CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE SHOWS COALITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000496

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EUN XG ECON EFIN SENV
SUBJECT: CENTRAL EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE SHOWS COALITION
BUILDING IS KEY TO EU POLICYMAKING

REF: A. BRUSSELS 134

B. BRUSSELS 280

C. BRUSSELS 331

D. BRUSSELS 382

Classified By: USEU POLITICAL M-C CHRIS DAVIS, FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary and Introduction. Experts agree that
effective EU policymaking is driven by coalitions among
member states. They also agree that the Central European
states that joined the EU since 2004 have only recently begun
to employ coalition building. As a corollary, some EU
experts contend that the U.S. could better influence EU
decision-making by identifying coalitions and approaching
bilaterally the key member state within it, prior to
approaching the EU institutions. Some argue that Russia has
shown considerable dexterity at working the EU coalition
building process to block EU consensus. The most effective
coalitions are likely to be dynamic constellations of member
states drawn from Western and Central Europe that share U.S.
positions -- or an openness to support such positions -- on
certain issues. When working with Central European states
in particular, it is important to consider widespread
perceptions in the region that their support of U.S. policies
and initiatives have been taken for granted. As Central
European member states become more experienced and confident
EU members, they are likely to become more independent
actors, underscoring the need for constructive transatlantic
relations with these new member states.


2. (C) This cable is the fifth and final in a series
(REFTELS) looking at how the Central European states that
joined the EU since 2004 -- Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia -- commonly known as the CE-10, are faring
within EU institutions, especially when it comes to
initiating policies in Brussels. End summary and
Introduction.

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Coalition Politics is the Name of the EU Game
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3. (C) On January 22 Poloffs met with a former U.S. offical
now with a thinktank in Brussels to discuss the topic of
Central European activism in the EU. Speaking broadly about
the EU, this U.S. observer noted that he is routinely
surprised at how easy EU institutions are to penetrate and
how malleable they can be if approached with an apt
understanding of the EU coalition building process. Such an
understanding is essential to influence EU policies, he said.
The U.S. observer grouped the new member states from Central
Europe into three groups: 1) those that aspire to influence;
2) those that aspire to influence but cannot; and, 3) those
that do not want to create waves and are largely content to
follow the EU consensus. Poland, he argues, is doing better
at working within the EU than under its previous government
and he believes that if this trend continues Warsaw could
wield the most influence among the new members over time.
Speaking about the other Central European member states, this
contact contends that Romania aspires to influence, but
currently suffers from a lack of credibility, despite its
size. The Czech Republic is trying to build influence and
has a good opportunity to do so with its current EU
Presidency, but the Czechs are hampered by domestic political
maneuverings that are eroding Prague's EU credibility and
influence (Note: Topolanek's government fell after this
discussion. End note.) Hungary does not seem to have much
interest in influencing EU policies and is predominately
focused on its domestic economic and political challenges.
Lithuania is seen as the most active of the Baltic States
within the EU and has shown a willingness to block EU
consensus, even if it must stand alone. For example, after
Warsaw relinquished its de facto veto over the renegotiation
of the EU's Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with
Russia, Vilnius remained the sole holdout.


4. (C) Jim Cloos, Director for General Political Questions
in the General Secretariat of the European Council and an

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astute observer of the EU scene, told Poloffs on March 23
that he has noticed differences among the CE-10 policy
positions on nearly every issue, which result from their
differing economic, historical and cultural experiences.
This, argued Cloos, has prevented CE-10 states from
organizing coalitions on a more geographic basis. As an
example, he pointed to the EU Summit on the economic crisis
on March 1, in which Hungary was effectively isolated from
its Central European peers by Budapest's calls for special
economic bailout assistance. Cloos noted that German
Chancellor Angela Merkel warned the Central Europeans at this
meeting that perceptions matter greatly; she asserted that
such requests would likely trigger capital flights from
countries requesting special assistance. Having argued their
differences, Cloos opined that domestic and economic
priorities on the part of the CE-10 largely prevent them from
taking a more active role on EU external policies. The one
state which he asserted punches above its weight is Poland,
pointing to the Eastern Partnership Initiative, and he noted
that over time, Romania could also begin to show more
activism in the EU. Cloos pointed out that he has already
begun to see signs of this, as Romanian officials are
constantly seeking to raise the profile of Black Sea issues
with the Council.

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EU Decision-Making Often Occurs in
Informal Working Groups
--------------


5. (C) Cloos noted that the increase in the number of member
states and the push for greater openness in decision-making
in the Council has ironically led to less transparency. He
pointed out that policy is often created on the sidelines --
in hallways or at lunches -- of meetings such as the General
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAREC) and the
Political and Security Committee (PSC). The U.S. observer
agreed that EU foreign policy decision-making most often
occurs within informal groupings of "the quad" in which
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as
three to four additional countries on an issue-by-issue
basis, meet to determine the course of EU policy. For
example on the Eastern Partnership Initiative -- largely
judged by local pundits a success of Warsaw's refocused
ability to influence the EU -- Poland, Sweden, and to a
somewhat lesser degree the Czech Republic, joined the quad in
crafting this policy (REF C). On Middle East issues, Spain
plays a role in the key grouping, whereas the new member
states from Central Europe are absent. A similar
circumstance exists on Iran policy, with the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, and now Italy in the lead.

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Opportunities for U.S. to Work within
EU Coalition Building Process
--------------


6. (C) The U.S. observer told Poloffs that some EU
bureaucrats consider Russia to be more adept than the U.S. at
playing the coalition politics game in the EU. He posited
that this is personified by Ambassador Chizhov, who has spent
some twenty years focusing on how the EU works, and is
especially skilled, albeit more often at blocking the EU
consensus process. He added that U.S. diplomats too often
deliver talking points and lack the ability to negotiate and
to conclude deals.


7. (C) The U.S. observer opined that the EU probably would
welcome a more active U.S. policy role on matters of shared
concern, such as energy security, climate change,
democratization and human rights. He noted that Washington
has an opportunity to drive the EU agenda precisely because
of the EU's loose operational style. One way this observer
suggests that this could be realized is by meeting
bilaterally with the various states that matter on a
particular issue in the early stages of policy formulation,
even before approaching EU institutions. Elaborating, he
suggested identifying the member states that can punch above
their weight on particular issues, and then forming
partnerships with a constellation of such states to advance

BRUSSELS 00000496 003 OF 004


or block specific proposals. He was quick to point out that
such initiatives can rarely be crafted exclusively from
groupings of new or old member states; Central European
states need to be attached with more experienced member
states to form shifting coalitions of critical mass. This
U.S. observer posited that the more EU understanding
Washington displays in constructively engaging the EU, the
more pro-U.S. the EU can be.

-------------- --------------
Central Europeans Looking for Greater Respect from the U.S.
as they more Closely Align with Western EU member states
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Marek Evison, Foreign Policy Advisor to Joseph Daul,
Chair of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)
and European Democrats, cautioned Poloff on March 6 that
while working with Central European countries, Washington
needs to resist taking these countries for granted. To
illustrate his point, Evison, a Pole, described unfulfilled
Polish expectations that the U.S. would assist Warsaw with
military modernization. He stressed that where military
assistance has occurred it has been seen as a failure, such
as Poland's F-16 purchase. While Washington may not be able
to compete with the levels of EU financial assistance to the
region, Evison told Poloff that Washington needs to show
Central Europeans that they are respected and appreciated, if
the U.S. is to retain influence in the region. Evison
stressed the importance of student exchanges, and he also
called for more military exchanges, particularly for junior
officers.


9. (C) Piotr Kacznyski, a Policy Fellow at the Centre for
European Policy Studies, told Poloff on March 23 that over
time, Central European states will become more independent
actors, perhaps less interested in working as closely with
the U.S., and instead preferring EU-based partnerships. He
maintained that Central European states almost certainly will
continue partnering with Western EU member states to advance
initiatives -- such as the Polish-Swedish cooperation on the
Eastern Partnership Initiative. On the economic front,
Kaczynski pointed out that the approximate 223 billion
dollars (176.6 billion Euros) of EU Structural and Cohesion
funds available to Central Europe from the EU over the next
seven years (REF D) will bring Central European states living
standards closer to those in Western Europe, possibly
reducing differences in their EU positions on economic and
social issues.


10. (C) Kaczynski asserted that the U.S. maintains
comparative advantage over the EU among Central European
member states in the field of security. He could not
envision the EU being able to sufficiently satisfy Central
European military security concerns in the near to medium
term, and instead thought the U.S. and, to a lesser extent,
NATO, would retain paramount importance in this regard. This
point was underscored in a March 24 meeting with Georgi
Gotev, a Senior Editor with the Brussels based EurActiv media
outlet. Gotev asserted that Washington's role of continued
relevance in Central Europe is as the sole credible security
provider, especially given perceptions in the region that
NATO is already overburdened with Afghanistan. He pointed to
what he judged to be continuing desires of political elites
in the region for U.S. military presences to illustrate his
point: military bases in the case of Romania and Bulgaria and
missile defense launchers and radar site in the case of
Poland and the Czech Republic, respectively. Still, Gotev
recognized that popular support for such initiatives is low,
and convincing skeptical publics of their importance will
prove challenging.


11. (C) Valentina Pop, a journalist with EUObserver.com,
asserted to Poloff on 25 March that many in Central Europe
perceive that the U.S. has "checked off" Central Europe as
fully cemented in the West and that Washington's focus has
shifted elsewhere. She noted this was evidenced by the
significant reductions in U.S. public diplomacy efforts
throughout the region. She cautioned about the risk of
democratic backsliding in some countries. She pointed to
increased popularity of nationalist and extremist parties in

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Bulgaria and Romania after their 2007 EU accession. Pop
judged that the U.S. is a more effective bulwark against
democratic backsliding than the EU, which lot much leverage
after these countries became fll members. Pop argued that
the region is significant because Central European states can
best illustrate to the world that transitions to fully
functioning democracies are possible. She projected that as
Central European states become more effective EU policy
initiators and coalition builders, they will be better able
to advance democracy initiatives in the EU, as Lithuania and
Poland have done on Belarus and the Czech Republic has tried
to do on Cuba. She said she was not surprised that Poland,
which has been one of the quickest to learn how to influence
EU policies, has been effective at getting EU attention and
resources focused on Belarus, its Eastern neighbor, while
Romania has been so far ineffective at elevating its parallel
concern, Moldova. She thought this was an apt comparison,
and argued that concerns over Moldova are equally justified
given the frozen conflict in Transnistria, but noted
disappointingly that this issue gets little traction in
Brussels. (Note: Belarus, too, is viewed by Germany as a
viable economic partner, whereas Moldova is not. End note.)


12. (C) Comment: The accession of the Central European
states to the EU greatly enhances our ability to form and
build coalitions that can sway the policy of the EU as a
whole. Even when they were new to the EU, and relatively
passive, we needed their votes, whether on economic and
environmental policy, where qualified majority voting is the
rule, or in foreign and security policy areas, which require
consensus. But now, five years since their accession, the
Central European member states are becoming more skilled at
playing the EU policy game. We should increasingly consider
playing the game with them, and especially on areas of
greatest concern to them, especially Russia, Ukraine and
other Eastern neighborhood policies; democracy and human
rights promotion; energy security, and climate change (where
they can be a brake on some of the less practical EU
aspirations). Early and frequent consultations with
individual Central European members about how they see the
other EU member states trending on a policy issue,
identification of possible "coalition" allies, quietly
coordinated approaches to influence policy outcomes in
Brussels, will both demonstrate that we do not take these EU
and NATO members for granted, and help ensure that we get the
right results with the EU. End comment.

MURRAY
.