INTRODUCING THE EUROPEAN UNION, PART VI: THE ACCESSION

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 BRUSSELS 000391

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN TU HR CY XH
SUBJECT: INTRODUCING THE EUROPEAN UNION, PART VI: THE ACCESSION
PROCESS

REF: (A) 2008 BRUSSELS 1825; (B) 2008 BRUSSELS 1790
(C) 2008 BRUSSELS 1880 ; (D) BRUSSELS 0108
(E) BRUSSELS 276 ; (F) BRUSSELS 134

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
--------------


1. The EU has been growing from the founding "Six" to the current
EU-27. Enlargement is viewed as one of the EU's most successful
policies and a powerful foreign policy tool for extending a zone of
peace and democracy across the European continent. The tight
conditions for membership and the various stages of the accession
process, as outlined below, allow for no flexibility to depart from
EU standards, rules and practices. Following the unprecedented
accession of ten countries on May 1, 2004, the process continued
with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania at the beginning of 2007.
Croatia and Turkey started accession negotiations in October 2005
and Macedonia was granted candidate status at the end of 2005.
While Croatia aims to complete its negotiations at the end of 2009,
Turkey's progress has been much slower and Macedonia has not yet
been given the green light to start formal talks with the EU. An
even wider Union extending to the whole region of Western Balkans is
already in the cards; however, persisting uncertainties about the
fate of Lisbon Treaty reforms and a widespread enlargement "fatigue"
among EU governments and public opinion are casting doubts on the
pace and the limits of further expansion.


2. This message -- the sixth in a series updating our USEU cables
-- is meant to help officers in positions requiring a good knowledge
and understanding of the EU machinery. Other cables in this series
discuss the history of the European Union (Ref A); the chief
political institutions of the EU (Commission, Council and Parliament
- Ref B),the EU Presidency and the European Council (Ref C); the
judicial, financial, supervisory and advisory bodies (Ref D); the
Treaties, structure and legal order (Ref E); and EU-U.S. cooperation
under the Transatlantic dialogue (SEPTEL). End Summary and
Introduction.

FROM SIX TO TWENTY-SEVEN
--------------


3. Enlargement is often presented by the EU itself as one of its
most successful policies and a powerful foreign policy tool,
extending a zone of peace and democracy across Europe. The original
six-member group of 1951 (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands) has already undergone six successive
enlargements (not including the 1991 unification of Germany) to:

-- Denmark, Ireland and the UK (1973);
-- Greece (1981);
-- Portugal and Spain (1986);
-- Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995);
-- Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia (May 1, 2004); and
-- Bulgaria and Romania (January 1, 2007).

ACCESSION CRITERIA
--------------


4. Per the EU Treaty, any European state may apply to become a
member of the Union. The Treaty fails to provide any definition of
what is meant by a "European state," leaving open the issue of the
EU's final borders. (Note: an application for membership submitted
by Morocco in the early 1980s was rejected on the ground that the
applicant was not a "European state." End note.) Nor does the
Treaty itself lay down detailed political and economic conditions
for membership. The first clearly-defined rules for membership
were established at a June 1993 meeting of the European Council in
Copenhagen and are referred to as the "Copenhagen criteria":

- Political: Achievement of stable institutions guaranteeing
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for
minorities;

- Economic: Existence of a functioning market economy and capacity
to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the
EU;

- Administrative: Ability to take on the obligations of
membership.


5. The 1995 Madrid European Council established a further
requirement that a candidate country must have created the
conditions for its integration through the adjustment of its
administrative structures. This means that, while it is important
that the EU body of law (the "acquis") be transposed into national
legislation, it is even more important that the legislation be
implemented effectively through appropriate administrative and
judicial structures.

HOW TO JOIN THE EU
--------------

BRUSSELS 00000391 002 OF 007




6. The basic aim of accession negotiations is, indeed, to ensure
that the candidate country is able to adopt and implement the
"acquis" by the time of accession. The implication is that new
members must abide by the whole EU body of law, including the case
law of the European Court of Justice. In some cases, where specific
difficulties make it impossible for the candidate to apply the
"acquis" fully from accession date, the EU can accept transition
measures. Derogations take the form of transition periods that the
EU grants to a newcomer to bring its legislation and practices in
line with the "acquis."


7. In essence, the membership criteria are non-negotiable, a key
feature for a correct understanding of the enlargement process. Any
derogation is strictly limited in scope and duration. The
derogations are negotiated with the candidate country as part of the
accession terms and conditions enshrined in the Accession Treaty.
Unlike some of the former EU-15, the ten plus two Member States that
joined in 2004 and 2007 had no recourse to simply "opt out" of any
EU policies, and are committed to eventually join European Monetary
Union and Schengen (some of them already did). The EU itself can
also seek temporary derogations to the application of EU policies to
the candidates, such as the free movement of labor into the EU.
Workers from the new Central and Eastern European countries did not
get immediate access to all EU labor markets after accession.


8. Though the legal basis for the process of enlarging the Union
can be found in the EU Treaty, its various stages have been
determined in a piecemeal fashion:

- An application for membership is addressed to the EU Council (the
Presidency),which asks the Commission to assess the applicant's
ability to meet the conditions of membership.

- The Council/European Council unanimously pronounces on the
Commission's opinion (the "avis"). The Council is not required to
follow the Commission's opinion. In the case of Greece, the Council
decided to overcome an unfavorable "avis" from the Commission.

- If the Commission delivers a positive opinion, and the Council
unanimously agrees a negotiating mandate, negotiations may be
formally opened between the candidate and all the Member States.

- As illustrated by the most recent cases of Turkey, Croatia and
Macedonia, the Council may also grant an applicant country the
status of EU "candidate" without agreeing to the immediate opening
of negotiations on accession terms. The candidate status is a
political recognition of a closer relationship with the EU, but does
not automatically mean that the aspirant may hope to join in a near
future.
- Moreover, the opening of accession talks requires the definition
of a negotiating framework for their conduct. This covers practical
arrangements for the negotiating sessions, the frequency of
meetings, chairmanship, etc., but could also address sensitive
political issues.

- The accession procedure per se starts with a "screening" process,
a careful and very detailed analysis by the Commission of the
legislation of the candidate country to identify differences with
the EU "acquis" that will need to be corrected by the candidate.
This is best undertaken within the framework of the contractual
links existing between the EU and the candidate country.

- Negotiations on accession terms take the form of a bilateral
conference between the EU Member States and the candidate country
with the Commission acting as the EU negotiating agent. The
negotiations take place either at senior official or
ministerial-level conferences that address one or several of the
policy chapters forming the EU body of law. Talks focus on the
terms under which candidates will adopt, implement and enforce the
"acquis." The bilateral negotiations cover all policy areas of EU
competence (over 80,000 pages of the "acquis"),broken down into
"chapters." There are 35 chapters in the ongoing negotiations with
Turkey and Croatia.

- For each chapter, the Commission makes proposals to the Council
for a "common position" of the EU. After submission to the
Enlargement Working Group of the Council, a draft common position is
put for consultation among Member States. All decisions on EU
common positions must be reached by unanimity in the Council (in
practice, the EU PermReps, meeting in COREPER (French acronym for
Council of Permanent Representatives)). Only then can it be
formally presented to the candidate country.

- The negotiating position of the candidate country is a
chapter-specific document adopted by the government that explains
the state of the country's legislation in that field, the extent to
which the "acquis" has been transposed into domestic law or the time
limit within which legislation is to be adopted. Where for
political, budgetary, economic or social reasons a given provision
of the "acquis" cannot become part of domestic legislation before
accession date, the candidate country may ask for a transition

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period, specifying its duration and the manner of full
transposition. The two sides then come to agreement on each
chapter.

- The final accession terms are the subject of an agreement between
the EU countries and the applicant. The Treaty of Accession
includes an "Accession Protocol" detailing the conditions and
arrangements for accession as well as "Accession Act" covering
adjustments to the EU institutions to make room for the new
member(s),e.g. voting rights in the Council, number of members in
the European Parliament, etc. For those countries that joined in
2004, a single "Accession Treaty" covered the terms of accession for
all ten. The same applied to the accession terms agreed with
Bulgaria and Romania.


9. When signed, the Accession Treaty remains subject to a
ratification procedure by the EU countries and each candidate
country, in accordance with their respective constitutional
requirements. It also requires the assent of the European
Parliament, which acts by an absolute majority of its members. The
completion of such ratification procedures normally takes at least
12-18 months from the end of negotiations and signing of the treaty.
EU Member States generally do not have a tradition of organizing a
referendum on the accession of new countries. France, which had
made an exception (for the UK) in 1972, reformed its Constitution in
2005 so that its ratification of future EU accession treaties would
require the organization of a referendum; however, a new amendment
in 2008 allowed for the French President not to enforce this
provision. Although most of the newest EU members had no
constitutional obligation to organize a referendum, a great majority
of them put their accession terms to voters.

NOTHING IS AGREED UNTIL EVERYTHING IS AGREED
--------------


10. Given the evolving character of the EU body of law, accession
negotiations are by no means a static process. The domestic
legislation of the candidate country must be further screened to
check its conformity with the evolving EU "acquis." The accession
negotiations are governed by other principles. One of them is that
each negotiation with a candidate proceeds on the basis of "its own
merits". Another is that as long as the negotiations continue and
until everything is agreed, nothing is agreed. In the language of
the negotiators, agreement on accession terms for a specific chapter
allows that chapter to be "provisionally closed," implying that
either side - the EU or the candidate - may come back with questions
on the chapter concerned and ask for further clarifications or a
reopening of talks on the issue.


11. The list of "provisionally closed" chapters is therefore an
easy but superficial way to assess the state of the accession
negotiations. Throughout the negotiations and up to accession, the
Commission (DG Enlargement) monitors the actual progress made by a
candidate in its preparations for membership. Comprehensive
assessments of a candidate's preparations are provided by the
Commission's annual reports that contain a detailed analysis of the
fulfillment of accession criteria. This monitoring is an integral
part of the accession process, as progress in the negotiations is
heavily dependent on concrete progress in the candidate's practices.
The pace of each negotiation therefore basically depends on the
degree of preparation by the candidate and on the complexity of the
issues to be resolved (hence the different pace of the talks with
Croatia and Turkey). For this reason, forecasting the duration of
accession negotiations is imprecise, and often merely a statement of
political intention.

BIGGEST ENLARGEMENT EVER
--------------


12. With the accession of ten Central and Eastern countries whose
aggregate level of welfare was well below the EU average, the Union
had to cope with wide regional disparities, differences in wage
rates and purchasing power. The accession terms for the newest
members provided for gradual access to the EU's system of direct
payments and common market organizations under the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP),EU funding under regional and structural
policy instruments (means of wealth redistribution),as well as
funds to improve nuclear safety, public administration and border
protection. The EU financial framework for 2007-2013 allowed for
such transfers and the accession terms ensured that new members
would be "net beneficiaries" in the years following accession; i.e.,
they should get more out of the EU budget than they contribute. The
countries that joined in 2004 were not expected to immediately adopt
the euro (Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus and Slovakia have all now done
so). In addition to adapting the EU's legislation to ensure that
its national central bank is considered independent, a newcomer also
has to demonstrate that its key economic indicators converge with
those of the monetary union members.


13. All through the negotiating process with Cyprus (Nicosia),the
EU refused to make accession of the island contingent on a
settlement of the intra-community dispute. In the continued absence

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of a Cyprus settlement, the application of the "acquis" to the
Northern part of the island was suspended until the Council decides
otherwise by unanimous decision.

NEWCOMERS STILL HAVE PROBLEMS
--------------


14. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania had been envisaged from
the start as part of the big wave of enlargement to the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. Both countries, which were lagging
behind, joined later than the "ten" on January 1, 2007; however, the
decision was political and accession took place under strict
conditions and safeguards. While honoring its long-standing
commitment, the EU became increasingly determined not to compromise
on its principle of "conditionality." Both countries continue to be
monitored closely for progress in fighting corruption and organized
crime, ensuring food safety, and making proper use of EU funds. The
review has clearly not been satisfactory, especially in the case of
Bulgaria, whose persistent failure to correct its management
problems already cost the country more than 200 million EUR in EU
payments with several hundred million EUR also being frozen. Some
EU watchers suggest the strict enforcement of "conditionality"
reassures EU public opinion and governments that are resisting
further enlargement, and cautions Turkey and Western Balkan nations
lobbying for accession. Nonetheless, others staunchly oppose
further accession any time in the near future.

EU CANDIDATES: CROATIA, TURKEY AND MACEDONIA
--------------


15. On October 3, 2005, the EU agreed to open accession
negotiations with Croatia and Turkey, ending months of debate on
whether both countries had fulfilled their respective requirements
to do so. Croatia had received candidate status in June 2004, but
the EU had made the opening of talks subject to Croatia "cooperating
fully" with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Turkey, which first applied in 1959 and has been
in association with the (then) European Economic Community since
1963, obtained candidate status in December 1999. It took several
more years, marked by continued EU calls for more Turkish reforms
and protracted differences over the Cyprus issue, before accession
talks were opened. Even so, the EU's negotiating framework
specifies that the negotiations with Turkey are "an open-ended
process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed." (Note: There
has been no case in EU history where accession negotiations, once
started, have not led to an offer of full membership. End note).


16. Since the start of the negotiations in October 2005, Croatia
managed to open 22 chapters out of the 35 chapters into which the
negotiations are divided and to provisionally close seven of them
(status as of March 2009). The progress of negotiations in 2008 was
hindered by a dispute between EU member Slovenia and Croatia over an
unresolved border issue. Many chapters said to be "technically
ready" for provisional closure remain on hold, due to Slovenia's
opposition. A mediation effort to solve the dispute was recently
initiated by the Commission.

17. Croatia is aiming to wrap up its accession negotiations by the
end of the Barroso Commission's term in November 2009; however, the
EU only sees the date as part of an indicative and conditional road
map meant to help Croatia make the outstanding efforts required.
Croatia's progress toward the final stage of the negotiations
therefore depends on its completion of the necessary political,
economic, legislative and administrative reforms. Taking account of
the necessary delays for drawing the Accession Treaty, signing and
completing national ratification procedures in all Member States,
and persisting uncertainties related to the Treaty of Lisbon (some
countries, led by France and Germany, making Croatia's accession
dependent upon entry into force of Lisbon reforms),Croatia cannot
hope to join before 2010-2011 at the earliest.


18. Turkey, which received candidate status in December 1999, was
able provisionally to conclude just one chapter (Science and
Research) and to open ten out of 35 chapters in its EU accession
talks (status at end of 2008). Moreover, under a December 2006
internal decision on the handling of its negotiations with Turkey,
the EU will not open eight policy chapters seen as related to
Turkey's persisting restrictions vis-`-vis Cyprus and will not close
any other chapter until Turkey fulfills its obligations of
non-discriminatory implementation vis-`-vis Cyprus of the Additional
Protocol to its Association Agreement with the European Community.
The eight chapters are: Free Movement of Goods, Right of
Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services, Financial Services,
Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy,
Customs Union and External Relations. The EU Council noted in
December 2008 that Turkey has not made progress toward normalization
of its relations with Cyprus. The EU also expects Turkey to
"actively support the ongoing negotiations aimed at a fair,
comprehensive and viable settlement of the Cyprus problem within the
U.N. framework."


19. While recognizing the strategic importance of Turkey and the
fact that Turkey "is now a viable market economy," the EU

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governments and the Commission continue to call for a review of
Turkey's constitutional rules. They insist that participants in
Turkish politics work to resolve their differences in a spirit of
dialogue and compromise, respecting the rule of law and fundamental
freedoms, while pursuing the reform process. The EU is calling for
further "substantial efforts to ensure that Turkey meets the
Copenhagen criteria" in several fields, such as "continued judicial
reform, establishing an anti-corruption strategy, effective
protection of citizens' rights, full implementation of the policy of
zero tolerance of torture and ill-treatment, ensuring freedom of
expression and of religion in law and in practice for all religious
communities, respect for and protection of minorities and
strengthening trade union and women's rights."


20. EU leaders from the start of the accession negotiations with
Turkey made it clear that the country's accession could not be
envisaged before the implementation of the EU financial framework
starting in 2014. With the 2007 election as French President of
Nicolas Sarkozy, who repeatedly expressed his opposition to Turkey's
membership of the EU, further doubts have been raised on the outcome
and timetable of the process. In the meantime, EU governments
accepted the Commission's recommendation to pursue the negotiations
and to take a final decision on the accession, or not, of Turkey
once the negotiations are completed.


21. At the end of 2005, the European Council granted Macedonia the
status of candidate country, based on a Commission's recommendation.
As of March 2009, no date has been set yet for the actual start of
accession negotiations. This will depend on the country's ability
to meet its obligations under the Stabilization and Association
Agreement (see below) and to comply sufficiently with the membership
criteria. The Commission will continue to assess the progress made
by Macedonia and report to the member states. But the decision on
candidacy status was a political signal to the whole region of
Western Balkans, giving these countries a clear European
perspective.

POTENTIAL CANDIDATES
--------------


22. A wider EU is already in the cards. At the November 2000
Zagreb Summit, leaders from the EU and the Western Balkans countries
confirmed their commitment to the Stabilization and Association
Process (SAP),a strategy explicitly linked to the prospect of EU
accession and adjusted to the level of development of each of the
countries concerned. In return for receiving the accession prospect
and assistance to achieve it, the countries concerned -- the EU
candidates Croatia and Macedonia, as well as Serbia-Montenegro (now
two separate countries),Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania -- undertook
to meet the political and economic requirements set for all
aspirants. Though the UN-sponsored status talks on Kosovo resulted
in no agreement, and the ensuing unilateral declaration of
independence was not the subject of unanimous recognition by EU
countries, the Republic of Kosovo remains part of the EU's strategy
vis-a-vis Western Balkans, formally under UNSCR 1244. European
integration is said to be "essential to reinforce the security and
stability of the region."


23. The SAP proved a success in laying foundations for faster
reforms. At their June 2003 Summit in Thessaloniki, EU leaders
reaffirmed their commitment to the integration of the Western
Balkans countries and the SAP was enriched to bring these countries
closer to the EU through new instruments such as the European
Partnerships, inspired by the Accession Partnerships that had been
designed for the countries bound to join in 2004. The Annual Report
on the Stabilization and Association Process (released by the
Commission in the fall) is a key instrument to assess the readiness
of the Western Balkans countries to move closer to the EU. The
report takes stock of progress made by the individual countries,
monitors the development of regional cooperation and assesses the
impact of the Stabilization and Association instruments.

PRE-ACCESSION STRATEGY AND ACCESSION PARTNERSHIPS
-------------- --------------


24. In order to assist a candidate country to carry out reforms to
fulfill the accession criteria and prepare for managing and
absorbing EU funds post-accession, the EU provides financial and
technical assistance. The pre-accession strategy defines for each
candidate the short-and medium-term priorities to be met.
Pre-accession financial support is devoted to meeting these
priorities. For the Central and Eastern European countries that
joined in 2004, pre-accession financial assistance included
instruments such as PHARE (which essentially supported institution
building),ISPA (development of environment and transport
infrastructure) and SAPARD (agricultural and rural development
support). For Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, the EU developed other
pre-accession instruments.


25. Pre-accession assistance to Turkey is being provided under the
EU's new single instrument for financial cooperation. Projects
funded under the program are accession-driven; i.e., targeted to

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assist Turkey in complying with priorities set out in an Accession
Partnership. Turkey carries out these projects with prior approval
and/or ex-post evaluation by the Commission, an approach applying to
all candidates. Like other candidates, Turkey can also obtain loans
from the European Investment Bank (EIB).


26. For the countries of the Western Balkans, the Commission also
proposed a road map setting out the stages and conditions attached
to each stage of their "European perspective." Establishing a
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) covering both
trade/economic and political dialogue with the EU is a fundamental
step in this process. All Western Balkan countries have now
concluded such SAAs, though ratification of the SAA with Serbia
remains subject to completion of national ratification procedures.
Some member States (the Netherlands, in particular),who laid
particular emphasis on Serbia's full cooperation with the Hague
tribunal (ICTY),continue to make the entry into force of the SAA
with Serbia contingent upon the arrest and transfer to the ICTY of
Serbian war criminal General Mladic. A country's track record in
implementing its SAA obligations is a key element for the EU to
consider any membership application. Based on a Commission opinion,
the EU may grant a country the status of candidate. Croatia and
Macedonia, which signed SAAs in 2001, have been using this path to
make headway toward EU integration. Montenegro formally submitted
its application in December 2008; as of early March 2009, the
Council had still not referred the application to the Commission for
its opinion. Albania also hinted at the prospect of submitting an
application in the near future, though EU officials have been wary
to encourage any hasty move.

ICELAND AND OTHER POTENTIAL MEMBERS
--------------


27. In Iceland, where the majority of political and labor forces
and public opinion long believed that the cost of joining would
outweigh the benefits of EU membership, the terms of the debate
suddenly changed with the financial turmoil in fall 2008 as the
country was particularly hard hit by the liquidity crisis. Key
players in the political class are now looking to have Iceland join
the EU. Enlargement Commissioner Rehn encouraged them by stating
that negotiations on Iceland's membership terms would definitely be
"much faster than with other countries that do not have such strong
ties to the EU." This is because the country's relations to the EU
are based on membership to the European Economic Area (EEA),which
implies participation in the EU single market.


28. Other countries have long been considered as potential EU
members. Norway applied twice, in 1967 and 1992, but both times a
national referendum rejected membership after negotiations were
completed. Switzerland applied in 1992 but a referendum the same
year on joining the European Economic Area (EEA) failed, forcing
Bern to shelve its application.

EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY
--------------


29. The EU also has stated its readiness to enhance relations with
close neighbors. The so-called European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
was designed in the early 2000s for a wide range of countries,
including Ukraine, Moldova and other former Soviet republics as well
as Southern Mediterranean partners. The aim was to offer these
neighbors a chance to develop greater political, security, economic
and cultural cooperation with the EU, but the EU always refrained
from making any membership commitment vis-`-vis any of these
countries (and actually rejected Morocco's bid in the 1980's). A
clear indication is the fact that ENP is part (in the current
Barroso Commission) of the portfolio of Commissioner
Ferrero-Waldner, who is responsible for the EU's External Relations,
whereas Enlargement Commissioner Rehn separately handles relations
with Turkey and the Western Balkans.


30. In 2008, the EU under French pressure established a new Union
for the Mediterranean (official title: "Barcelona Process: Union for
the Mediterranean") for developing ties with its Southern neighbors.
The EU leaders also agreed to strengthen ties with the EU's Eastern
partners under the ENP (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Belarus). Aimed at enhancing cooperation both on
bilateral and multilateral levels, this "Eastern Partnership"
initiative will be developed and launched in the first half of 2009,
based on a differentiated approach with each partner (REF F). The
EU would offer new Association Agreements to partner countries
willing to take on far-reaching commitments such as acquis-like
legislative and regulatory reforms (e.g. on market access and energy
security) and that meet the essential requirements of ENP.

WHERE SHOULD THE EU END?
--------------


31. The issue of the final borders, which has always been a
political taboo, continues to haunt the Union. The EU leaders
recently set up an independent "Reflection Group" to advise the EU
on its long-term future and to "meet challenges more effectively" on

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the horizon 2020-2030. The idea of such a panel, headed by former
Spanish PM Felipe Gonzalez, originally came from French President
Sarkozy, who was willing to engage in a discussion of the EU's
geographical limitations. Pro-enlargement countries (including the
UK, the Czech Republic and the Nordics) and the Commission were
suspicious of a proposal perceived as intended to stop the
enlargement process and to shift EU policy against Turkish
membership. The Portuguese Presidency in the second half of 2007
then proposed to give the panel a broadly-worded mandate that
avoided sensitive issues, including any specific reference to the
EU's future borders. The establishment of the panel nevertheless
owed much to the need to enlist French support for the continuation
of the accession talks with Turkey.

LEAVING THE EU
--------------

32. No country ever stated its intention of leaving the EU and
there is no "exit clause" in the Treaty order as currently
effective. However, with the Treaty of Lisbon (not fully ratified
and not in force yet) the EU equipped itself for the first time with
such an exit clause, stating that any Member State may withdraw from
the EU. This would be done in accordance with that country's
constitutional requirements. More specifically, the Treaty of
Lisbon sets out a mechanism for negotiation and conclusion of a
withdrawal agreement with the other Member States. The Member State
concerned has to notify the Commission of its intention and then
negotiate on the terms. The withdrawal agreement is oncluded on
behalf of the Union by the Counci, acting by a qualified majority
after obtaining the consent of the EP. The EU legal framework then
ceases to apply to the country concerned, which will be allowed to
reapply for membership in the future, subject to the accession
procedure as described in this cable.

COMMENT
--------------


33. The pull of the EU has been a powerful leverage for
transforming former Communist countries in Europe. The EU and its
Member States can only benefit from having neighbors that are
democratic and prosperous market economies, but they need to
communicate better on the objectives and challenges of accession
processes. Some leaders in the EU fear that ongoing expansion might
hinder the Union's ability to function as a coherent whole. While
stating its willingness to honor commitments, the EU has therefore
been increasingly determined to ensure that aspirant countries can
only proceed from one stage of the rapprochement process to the next
once they have strictly met the conditions for that stage. The
latest enlargement package tabled by the Commission in fall 2008
reflects this delicate balancing act, for which Enlargement
Commissioner Rehn has proved a deft advocate.

MURRAY