Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BRUSSELS331
2009-03-11 18:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USEU Brussels
Cable title:  

CENTRAL EUROPEANS DRIVE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP BUT

Tags:  PREL PGOV KDEM EUN XG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6777
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0331/01 0701803
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111803Z MAR 09
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000331 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EUN XG
SUBJECT: CENTRAL EUROPEANS DRIVE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP BUT
FACE FINANCIAL OBSTACLES

REF: A. BRUSSELS 134

B. BRUSSELS 280

C. BRUSSELS 277

Classified By: USEU POLITICAL M-C CHRIS DAVIS, FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000331

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM EUN XG
SUBJECT: CENTRAL EUROPEANS DRIVE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP BUT
FACE FINANCIAL OBSTACLES

REF: A. BRUSSELS 134

B. BRUSSELS 280

C. BRUSSELS 277

Classified By: USEU POLITICAL M-C CHRIS DAVIS, FOR REASONS 1.4(b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary and introduction: Experts on EU policy
development point to the EU's Eastern Partnership Initiative
as the most successful example of how Central European member
states have been able to influence EU foreign policy to date.
The Eastern Partnership is designed to encourage political
and economic stability in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Belarus, while over time bringing these
countries closer to the EU. Originally a Czech concept, the
plan came to life when Poland partnered with Sweden to win EU
support. The plan will officially be launched by the Czech
EU presidency at a summit on May 7 in Prague. As a model of
how to advance a member state's policy interests in Brussels,
the Eastern Partnership Initiative is evidence that Warsaw is
becoming more effective at influencing EU policies. Although
Eastern Partnership is officially endorsed by the European
Council, support for it varies among the EU member states,
however, due largely to competition over financial resources
for Neighborhood programs in the Mediterranean and Black Sea
regions. The global economic slowdown is prompting the EU's
largest budget contributing states to look increasingly
inward even as the Eastern neighborhood requires more
financial assistance to ensure stability. Some of the member
states' enthusiasm for the project has also been tempered by
concerns over negative Russian reactions to increased EU
activism in the post-Soviet sphere.


2. (C) This cable is the third in a series (REF A and B)
looking at how the Central European states that joined the EU
since 2004 -- Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia --
commonly known as the CE-10, are faring within EU
institutions, especially when it comes to initiating policies
in Brussels. End summary and Introduction.

--------------
Eastern Partnership Aims to Bring
Post Soviet States Closer to EU
--------------


3. (C) Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, Policy Fellows with
the European Council on Foreign Relations, recently asserted
to Poloff that the Eastern Partnership Initiative is the most
successful example of Central European states' impact on EU
foreign policy to date. The Eastern Partnership Initiative
was presented to the EU's General Affairs and External
Relations Council in Brussels on May 26, 2008 by Polish
Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, with assistance from Sweden,
and accepted by the European Council on June 20, 2008. The
Eastern Partnership was designed to provide an
institutionalized forum for discussing visa agreements, free
trade deals, and strategic partnership agreements with the
EU's eastern neighbors, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine. A bureaucratic challenge concerning
where Eastern Partnership fits within the European
Neighborhood Policy lingers. Local EU observers speculate
that organizational shuffling may occur after this autumn,
when the new Commission is seated. Presently, unlike the
Union for the Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership does not
have its own secretariat, but is set to be managed directly
by the European Commission.


4. (SBU) Although Warsaw has sought the inclusion of Belarus
in the Eastern Partnership Initiative, a particularly
sensitive issue given the Polish minority there, its level of
participation remains uncertain. Although a senior policy
advisor to the Council Secretariat told us in late February
that Belarus's inclusion in Eastern Partnership is "a
foregone conclusion," statements from the Czech EU Presidency
have indicated otherwise. Czech Foreign Minister Karel
Schwarzenberg on February 23 in Brussels noted uncertainties
about Belarus's inclusion in Eastern Partnership, and he
specifically warned Minsk not to recognize South Ossetia or
Abkhazia, which he said would put Belarus "out of the
European consensus" (REF C). At a conference sponsored by
the European Parliament on March 4, Jacek Protasiewicz,
Chairman of the Delegation on Relations with Belarus within
the European Parliament, Helga Schmid, Director of the Policy
Unit of the General Secretariat in the EU Council, and Hugues
Mingarelli, Deputy Director of the DG RELEX in the European
Commission all cautioned that Belarus's progress, especially
on releasing political prisoners and allowing two independent

BRUSSELS 00000331 002 OF 003


media outlets to register, can be easily reversed. The
Council and Commission representatives called for systemic
improvements in the areas of free and fair elections, freedom
of speech, assembly and association, and cancellation of
certain elements of a new criminal code, whose provisions,
they argued, would make it easier for the regime to prosecute
political dissenters. In the presence of the Belarusian
Ambassador to the EU, Uladzimir Syanko, Mingarelli outlined
all the carrots that the Commission is prepared to offer
Minsk, provided steady progress on democratization and human
rights standards continue. Syanko responded by saying that
Belarus would only welcome an EU partnership without
preconditions, and criticized the EU's "excessive focus on
spreading democracy."

--------------
Poland's Growing EU Expertise
Makes Eastern Partnership a Reality
--------------


5. (C) Policy Fellow Andrew Wilson noted that the Eastern
Partnership is an excellent case study of how best to advance
a member state's initiative in the EU and demonstrates
Warsaw's growing expertise of the EU system. He pointed out
that Eastern Partnership was originally a Czech idea, but
that Warsaw proved successful where the Czechs did not
because of Poland's larger size and its proven ability to
multiply its influence through coalition building.
Separately, David Kral, Director of Europeum, a Prague-based
EU policy think-tank, asserted that Prague failed to lead on
Eastern Partnership because the Czechs presented the first
proposal to the European Council "quite clumsily and
unilaterally." Kral claimed that the idea of Eastern
Partnership was born in the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs
while the Czechs held the presidency of the Visegrad regional
grouping, and maintained that the Czechs later passed the
concept to the Poles. (Note: The Visegrad Group includes the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. End note.)
Popescu asserted that what really rocketed Poland's Eastern
Partnership efforts was its decision to partner with Sweden,
which significantly enhanced the proposal's credibility among
member states. While the Czech Republic and Lithuania have
certainly been active interlocutors on Eastern issues in the
EU, a move by Poland to partner exclusively with those states
probably would have been perceived in Brussels as a "New
Europe" versus "Old Europe" approach. Indeed, Wilson noted
that more established member states still harbor the
perception that Central European states are troublemakers
when it comes to eastern policies. Secondly, a coalition of
only new member states probably would have added credence to
Russian suspicions that Eastern Partnership is an attempt by
the new member states to undermine Moscow's influence in the
region. Popescu asserted that the Eastern Partnership
Initiative represents a successful model in the art of EU
coalition building, which the Central European states are
likely to emulate in future efforts to influence EU policies.

--------------
Differing Regional Preferences
and Budgetary Concerns Remain Obstacles
--------------


6. (C) Poloff met on February 24 with Piotr Kaczynski, a
Research Fellow with the Centre for European Policy Studies.
Kaczynski posited that, even though Eastern Partnership has
been accepted by the Council, it is likekly to be
underfunded. Poland and other supportive member states, he
said, will need to shore up backing for the initiative from
other member states. Kaczynski explained that although
Poland, Sweden, the Czech Republic and Lithuania completely
support the project, Bulgaria and Romania remain lukewarm.
They view it as competitor for EU resources for their
regional priority, the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and
Dialogue and the Organization of Black Sea Economic
Cooperation. For their part, Germany and France have
expressed concern that Eastern Partnership will be viewed as
a stepping stone toward EU membership, an effect Polish
Foreign Minister Sikorski in fact welcomed in May 2008.
France, Spain, Italy and Greece favor the Union for the
Mediterranean, initiated by Paris on 13 July 2008, over
Eastern Partnership. Slovakia and Hungary tend to prioritize
efforts in the Balkans. Poloff spoke on 3 March with Andor
David, a Balkans expert with the Hungarian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, who claimed that Budapest was indeed
concerned that focusing on the Eastern Partnership risks
taking attention away from the Balkans. David cynically
viewed the Eastern Partnership as an effort by Central
European states to prevent all of the EU's neighborhood

BRUSSELS 00000331 003 OF 003


policy funds from going to Mediterranean initiatives. Such
competition will come to a head when time to allocate
resources, particularly given the global economic slowdown.
An additional dimension to the funding concerns comes from
domestic constituents, even among member states that support
Eastern Partnership. A Czech Member of the European
Parliament recently told Mission officials that convincing
local constituents of the value of fully funding neighborhood
policy initiatives is a hard sell, as voters want to see EU
funds spent on EU citizens directly.


7. (C) EU External Relations Commissioner Benita
Ferrero-Waldner on 23 February unsuccessfully called on EU
foreign ministers to agree to increase the Eastern
Partnership budget by some $440 million (350 million Euro).
She justified the request by pointing to the Russian-Georgian
conflict, the recent gas crisis, and the need to stabilize
the political and economic situations of the EU's eastern
neighbors. French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner spoke
out against the request for additional funds, declaring EU
members had already agreed to give two-thirds of their
neighborhood policy budget to Mediterranean countries, and
one-third to Eastern Partnership. Even though Kouchner
acknowledged that the current budget of some $19 million (15
million Euro) a year earmarked for the each of the six
eastern countries was insufficient to have a real impact,
especially considering the plight of Ukraine's economy, he
opposed increasing the Eastern Partnership's budget.
Kaczynski also pointed to the controversy Kouchner stirred
when he suggested that Russia and Turkey also be involved in
some Eastern Partnership initiatives, so that Russia does not
conclude it is being surrounded. Czech Foreign Minister
Karel Schwarzenberg responded to journalists on this issue
with what some EU observers interpreted as sarcasm, saying,
"We have nothing against a third country taking part in
projects - not only Russia and Turkey, but maybe also Japan,
the United States or China. Why not? We are open to
cooperation with many countries." (REF C)


8. (C) Comment: The Eastern Partnership Initiative
represents the most successful example of how new Central
European member states have been able to influence EU foreign
policy. Moreover, it is a good model of the type of
coalition building that is needed to win EU support for
future initiatives. Poland, Sweden, and the other member
states that prioritize the Eastern Partnership Initiative
must still ensure that this initiative has adequate funding
to effectively advance economic and political stability on
the EU's eastern borders. To ensure success, Eastern
Partnership's advocates might be tempted to take their
coalition building efforts outside of the EU for added
support, to include the United States. End comment.

MURRAY


.