Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS361
2009-03-13 14:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

IRAN: MARCH 3 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S.

Tags:  PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000361 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, ISN, EUR/ERA, EEB, AND NEA/IRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019
TAGS: PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: MARCH 3 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S.
POLICY REVIEW

REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 174

B. B) BRUSSELS 205

Classified By: Chris Davis, USEU Political-Minister Counselor for reaso
ns 1.5(d) and (e)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 000361

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, ISN, EUR/ERA, EEB, AND NEA/IRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2019
TAGS: PREL KNNC ETTC ETRD EFIN IR EUN
SUBJECT: IRAN: MARCH 3 EU DEBATE ON SANCTIONS AND U.S.
POLICY REVIEW

REF: A. A) BRUSSELS 174

B. B) BRUSSELS 205

Classified By: Chris Davis, USEU Political-Minister Counselor for reaso
ns 1.5(d) and (e)


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: On March 3, EU Political and Securty
Council Ambassadors held an inconclusive debate on Iran
policy with a view toward framing a response to the U.S. Iran
policy review. Council Secretariat DirGen Robert Cooper
circulated a draft paper detailing the purely military nature
of the Iranian nuclear program. While no one disputed its
contents, some expressed uncertainly about time estimates for
Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. Cooper,
supported by the EU-3, Italy, Poland, and Hungary argued that
bigger sticks were needed to match bigger carrots that may
soon be offered to Iran by the United States. All 27 member
states intervened in the debate, largely along familiar
lines. However, in a departure from previous discussions,
Cyprus, Sweden, Spain and Greece all attempted to establish a
link between Iran's decision to pursue a nuclear capability
and the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process.
Some EU member states also underscored the importance of
pursuing dialogue with Iran and other regional players on
Afghanistan and Iraq. END SUMMARY.

Solana's Deputy Urges EU to Prepare to Act
--------------

2. (C//NF) Over the last week, friendly EU and a third
country contacts provided detailed read-outs of the March 3
EU-27 Political and Security Council (PSC) Ambassadors debate
on Iran policy. Robert Cooper, Council Secretariat Director
General (and Deputy to High Rep Solana on Iran nuclear
negotiations),distributed to member states a written
assessment of developments in Iran's nuclear program that
pointed to a purely military purpose. No one in the room
disputed the conclusion of the paper or its underlying
analysis. However, some PSC Ambassadors expressed uncertainly
about time estimates for Iran to achieve a nuclear weapons
capability. Reprising his argument from the February 6 PSC

debate on Iran (REF B),Cooper noted that the diplomatic
track had not succeeded thus far, and that international
effort had to succeed this year in making Iran an offer it
could not refuse. The United States needed to design carrots
as well as coercive measures Iran would not be able to stand.
For its part, the EU needed to act urgently to prepare
bigger sticks, including new designations of Iranian banks
and other entities, to be helpful to the U.S. effort.

Member State Interventions
--------------

3. (C//NF) All 27 EU member states' representatives
reportedly intervened in the inconclusive debate. Following
are the highlights reported by EU and third country contacts:


4. (C//NF) Cyprus, Greece, and Sweden all spoke to Iran's
possible motivations for pursuing a nuclear capability. The
three countries suggested that Iran's intentions and
calculations were linked to insecurity in the Middle East and
the lack of progress in the peace process. Cyprus and Greece
further asserted that Iran wanted a nuclear weapon because of
Israel's presumed nuclear capability and for greater prestige
in the region. They stressed the importance of two
incentives: improving regional stability and the need for a
USG security guarantee for Iran. Sweden (which takes over
the EU Presidency in July) agreed that the U.S needed to
engage Iran directly on Afghanistan and Iraq. The Swedes
also believed the EU should talk to Gulf states, Turkey and
Israel about the nexus of the regional situation and the
nuclear standoff. The Irish PSC rep believed the EU should
approach the U.S. regarding "positive engagement" with Iran.
Several member states also spoke of the need to get China and
Russia on board. Slovenia specifically supported action
through the UN Security Council.


5. (C//NF) Spain doubted that Tehran would offer a response
to any U.S. or P5 1 offer of engagement until after the
Iranian Presidential elections in June. Ireland bemoaned the
fact that Iran seemed unwilling and unmoved by anything on
offer thus far and that it had the capacity to "spoil Lebanon

BRUSSELS 00000361 002 OF 002


and Gaza." Portugal agreed that sanctions had failed to
"bother" Iran thus far. Furthermore, the Portuguese
suggested that the threshold for firmer sanctions should be
Iranian moves to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and kick out IAEA monitors.


6. (C//NF) Conversely, Italy, the UK, Germany, Poland, and
Hungary all expressed support for quick action on tougher
sanctions. Cooper emphasized that the international
community needed to succeed this year. He pointed out that
failure would mean facing two bad options: the military
option (by the United States, Israel or some form of
coalition); or a nuclear Iran (leading to regional nuclear
proliferation and some kind of fragile mutual deterrence
between Iran and Israel). The French PSC Ambassador added
that a nuclear-armed Iran posed a security threat to Europe
because Shahab missiles could reach European territory.

COMMENT
--------------

7. (C//NF) The arguments presented by the EU's pro- and
anti-sanctions camps are strikingly different: time-definite
and security-driven versus abstract, political and
open-ended. The PSC's inconclusive policy debate took place
only hours before a U.S. Treasury delegation presentation to
over 70 EU member state experts on targeting illicit conduct
by specific Iranian financial and transport entities
(septels). While it is too soon to gauge the impact of the
USDel's presentation, we are confident that its pointed
message on the need for tougher EU sanctions reached all 27
EU capitals as well as PSC Ambassadors. The Czechs have not
placed Iran on the agendas of the GAERC (EU-27 Fonmins) or
European Council meetings, March 16 and 19 respectively.
However, it is possible that member state could exchange
views on Iran at the informal foreign ministers meeting (aka
"the Gymnich") on March 27-28. END COMMENT.
MURRAY
.