for influence might be
coming, with France and the U.K. trying to set policy for the
EU without consulting other members of the Africa Group. End
Summary.

New U.S. Africa Team and Policy
--------------


2. (U) Acting A/S Carter suggested the Belgians watch for A/S
for African Affairs-designate Johnnie Carson's confirmation
hearing on April 29. He said it would offer an excellent
opportunity to understand the trajectory of the Obama
administration's Africa policy. He predicted a strong
commitment to working with partners in Africa, both African
and non-African. He stressed the Administration's desire to
work together with allies in Europe in particular. He also
mentioned the creation of a new Envoy for Sudan, retired Air
Force General Scott Gration. NSC Senior Director for Africa
Michelle Gavin emphasized President Obama's interest in
Africa, and explained that Congo had been a particular focus
of his efforts as a Senator. She said the President cares
deeply about tackling corruption and the role of civil
society in Africa.

Belgium's DRC Political Analysis
--------------


3. (C) Africa Director Guy Trouveroy said Belgium appreciated
the new openness and recent U.S. - Belgium discussions. He
observed that the recent DRC - Rwanda dialogue may obviate
the need for Belgium to mediate between the two countries if
dialogue continues. Belgium would like to see real
rapprochement and the reopening of embassies and normal
relations between Kinshasa and Kigali. However, Trouveroy
made it clear that Belgium was preoccupied with the DRC's
overall weakness and vulnerability. In the eastern DRC, he
noted the FDLR was regrouping and continued to threaten
regional stability while the Congolese army lacked food and
logistical support.

4.(C) Great Lakes Envoy Karl Dhaene said FM Thambwe told the
GOB that DRC - Rwandan relations would improve if joint
military actions were successful. He then observed that no
steps towards reopening embassies have been made since the
joint FRDC - Rwanda offensive against the FDLR. A large part
of the CNDP had been integrated into the army, but remained
unpaid, and another faction had rejected reconciliation.

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South Kivu was of particular concern.


5. (C) Acting A/S Carter asked for Belgium's analysis of the
dismissed Parliament Speaker Kamerhe and his role in
democratic governance. Deputy Cabinet Director Bodson
commented that the parliament was the only working
institution in the Congo and the only place where an active
political debate took place. He feared that Kamerhe's
replacement, Kabila loyalist Boshab, might diminish an
important check on the government's power. Bodson then
suggested Kamerhe's popularity could allow him to become
leader of the opposition. Carter agreed Kamerhe could
consolidate the opposition, but questioned Kamerhe's
credentials as a democrat. Bodson described Kamerhe as a
thug. He admitted the proclivity of "democratic" African
opposition leaders to revert to thuggish behavior after
obtaining power. The GOB had considered making a statement
about Kamerhe's dismissal, but did not want him to appear
weak as a result. Trouveroy was doubtful Kamerhe had a
future role unless something happened to Kabila. Trouveroy
listed Kamerhe's weakness as lack of funds to mount a
campaign, his departure from the main party, and his
background in the eastern DRC. Adam interjected that Kamerhe
was charismatic and spoke all the major languages well and
could obtain support in Kinshasa and the western DRC. He
offered praise for Kamerhe's insistence on
ensuring the opposition was heard when he presided over
parliament. He viewed Kamerhe as the most formidable
potential opponent against Kabila in 2011.

LRA
---


6. (C) Trouveroy said Belgian army intelligence thought the
Ugandan - DRC operation against the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA) was a failure. The small LRA bands were regrouping and
Kony had a core group of about 200 loyal fighters who were
preparing for a recruitment drive. Belgium's intelligence
predicted the LRA would move north into Ituri and Sudan from
its present location on the DRC - CAR border to recruit among
the Acholi there. Carter said the estimated 200 remaining
LRA fighters were hard core LRA members, and likely the
deadliest cluster in recent history. U.S. information
suggested that some LRA lieutenants had split and retreated
into the bush. Adam offered that internal dissension could
disrupt the LRA; he suggested Ojemba could become a rival to
Kony if fighters could be lured by offering a package to
leave the LRA.

Eastern Congo and SST
--------------


7. (C) Trouveroy agreed that something had to be done to stop
Kony, but said troops from neighboring countries on Congolese
soil reminded Belgium of the early part of this decade when
several neighboring armies had invaded during civil strife.
From the Belgian perspective, when Rwandans intervene, they
are trying to send a signal of their discipline and ability
to the DRC. Trouveroy argued that the Congolese people pay
the greatest cost when foreign armies are present on
Congolese soil. Gavin said she understood the Belgium view,
but noted there were few alternatives. She said Belgium knew
the Congolese forces and the challenges of getting them to
deal effectively with insurgencies. Trouveroy called for
another option, the reinforcement of the Goma Process, and
building up the DRC. He pointed out the DRC had no army, no
administration, and no real state, making intervention by
neighbors too easy.


8. (C) Carter said the USG was ready to hold a serious
discussion with donors and partners on SST. He said the
current model with different countries training different
battalions was inefficient. SST should be addressed globally
in terms of reforming the army, the police, and the
judiciary. He cautioned that failure to address these issues
would result in problems during the 2011 elections. Carter
acknowledged that all donors had specific skills, but called
for a system of coherent and systematic contributions.
Bodson said Minister De Gucht was interested in better SST
coordination, but noted there were differences between the
EU, the MFA, the BelgianQrmy, and the UN on SST and
disarmament, Qmobilization, and reintegration (DDR). He

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admitted the Belgian Army preferred a piecemeal approach to a
global approach because it made the challenges more
digestible. Carter said the USG worried that money had been
wasted on DDR and the Congolese army. Bodson said the DRC
should be pushed to endorse SST, but said he doubted whether
Kabila supported a strong army. He said the GOB was
considering closer internal coordination on Africa, and said
that FM De Gucht and Development Minister Michel would be
visiting Congo together. He said Belgium's limited
assistance money is currently focused on roads and
agriculture, but he believed the Belgian army and Development
could coordinate on projects. Carter emphasized that a real
transformation could not occur without reform of the justice
system and police.


9. (C) Adam described a Belgian project in Kindu, where the
Belgian Army and Development Agency are following the
"Afghan" security and development model. The Belgian
military retains a presence in Kindu and the Development
Agency finances projects such as family housing. He
cautioned the model could only succeed if the Congolese kept
their commitments. Trouveroy said the MFA is now paying for
encampments, and added that ensuring families are fed, and
people are paid is an important precedent, and moved beyond
simply handing out money and weapons to officers. He also
observed the DRC is better at playing its weaknesses than its
strengths; rather than committing to building an army, it
will ask neighbors to come and take care of problems.


10. (C) Dhaene provided insight into the most recent EUSEC
discussions on the Congo. The Europeans will continue their
efforts on SST, but only with clear Congolese buy-in. The EU
intends to proceed while setting benchmarks, obtaining
Congolese commitment at the highest level, and moving forward
only after agreement on goals has been reached. He said
natural resources extraction played a role as well. He
suggested that as long as the army was weak and not supported
by the Congolese state, local commanders would stay focused
on profits from regional mines. He mentioned a CNDP mine
that was given to Rwanda in exchange for its recent
intervention. Carter asked how the natural resources
tracking process could be made more efficient. Bodson said
Belgium would continue to push for an Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) solution at upcoming meetings
in Washington and London. The GOB hoped the World Bank would
take over the funding, even if there is little African
interest.

Problems of U.S. and EU Coordination in Africa
-------------- -


11. (C) Carter expressed dismay at the IMF loan given to the
GoDRC with no conditionality, when the Congolese state
collects less than eight percent of potential revenues. He
asked how the international community could hold other
governments accountable when the DRC was given USD 50 billion
with no strings attached. Carter predicted more such grants
from the IFIs if partners do not insist on accountability.


12. (C) Trouveroy mentioned European concern with Senegal's
difficult geographic location, surrounded by problems in
Niger, the Sahel, and the Gulf of Guinea. Acting A/S Carter
explained the U.S. intended to place pressure on the regimes
that come to power after coups, such as Guinea, Mauritania,
and Madagascar. The U.S. pushed for tough sanctions with the
support of the African Union. He expressed dismay at
European decisions to avoid confronting the regimes. Carter
hoped the international community would support AU calls for
sanctions. He also questioned the wisdom of giving EUR 122
million to aregionally-destabilizing pariah regime in
Eritrea. Trouveroy said the gift to Eritrea was a personal
initiative of EU Commissioner for Development Louis Michel,
without elaborating further. Gavin rejoined that President
Obama supported forward engagement and talking to difficult
regimes, but not writing checks of that type. Carter
suggested engagement with principles, and said coups were a
red line. Bodson agreed with Carter's argument and said he
would take his message to FM De Gucht. He admitted Belgium
could play a stronger role in EU deliberations.


13. (C) Carter said the broader question for the United
States would be how to engage with the EU on Africa. He said

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the U.S. and EU should come together on these issues, but
have not yet found common ground. The U.S. is willing to
stand alone against coups and in supporting the AU. He again
expressed disappointment with the EU position, and noted that
coups begat coups. Dhaene asked whether the U.S. was working
with Uganda at the UN on the anti-coup resolution. Carter
said the resolution was unfortunately having difficulty
passing. Trouveroy offered a cynical view that the six
countries with interests in certain parts of Africa were
working against each other. He said that the British and
French foreign ministers would travel to Africa together
soon, but have not told the other members of the Africa Group
what their plans were.


14. Comment: This is the fourth high-level dialogue between
senior U.S. and Belgian officials since January. The
Belgians clearly welcomed Acting A/S Carter's comment that
the new Administration's Africa policy would be based on
openness and cooperation with partners. Belgium has already
shown it is receptive and open to coordinating more closely
with the U.S. on SST in the DRC. End Comment.

BUSH
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